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Charles P. Ferry

Charles P. Ferry

Chief Executive Officer at DUOS TECHNOLOGIES GROUP
CEO
Executive
Board

About Charles P. Ferry

Charles P. Ferry, age 58, is Chief Executive Officer of Duos Technologies Group, Inc. (DUOT) since September 1, 2020 and has served as a director since November 19, 2020 . He holds an undergraduate degree from Brigham Young University and has a 26-year U.S. Army career with distinguished combat leadership, followed by senior operating roles in defense contracting and power generation . Company performance under his tenure includes FY2023–FY2024 total shareholder return of $145 and $206 respectively on a $100 base (per SEC “Pay vs. Performance”), and significant revenue expansion in 2025 driven by Duos Energy’s AMA with New APR: Q3 2025 revenue up 112% year-over-year to $6.9M and nine-month 2025 revenue up 202% to $17.6M, with improved gross margins .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
APR EnergyChief Executive Officer2018–2020Led global fast-track power operations
APR EnergyPresident & Chief Operating Officer2016–2018Operational leadership prior to CEO role
General Dynamics (ARMA Global)General Manager2014–2016Directed IT engineering and logistics services
ARMA Global CorporationVice President2010–2014Growth and operations pre-acquisition
Lockheed MartinDirector, Business Development & Operations2009–2010Business development and operations leadership
U.S. ArmyMultiple command/operations roles1980s–2000s48 months combat; Bronze Star (Somalia), Silver Star (Iraq)

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
New APR Energy, LLCExecutive Chairman; Board Member2024–presentDual role alongside DUOT; related party
Sawgrass APR Holdings, LLC (Sawgrass Parent)Board representation2024–presentDUOT holds 5% non-voting equity; related party

Fixed Compensation

Item202320242025 Agreement Terms
Base Salary ($)$265,000 $276,263 $400,000 (annual; subject to review)
Target Bonus (% of Salary)Up to $150,000 (criteria-based) None disclosed as paid Up to 100% of base; payable April and October, based on revenue, profitability, KPIs

Performance Compensation

ComponentGrant/TermsMetricWeightingTargetActualPayout/Vesting
Restricted Stock522,889 shares granted Jan 1, 2025 under 2021 Plan; three-year cliff vest; all prior options canceled Revenue, profitability, KPIs govern annual bonus (not RSU vest) Not disclosedNot disclosedNot disclosedRSUs vest Dec 31, 2027; accelerated on change of control, death/disability, termination without cause, or resignation for good reason
Annual Performance BonusUp to 100% of base salary Revenue, profitability, KPIs Not disclosedNot disclosedNot disclosedTwo installments (April/October) post Board approval

Note: DEF 14A footnote lists 552,889 restricted shares vesting Jan 1, 2028 for Ferry; the Feb 4, 2025 8-K contemporaneously discloses 522,889 RSUs vesting Dec 31, 2027. Analysts should reconcile with company IR; both figures are presented as disclosed .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

MetricDetail
Total beneficial ownership536,036 shares; 4.60% of outstanding common stock as of Apr 4, 2025
Composition (per proxy footnote)Includes 552,889 restricted shares subject to three-year cliff vest (vesting Jan 1, 2028), 3,374 shares owned individually, and 9,773 shares in joint account with spouse
RSU grant (2025 agreement)522,889 restricted shares with three-year cliff vest (Dec 31, 2027); prior options canceled
Ownership guidelinesNot disclosed in proxy; Compensation Committee oversees clawback policy
Pledging/HedgingNo pledging/hedging disclosure identified in the proxy sections reviewed

Employment Terms

TermFerry Agreement (effective Jan 1, 2025)
Contract length & renewal3-year term; auto-renews for successive 1-year periods unless 60 days’ notice of non-renewal
SeveranceUp to 12 months of base salary (or through end of current term for resignation with good reason) if terminated early
Change-of-controlAccelerated vesting of restricted shares upon change of control (single trigger), and acceleration on death/disability, termination without cause, or resignation with good reason
Non-compete1-year post-termination covenant not to compete
Non-solicit (employees/customers)1-year post-termination non-solicit of employees and customers
Dual rolesAuthorized to concurrently serve as Executive Chairman/CEO of New APR Energy; must report potential conflicts to DUOT Board

Board Governance

  • Ferry serves as CEO and management director; independent committee chairs are: Audit—Ned Mavrommatis; Compensation—James Craig Nixon; Corporate Governance & Nominating—James Craig Nixon .
  • The Board held eight meetings in 2024; independence affirmed for Nixon, Mavrommatis, and Lonegro under Nasdaq rules .
  • Committee oversight includes a policy for recovery of erroneously awarded compensation (clawback) administered by the Compensation Committee .

Director Compensation (Board-wide)

  • Independent directors: $40,000 annual retainer; +$10,000 for committee chair; 40% cash / 60% stock or options (member election; up to 100% stock) .
  • 2024 director compensation examples: Lonegro $40,000 (stock); Nixon $50,000 (stock); Mavrommatis $50,000 (cash and stock) .

Performance & Track Record

YearPEO “Compensation Actually Paid” ($)Company TSR (Value of $100)Net Loss ($000)
2023$675,503 $145 $(11,242)
2024$276,263 $206 $(10,765)
  • 2025 operating momentum: Q3 2025 revenue $6.88M (+112% YoY), nine months $17.6M (+202% YoY), with gross margin expansion tied to AMA services and equity income from 5% stake in Sawgrass Parent .

Related Party Transactions and Dual-Role Implications

  • DUOT entered an AMA with New APR (affiliates of Fortress Investment Group) on Dec 31, 2024; Ferry serves as Executive Chairman and board member at New APR; DUOT received 5% non-voting equity in Sawgrass Parent; New APR covers 50% of Ferry’s DUOT compensation (and certain other management compensation), while DUOT continues to pay full compensation—a governance sensitivity requiring strict oversight .
  • DUOT policy requires independent director approval for related party transactions; Board independence for committee leadership is affirmed .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Shift from options to RSUs: All prior Ferry options canceled in 2025 and replaced with a large RSU grant with three-year cliff vest—reduces near-term sell pressure but introduces single-trigger CoC vesting acceleration .
  • Increase in guaranteed compensation: Base increased from $265k (2023) and $276k (2024 paid) to $400k (2025 agreement), with higher at-risk bonus potential (up to 100% of base) aligned to revenue/profitability/KPIs .
  • Clawback: Compensation Committee administers a recovery policy for erroneously awarded compensation .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Ferry’s sizable RSU grant and 4.60% beneficial ownership indicate skin-in-the-game; three-year cliff vest discourages short-term selling, though the proxy footnote vs. 8-K grant size discrepancy warrants confirmation with IR .
  • Incentives vs. performance: Variable bonus tied to revenue/profitability/KPIs, and 2025 results show strong growth under the AMA, suggesting near-term bonus realization potential if Board-approved targets are met .
  • Governance risk: Dual role at New APR and related party economics (50% compensation sharing, equity interest) heighten conflict-of-interest sensitivity; independence and related party oversight frameworks are in place but require continued monitoring .
  • Change-of-control dynamics: Single-trigger vesting acceleration could create event-driven upside for Ferry but may dilute pay-for-performance rigor; severance capped at up to 12 months base mitigates parachute inflation risk .
  • Signal: The pivot to RSUs, clawback policy, and bonus criteria suggest a balance of retention and performance focus; given 2025 revenue/gross margin trends, compensation outcomes may align with shareholder value creation if execution sustains .