Quincy L. Miller
About Quincy L. Miller
Quincy L. Miller (age 50) is President and Chief Operating Officer of Eastern Bankshares, Inc. (EBC) and Vice Chair, President and COO of Eastern Bank, promoted in July 2024 after joining Eastern in 2016 and becoming President of the Bank in 2017; he oversees Consumer Banking, Credit, Technology, Operations, and HR and co-leads overall strategy with the Executive Chair and CEO . Education and credentials: B.A. in economics and business from Lafayette College; graduate of Consumer Bankers Association Executive Banking School; board roles include Blue Cross Blue Shield of MA, Boys and Girls Club of Boston, and Nectar Community Investments; founding member of The New Commonwealth Fund; trustee of Lafayette College . 2024 performance compensation was primarily tied to Operating Net Income (MIP) and TSR-based PSUs versus KBW Regional Banking Index peers (KRX); Operating Net Income achieved $192.6M vs $180.5M target (113% pool), while prior 2022–2024 PSUs paid at 75% of target driven by 150% for relative EPS growth and 0% for relative TSR below threshold .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Citizens Bank (MA) | President; President, Business Banking division | Not disclosed | Led state franchise and business banking; predecessor to Eastern leadership |
| M&T Bank (NYC) | Consumer banking | 1997 start | Foundation in consumer banking; subsequent senior roles |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blue Cross Blue Shield of MA | Director | Not disclosed | Governance at major payer; cross-industry perspective |
| Boys and Girls Club of Boston | Director | Not disclosed | Community impact and talent pipeline |
| Nectar Community Investments | Director | Not disclosed | Community investment oversight |
| The New Commonwealth Fund | Founding member | Not disclosed | DEI and philanthropic leadership |
| Lafayette College | Board of Trustees | Not disclosed | Institutional governance and alumni network |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary earned ($) | $587,500 | $590,000 | $628,462 |
| Year-end base salary rate ($) | Not disclosed | $590,000 | $650,000 (raised to $610,000 then $650,000 on 7/13/24) |
| Target MIP (% of salary) | 60% | 60% | 75% |
| Actual MIP payout ($) | $385,900 | $866,942 (includes legacy LTIP cash matured) | $531,494 (113% of target; prorated across salary steps) |
Performance Compensation
Annual MIP Design and Results (FY2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout factor | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Net Income | 100% | $144.4M (50%) | $180.5M (100%) | $225.6M (150%) | $192.6M | 113% of target | Annual cash |
LTIP Equity Mix and 2024 Grants
| Element | Mix | Grant date | Target units/value | Vesting | Performance calibration |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (TSR vs KRX) | 60% of LTI | 3/1/2024 | 7,945 target PSUs; $343,849 grant-date fair value | Cliff vest after 3-year period ending 12/31/2026, settles ~3/1/2027 | 25% at 25th percentile; 100% at 50th; 150% at 75th+; capped at target if absolute TSR negative |
| RSUs | 40% of LTI | 3/1/2024 | 21,186 RSUs; $271,393 grant-date fair value | 1/3 annually on each 3/1 anniversary (2025, 2026, 2027) |
One-time PSU cycle (2022–2024) – Earned and Vested March 2025
| Measure | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Outcome | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Relative TSR vs KRX | 50% | 25th pct | 50th pct | 75th+ pct | Below threshold | 0% |
| Relative EPS Growth vs KRX | 50% | 25th pct | 50th pct | 75th+ pct | 76th percentile | 150% |
| Aggregate earned | — | — | — | — | — | 75% of target (Miller: 53,367 earned vs 71,156 target) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 132,061 shares (<1% of outstanding) |
| Ownership components | 43,629 direct; 83,240 in IRAs; 1,280 spouse’s IRA; 3,912 ESOP |
| Shares outstanding (record date) | 213,500,243 |
| Unvested RSUs (by grant) | 2022 RSUs: 42,695; 2023 RSUs: 7,550; 2024 RSUs: 21,186 (market values at $17.25 as of 12/31/24: $736,489; $130,238; $365,459) |
| Unvested PSUs | 2022 PSUs (EPS): 8,895; 2022 PSUs (TSR): 8,895; 2023 PSUs (TSR): 2,831; 2024 PSUs (TSR): 7,945 (market values at threshold, $17.25 as of 12/31/24: $153,430; $153,430; $48,835; $137,047) |
| Stock ownership guidelines | President/CFO: 3x base salary; all NEOs on track to meet; 1-year holding period for 50% of vested shares until compliant |
| Hedging/pledging policy | Hedging prohibited; Section 16 officers and directors generally prohibited from pledging/margin accounts |
| Options | Company has not historically issued options; maintains policy on timing if used in future |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Executive Severance (no change-in-control) | If terminated without cause: lump sum 200% of base salary + prorated MIP eligibility; non-solicit of customers/employees for 24 months; COBRA: Miller receives lump sum equal to 24x Company’s monthly contributions to his group health/dental premiums; monthly auto allowance $700 and country club membership reimbursement while employed |
| Change-in-Control (double trigger) | Lump sum severance multiple: 300% of base salary plus greater of current-year annual bonus or 3-year average bonus; COBRA cash payments for up to 18 months equal to employer cost if elected (general terms for NEOs; medical amounts vary) |
| “Good reason” definition | Material diminution of duties; material comp reduction; relocation >25 miles; Company breach |
| Potential Payments (as of 12/31/24) | Without cause/Good Reason: Salary $1,300,000; MIP $487,500; Medical $— |
| Potential Payments (Death/Disability) | MIP $487,500; RSU acceleration $1,232,185; PSUs shown at target for illustration; medical $— |
| Potential Payments (Change-in-Control, double trigger) | Salary $1,950,000; MIP $487,500; RSU $1,232,185; PSU-EPS $613,721; PSU-TSR $1,357,247; Medical $— |
| Clawback | Recoup incentive-based comp for accounting restatements under SEC/Nasdaq rules |
| Tax gross-ups | None for parachute payments; cutback only if net-after-tax benefit is higher |
Multi-year Compensation Summary (SCT)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | $587,500 | $590,000 | $628,462 |
| Bonus ($) | $— | $— | $— |
| Non-Equity Incentive + Legacy LTIP Cash ($) | $385,900 | $866,942 | $531,494 |
| Stock Awards (RSU/PSU ASC 718) ($) | $3,002,449 | $292,046 | $615,241 |
| Change in Pension Value/Nonqualified Earnings ($) | $20,111 | $196,629 | $201,482 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $114,166 | $41,241 | $57,453 |
| Total ($) | $4,110,126 | $1,986,858 | $2,034,132 |
| Nonqualified deferred comp (aggregate balance; agg. earnings) | —; — | —; — | $2,147,764 balance; $377,423 earnings |
Governance and Compensation Program Signals
- Compensation governance practices include heavy variable pay emphasis, stock ownership guidelines, double-trigger CiC, clawback, anti-hedging/pledging, no tax gross-ups, and no repricing of underwater equity; 2024 say-on-pay support was 85.5% .
- 2024 compensation benchmarking used a 21-company peer set across U.S. regional banks, with LTI mix shifted to 60% PSUs to increase performance linkage .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Miller’s sizable unvested RSUs and PSUs across 2022–2024 cycles, with RSUs vesting through 2027 and PSUs tied to 3-year TSR vs KRX, create retention and performance alignment; anti-hedging/pledging and 3x salary ownership guideline strengthen alignment with shareholders .
- Near-term selling pressure: Scheduled RSU vesting from 2024 and remaining tranches from 2022/2023 imply potential incremental supply around annual March vest dates; PSUs have no near-term settlement until 2026–2027, contingent on TSR outcomes .
- Retention risk: Severance protections (200% base+prorated MIP) and double-trigger CiC (300% multiple) reduce voluntary departure risk; however, cash severance terms and sizable accelerated equity under CiC could create event-driven incentives; non-compete/non-solicit at 24 months is a strong retention constraint .
- Pay-for-performance: 2024 cash incentive tied solely to Operating Net Income (met at 113% payout), and PSU framework linked to relative TSR with caps under negative absolute TSR, suggest disciplined, shareholder-oriented incentive design; prior 2022–2024 PSUs paying at 75% reflects mixed TSR vs EPS performance—executive execution benefited EPS growth but lagged peers on TSR .