Briony Quinn
About Briony Quinn
Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of DiamondRock Hospitality (DRH) since April 2024; age 52; B.S. in Accounting with a finance minor from Providence College; former CPA. Responsibilities include capital markets, accounting, tax, FP&A, IR, internal audit, HR, and insurance placement . Company performance over 2024: revenues $1.130B (+5.1% YoY), Hotel Adjusted EBITDA $318.6M (+5.8% YoY), Adjusted FFO/share $1.01 (+8.6% YoY), comparable RevPAR $205.15 (+2.6% YoY) . PSU program’s relative TSR outcome for awards ending Feb-2025 ranked 60th percentile, but with negative absolute TSR the payout was capped at 100% of target .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| DiamondRock Hospitality | Assistant Controller | 2007 | Entry point to DRH finance leadership pipeline |
| DiamondRock Hospitality | VP & Corporate Controller | 2008 | Built reporting controls and corporate accounting processes |
| DiamondRock Hospitality | Chief Accounting Officer | 2014 | Led SEC reporting, accounting policy, internal controls |
| DiamondRock Hospitality | SVP & Treasurer | 2018 | Managed capital markets, liquidity, insurance placement |
| DiamondRock Hospitality | EVP, CFO & Treasurer | 2024–present | Oversees finance suite, capital allocation, IR, internal audit |
| Meristar Hospitality Corporation | VP Finance & Accounting | Not disclosed | Public lodging REIT finance leadership |
| Arthur Andersen; Beers & Cutler | Audit/consulting roles | Not disclosed | External audit, advisory grounding |
External Roles
- None disclosed for Quinn in the proxy; no public boards listed .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | — | $450,000 (annual rate) | $500,000 |
| Salary Paid ($) | — | $435,417 | — |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | — | 100% | — |
| Actual Cash Incentive Paid ($) | — | $638,634 | — |
| Actual Payout (% of Target) | — | 141.9% | — |
| 401(k) Match ($) | — | $13,800 | — |
- Note: Proxy biographical section states Quinn has served as EVP, CFO since April 2024 , while a footnote in the base salary table references “promoted to CFO on April 15, 2025,” likely a scrivener’s error; compensation tables and NEO list reflect 2024 promotion .
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Payout Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hotel Adjusted EBITDA | 50% | $260.7M | $306.7M | $352.7M | $318.6M | Over target; contributes to 141.9% joint payout |
| Adjusted FFO per Share | 20% | $0.83 | $0.98 | $1.12 | $1.04 | Over target; contributes to 141.9% joint payout |
| GRESB Real Estate Assessment | 2% | 80 | 82 | 84 | 86 | Over max |
| GRESB Public Disclosure | 2% | 80 | 82 | 84 | 98 | Over max |
| ISS Governance Score (lower better) | 2% | 5 | 4 | 3 | 1 | Better than max |
| ISS Environmental Score | 2% | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | At max |
| ISS Social Score | 2% | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | At max |
| Liquidity | 2.5% | $475M | $500M | $525M | $584.3M | Over max |
| Debt+Preferred/Gross Assets | 2.5% | 33% | 30% | 27% | 29.2% | Better than target |
| Net Debt/Adj. EBITDA | 2.5% | 4.2x | 3.8x | 3.4x | 3.5x | Better than target |
| Fixed Charge Coverage | 2.5% | 2.75x | 3.0x | 3.25x | 3.05x | Above target |
| Individual Objectives (Quinn) | 10% | — | — | — | 150% of target | Insurance placement, ALM/interest-rate risk, share repurchases, finance leadership |
- Joint objectives earned 141.9% of target for all executives . Quinn’s aggregate 2024 cash incentive was 141.9% of base salary ($638,634) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Amount/Status | Vesting/Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Stock ownership guideline | 3x base salary; compliance status: Yes | Must reach within 5 years; counts vested/time-based units (not performance) |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for executives | No short sales; no puts/calls; no pledging |
| Outstanding unvested time-based shares (as of 12/31/24) | 57,339 | Vests ratably on Feb 27, 2025/2026/2027 |
| Outstanding unearned PSUs (as of 12/31/24) | 90,330 (max potential disclosed separately) | 3-year performance; settlement at end of period |
| Prior time-based awards outstanding | 19,947 (2021 RS) | 25% vest 2/27/2025; 50% vest 2/27/2026 |
| Prior time-based awards outstanding | 8,717 (2022 RS) | Vest 2/27/2025 |
| Prior time-based awards outstanding | 24,235 (2023 RS) | Ratably 2/27/2025 and 2/27/2026 |
Upcoming vesting schedule driven by February 27 dates (2025–2027) could create incremental supply from time-based vesting events; PSUs vest only if performance goals are met at cycle end .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Quinn (EVP, CFO) |
|---|---|
| Severance trigger | Double trigger; benefits only if terminated without cause or resign with good reason; CIC requires qualifying termination |
| Cash severance (no CIC) | 2x (base salary + target bonus) |
| Cash severance (post-CIC) | 3x (base salary + target bonus) |
| Pro-rated bonus at termination | Yes, at target for year of termination |
| Benefits continuation | 18 months medical/dental/life/disability for no-cause/good reason |
| Equity vesting on death/disability | Immediate vesting of unvested time-based RS/LTIP; PSUs vest at target |
| Equity on termination (no CIC) | Time-based RS/LTIP immediate vesting; PSUs vest at target |
| Equity on CIC | PSUs determined through CIC date; continue service-vesting unless unassumed or later involuntary termination (accelerates) |
| Retirement (eligible) | Continued vesting of RS/LTIP/PSUs; no cash severance or benefits |
| Clawback | SEC Rule 10D-1 compliant clawback adopted Oct-2-2023; 3-year lookback |
| Insider trading restrictions | No hedging, short sales, or pledging permitted |
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 operating and balance sheet outcomes included liquidity $584.3M, net debt/Adj. EBITDA 3.5x, and equity repurchases of 3.1M shares at $8.33; strategic capital allocation and asset management progress highlighted .
- 2025 cadence: DRH raised the midpoint of 2025 Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted FFO guidance and continued share repurchases; Quinn is CFO contact and signatory on results disclosures .
- Q2 2025: Quinn emphasized refinancing to an unsecured capital structure, no secured debt, no maturities until 2029 including extensions, and active share repurchases as a preferred capital allocation in current environment .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Majority-at-risk pay: For NEOs, long-term equity is a substantial share of target pay; 2025 increased performance-based weighting to 60% of LTI, all PSUs tied to relative TSR over 3 years .
- No stock options; full-value shares only; negative TSR cap reduces PSU payouts if absolute TSR is negative even with strong relative performance .
- Strong governance features: clawback, anti-hedging/pledging, meaningful stock ownership requirements (3x salary for non-CEO executives) .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- Say-on-Pay approval: 96% support at 2024 annual meeting .
- Independent compensation consultant FW Cook; program regularly benchmarked against lodging REIT peers; mix adjusted to increase performance-based alignment in 2025 .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Pledging prohibited; hedging prohibited; reduces misalignment risk .
- Double-trigger CIC terms; no tax gross-ups disclosed; clawback policy in effect .
- No stock options or repricing; mitigates underwater option risk .
- Director independence and governance practices robust; committee oversight in place .
Investment Implications
- Strong pay-for-performance architecture: Quinn’s 2024 payout exceeded target due to overachievement on EBITDA, FFO/share, liquidity and ESG/governance objectives; 2025 LTI tilt toward 100% TSR-based PSUs should increase alignment with shareholders and reduce discretionary outcomes .
- Insider selling pressure near vest dates: Significant time-based tranches vesting on Feb 27, 2025/2026/2027 could create incremental supply; however, anti-hedging/pledging plus ownership requirements temper misalignment risk; PSUs vesting remain contingent on 3-year TSR performance .
- Retention economics: 2x severance (3x post-CIC) and benefit continuation provide retention stability; double-trigger CIC reduces windfall risk; immediate vesting provisions at termination mean equity overhang is controlled but could accelerate on involuntary events .
- Execution signal: Quinn’s objectives included managing interest-rate risk, executing share repurchases, and capital allocation strategy; continued balance sheet optimization and repurchase activity indicate disciplined capital markets execution under her leadership .