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David Rosato

Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer at Eastern Bankshares
Executive

About David Rosato

David Rosato (age 64) is Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Eastern Bankshares, Inc. and CFO of Eastern Bank, joining on August 1, 2024 after four decades in regional/community banking; he holds a BS in Business & Economics and an MBA (University of Maryland) and is a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) . Prior roles include CFO at Berkshire Hills and nine years as CFO at People’s United, where assets grew from ~$14B to ~$65B prior to its sale to M&T, underscoring deep ALM, M&A and integration experience . In 2024, Eastern’s Operating Net Income reached $192.6M vs $163.2M in 2023 (+18%), funding MIP at 113% of target; for the 2022–2024 PSU cycle, relative TSR was below threshold while relative EPS growth ranked 76th percentile, yielding 75% of target earned—reinforcing a pay-for-performance tilt tied to core earnings and multi-year metrics .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Berkshire Hills Bancorp / Berkshire BankSenior EVP & Chief Financial Officer2023–2024 (most recent prior role)Public bank CFO experience; led finance through 2023–2024; broadened regional bank CFO toolkit .
People’s United Financial, Inc.Senior EVP & Chief Financial Officer (9 years); earlier senior finance roles (15+ years total)15+ years (incl. 9 as CFO)Asset growth from ~$14B to ~$65B; led finance through multi-decade expansion and sale to M&T Bank .
Webster Financial CorporationSenior Vice President & TreasurerNot disclosedTreasury leadership; balance sheet, liquidity and capital markets responsibilities .
M&T Bank CorporationSenior Vice President, Asset/Liability ManagerNot disclosedALM leadership; interest rate risk and balance sheet strategy .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleStatus/YearsNotes
NASDAQ Exchange BoardBoard member (Regulatory Oversight Committee)CurrentCapital markets/regulatory oversight exposure .
Returned.comBoard memberCurrentAI-powered commerce solutions; tech/fintech adjacency .
Federal Home Loan Bank of BostonBoard member (former), chaired Finance CommitteeFormerDeep funding markets and bank liquidity governance experience .

Fixed Compensation

Item (2024 unless noted)Value
Base salary rate (upon hire)$550,000
Base salary earned (prorated for 2024)$205,192
Target bonus (MIP) % of salary65%
Target bonus ($)$357,500
Actual MIP paid (2024; prorated)$167,771
One-time sign-on cash$200,000 (paid ~90 days post-hire)
Auto allowance$8,400 per year

Performance Compensation

2024 MIP – Company Performance Framework and Outcome

MetricWeightThresholdTargetMaximumActualFunding (% of Target)
Operating Net Income100%$144.4M$180.5M$225.6M$192.6M113%
Executive2024 MIP Target ($)ProrationPayout ($)Payout (% of Target)
David Rosato$357,500 Prorated (Aug. start) $167,771 113%

Notes:

  • 2024 MIP used a single company metric—Operating Net Income—selected for clarity during merger year; payouts linearly interpolate between thresholds; below threshold pays 0% .

Equity LTIP Design and 2024 Grants

AwardGrant DateUnits/Target (#)Grant-Date Fair Value ($)Design/Vesting
RSU (annual)09/03/202434,070$569,991Vests in three equal annual installments on grant anniversaries, subject to service .
PSU (TSR) (annual)09/03/202419,725 (target)$213,4253-year performance (2024–2026) vs KRX banks: 25%–150% payout; capped at target if absolute TSR is negative; vests around Mar 1, 2027 subject to performance .
LTIP Target (salary multiple)2024100% of salary$550,000 total at target (60% PSUs / 40% RSUs)Target split $330,000 PSUs / $220,000 RSUs; Rosato’s 2024 awards used $16.73 grant price .
One-time RSU (new-hire)Q3 2024N/A$350,000Vests in three equal annual installments; forfeited on resignation; accelerated if terminated without cause in first two years .

Outstanding Unvested Equity (12/31/2024)

AwardUnvested Units (#)Year-End Value ($)
RSU – 202434,070$587,708 (at $17.25)
PSU – TSR 20244,931 (reflected at threshold)$85,064 (at $17.25)

Multi-year PSU backdrop:

  • For the 2022–2024 cycle (pre-dating Rosato), relative TSR was below threshold (0% earned on TSR), relative EPS growth was 76th percentile (150% earned on EPS); overall 75% of target earned and vested, illustrating leverage to multi-metric outcomes .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership (as of 03/14/2025)AmountFormOwnership %
Common shares20,000Held indirectly by spouse’s trust <1% (213,500,243 shares outstanding)

Additional alignment and risk controls:

  • Stock ownership guidelines: CFO required to hold 3x salary; compliance window is the longer of five years from September 2021 or from becoming a management committee member; all NEOs were on track as of 12/31/2024 .
  • Clawback: Policy compliant with SEC/Nasdaq to recoup incentive compensation upon restatements .
  • Hedging/pledging: Prohibited for employees; Section 16 officers and directors generally barred from margin and pledging .
  • Options: None outstanding or exercised by NEOs in 2024, limiting leverage-driven risk .
  • Nonqualified deferrals: No balances for Rosato in 2024 .

Employment Terms

TermDetail
Start dateAugust 1, 2024
Compensation package$550,000 base; 65% MIP target; 100% LTIP target; $350,000 new-hire RSU; $200,000 sign-on cash; $8,400 auto allowance .
MIP mechanics0–150% payout; 2024 measure = Operating Net Income; Rosato’s 2024 award prorated for hire date .
Change-in-Control (CiC)Double-trigger; lump sum equal to 2x (base salary + greater of target bonus or 3-year average bonus); 18 months COBRA-equivalent cash; 280G best-net cutback .
Triggers/definitionsGood Reason includes material diminution, compensation cuts, >25-mile relocation, or material breach; detailed CIc definitions included .
Restrictive covenantsNon-compete 12 months; non-solicit 24 months (as part of CiC/separation framework) .
Severance outside CiCNone disclosed for Rosato as of 12/31/2024 (table shows “—” for without cause/for good reason) .
Equity acceleration on CiCRSUs/PSUs treatment as shown in potential payments table below; RSUs accelerated value based on $17.25 at 12/31/2024; PSUs shown at target for illustration .
Related partyCompany disclosed no direct/indirect material interest in related-party transactions for Rosato .

Potential Payments Upon Termination/Change-in-Control (as of 12/31/2024)

ScenarioSalaryMIPRSUPSU – TSRMedical
Change in Control (Double Trigger)$1,100,000$357,500$587,708$340,256$20,325
Without Cause / For Good Reason
Death/Disability$357,500$587,708
Retirement$357,500

Notes:

  • CiC salary multiple for Rosato = 200% of base; MIP component equals 2024 target; medical represents 18 months of employer cost; RSU/PSU values computed at $17.25 as of 12/31/2024 per proxy methodology .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment with measured retention: 2024 MIP tethered to Operating Net Income (delivered 113% funding), while LTIP shifts to 60% PSUs (relative TSR with cap in down markets) and 40% RSUs; Rosato’s 2024 grant followed this mix, aligning upside with multi-year market-relative outcomes and downside protection via caps .
  • Retention and near-term selling pressure: The $350,000 new-hire RSU is forfeitable upon resignation and accelerates if terminated without cause within two years, reducing near-term voluntary turnover risk; time-based RSUs vest in three equal annual tranches, creating predictable potential liquidity windows but modest pressure given current beneficial ownership (20,000 shares) .
  • Risk controls and governance: No options, a robust clawback, anti-hedging/pledging, and a double-trigger CiC with 280G best-net mitigation limit misalignment and shareholder-unfriendly outcomes; CFO stock ownership guideline of 3x salary further tightens alignment over the compliance window .
  • Execution history and integration credibility: Prior CFO tenure at People’s United (asset growth ~$14B→$65B) and sale to M&T, plus Berkshire CFO experience, bolster Rosato’s integration and balance sheet credibility amid Eastern’s merger activity—supportive for value creation and disciplined capital/ALM execution .
  • Shareholder feedback: Say‑on‑pay support of 85.5% in 2024 suggests investor acceptance of the compensation construct as redesigned around variable pay and performance metrics .