Mark O'Neill
About Mark O'Neill
Mark A. O’Neill is Senior Vice President and Chief Lending Officer of Eagle Bancorp Montana (Opportunity Bank), age 53, serving as CLO since October 2017 after joining as Butte Market President in February 2016; he holds a B.A. in Economics from the University of Montana . In 2024, company-wide cash incentives were driven by ROAA and efficiency ratio; corporate achievement was 37% (ROAA target 0.72% vs actual 0.53%; efficiency ratio target 77.30% vs actual 81.55%), while O’Neill’s payout was on a separate production-based plan with $151,467 earned; effective January 1, 2025 his pay structure changed (details not disclosed) . The company prohibits hedging and pledging and has a clawback policy; executive CIC equity will be double-trigger under the proposed 2025 Incentive Plan .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eagle Bancorp Montana / Opportunity Bank | Senior Vice President / Chief Lending Officer | Oct 2017–present | Oversees lending; promoted from Market President |
| Eagle Bancorp Montana / Opportunity Bank | Butte Market President | Feb 2016–Oct 2017 | Market leadership and production |
| First Citizens Bank | Lending and management roles | — | Various lending/management roles |
| Wells Fargo | Lending and management roles | — | Various lending/management roles |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Silver Bow Kiwanis | Past Board Member | — | Community engagement |
| Butte Local Development Corporation | Past Board Member | — | Local development involvement |
| Leadership Montana | Member (Class of 2024) | 2024 | Leadership cohort |
| Montana Chamber’s Prospects | Volunteer | — | Volunteer service |
Fixed Compensation
| Component (2024) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | $164,995 |
| All Other Compensation (total) | $68,785 |
| 401(k) Company Match | $6,537 |
| Life and Medical Insurance | $11,328 |
| Profit Sharing Contribution | $19,405 |
| Salary Continuation Agreement Benefit (recognized) | $23,147 |
| ESOP | $2,022 |
| PTO Cash Out Program | $6,346 |
Performance Compensation
| Metric/Plan | Weighting | Target | Actual | Achievement/Payout | Vesting/Timing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate ROAA (CIP) | 50% (corporate component) | 0.72% | 0.53% | 0.74 (factor) | Annual cash (2024) |
| Corporate Efficiency Ratio (CIP) | 50% (corporate component) | 77.30% | 81.55% | 0.00 (no payout) | Annual cash (2024) |
| Corporate Component Total (CIP) | — | — | — | 37% | Annual cash (2024) |
| Individual Goals (O’Neill) | — | Production-based quarterly formula | Loan production-based | 100% (individual achievement) | Quarterly cash (2024); actual payout $151,467 |
| 2025 LTIP Structure | N/A | 50% performance-vesting; 50% time-vesting | Financial metrics over 3-year period | N/A | Under 2011 Plan or proposed 2025 Plan |
For 2024, Mr. O’Neill received quarterly incentives based on production; effective January 1, 2025 his pay structure changed (undisclosed) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (shares) | 13,541 (includes ESOP) |
| Percent of Class | <1% (per proxy table; 7,977,177 shares outstanding) |
| Unvested Restricted Stock (12/31/2024) | 934 shares; market value $14,318 at $15.33/share |
| Options | None granted to NEOs; Company has not granted options in recent years |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers |
| Ownership Guidelines | Maintained for CEO and directors (no explicit NEO guideline disclosed for O’Neill) |
Vesting Schedule (Outstanding Awards)
| Grant Date | Award Type | Shares Granted | Vesting Schedule | Remaining Unvested (12/31/2024) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nov 1, 2023 | Restricted Stock | 1,401 | Ratable over 3 years through Nov 1, 2026 | 934 | Market value based on 12/31/2024 close $15.33 |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Change-in-Control Agreement (executive officers other than CEO) | Double-trigger cash severance equal to the sum of annual salary + most recent incentive bonus if terminated without cause or resign for good reason within 4 months prior to, in connection with, or within 18 months after a CIC; 12 months COBRA paid; 2-year agreement auto-renews in 1-year increments unless non-renewed with 60 days notice |
| Equity Treatment on CIC (2025 Plan) | If awards assumed/replaced and then involuntary termination or good reason resignation, performance awards vest at greater of target or actual annualized performance; service-based options vest with 1-year post-termination exercise; if not assumed, all awards vest at CIC and may be cashed out; “double trigger” rationale stated |
| Clawback Policy | Recoupment of certain executive compensation upon accounting restatements due to material noncompliance with financial reporting requirements |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors and executive officers |
| Salary Continuation Agreement (nonqualified retirement) | Annual retirement benefit at age 65 increased from $38,500 to $59,500 via amendment dated Nov 1, 2024 (Bank-maintained plan) |
Company Performance During O’Neill’s Tenure (context)
| Metric | FY 2019 | FY 2020 | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($) | $23,841,000* | $49,067,000* | $46,183,000* | $26,220,000* | $22,722,000* | $17,776,000* |
| Net Income ($) | $10,872,000 | $21,206,000 | $14,419,000 | $10,701,000 | $10,056,000 | $9,778,000* |
| Values with asterisks were retrieved from S&P Global. |
Compensation Governance, Shareholder Feedback, and Peer Design
- Say-on-Pay support was approximately 70.7% at the 2024 Annual Meeting; in response, the Compensation Committee engaged Meridian to revise programs, enhancing disclosure and shifting LTIP so that 50% of awards will be performance-based starting in 2025 .
- The Company states it engages an independent compensation consultant, prohibits hedging/pledging, and maintains a clawback policy; options repricing is prohibited under the 2025 plan .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: O’Neill’s 2024 incentive was heavily production-based ($151k vs $165k base), implying a high variable pay mix that rewards loan origination; monitor for 2025 structure changes and the introduction of PSUs (performance shares) that could better align with profitability/returns over a 3-year horizon .
- Selling pressure risk from vesting: Unvested RSUs total 934 shares as of 12/31/2024, a modest level relative to float; vest through 11/1/2026, suggesting limited mechanical selling pressure from his equity vesting cadence .
- Retention/CIC economics: Double-trigger CIC severance (1x salary + most recent incentive) plus equity acceleration under the 2025 Plan if not assumed (or on qualifying termination if assumed) provide retention but limit windfalls; COBRA for 12 months reduces transition friction .
- Governance risk mitigants: Prohibitions on hedging/pledging and an explicit clawback reduce alignment risk; however, 2024 say-on-pay support of 70.7% suggests ongoing shareholder scrutiny of executive pay design and outcomes .