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John Yung

President of International and Cabot Credit Management at ENCORE CAPITAL GROUPENCORE CAPITAL GROUP
Executive

About John Yung

John Yung, age 60, is President of International and Cabot Credit Management at Encore Capital Group (ECPG). He joined Encore in 2015 and has served in his current role since May 2023, following his tenure as Senior Vice President, Chief Global Strategist and Growth Officer . He holds a BA in Economics from UC Davis and an MBA in Finance and Marketing from Duke University . 2024 performance context: Encore delivered a 20% year-over-year increase in KCP Adjusted EBITDA and 16% growth in global collections; however, relative TSR for the 2022–2024 PSU cycle ranked at the 18th percentile (0% vesting), and Cabot (Europe) required restructuring actions that negatively impacted GAAP earnings—areas directly tied to Yung’s international remit .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Encore Capital GroupPresident, International and Cabot Credit ManagementSince May 2023Leads European operations; oversaw restructuring of Cabot amid challenging environment .
Encore Capital GroupSVP, Chief Global Strategist and Growth OfficerPrior to May 2023Corporate strategy and growth initiatives .

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
ZenBanx Holding Ltd.Co‑founderNot disclosedInternational fintech company acquired by Sofi .
ING Direct USAHead of Consumer Lending; Head of Customer Research & AnalyticsNot disclosedConsumer lending growth and analytics leadership .
Bank of America; MBNA; Sears Roebuck & Co.Executive rolesNot disclosedFinancial services and retail operating experience .

Fixed Compensation

  • Salary rate progression (reflects role transition and market/merit): base increased 11.5% in March 2024 to $501,750 from $450,000 at 12/31/2023 .
Metric2023 (year-end)2024 (year-end)
Base Salary Rate ($)$450,000 $501,750
% Increase11.5%
Cash Compensation20232024
Salary Paid ($)$431,082 $493,832

Performance Compensation

  • Annual bonus (KCP) mechanics: Target 100% of base; 2024 company KCP funding reduced via negative discretion from 135.9% to 120% for non-CEO NEOs; individual modifier 100% for Yung; payout 120% of target .
KCP (2024)Value
Target Bonus % of Base100.0%
Target ($)$493,832
Company Funding (pre-discretion)135.9%
Adjusted Company Funding120.0%
Individual Modifier100.0%
Actual Bonus Paid ($)$592,598
Bonus as % of Target120.0%
  • 2024 long-term equity: mix 50% RSUs / 50% PSUs (split evenly between ROIC and TSR); RSUs vest in equal thirds on Mar 9 of 2025/2026/2027; ROIC and TSR PSUs cliff vest Mar 9, 2027 based on 3-year targets .
2024 Grant TypeTarget Shares (#)Grant-Date Fair Value ($)Vesting
RSU8,973 $449,996 1/3 each Mar 9, 2025/2026/2027
ROIC PSU4,486 $224,973 Cliff on Mar 9, 2027; 0–200% vs 3-yr avg pre-tax ROIC
TSR PSU4,409 $224,991 Cliff on Mar 9, 2027; 0–150% vs S&P SmallCap 600 Financial Sector peers; capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative
  • Performance outcomes on outstanding PSU cycles: 2022 ROIC/TSR PSUs did not vest (below threshold); 2023 ROIC PSUs trending at target, 2023 TSR below threshold as of 12/31/2024 (both cliff vest Mar 9, 2026, subject to final performance); 2024 TSR below threshold as of 12/31/2024 .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Beneficial ownership: 38,715 shares (~0.17% of 23,448,221 shares outstanding) as of April 11, 2025; company reports “less than 1%” for Yung .
  • Ownership guidelines: EVP-level requires 3x base salary; all NEOs (including Yung) meet requirements; executives who have not met must retain 100% of after-tax shares until compliant .
  • Hedging and pledging: Company policy prohibits hedging, margin purchases, and pledging of Company securities; also sets blackout and other restrictions for insiders .
  • 2024 vested equity: 10,369 shares vested for Yung in 2024; value realized $520,005 .

Outstanding equity detail (as of 12/31/2024; $47.77/share used by company for market value):

AwardShares/UnitsMarket/Payout Value ($)
2022 RSU (unvested)1,194 $57,037
2023 RSU (unvested)3,162 $151,049
2023 RSU (May 15 grant; unvested)3,285 $156,924
2024 RSU (unvested)8,973 $428,640
2022 ROIC PSU (unearned)896 $42,778
2022 TSR PSU (unearned)810 $38,694
2023 ROIC PSU (unearned)2,372 $113,310
2023 TSR PSU (unearned)1,146 $54,721
2024 ROIC PSU (unearned)4,486 $214,296
2024 TSR PSU (unearned)2,204 $105,285

Key vesting dates that may influence supply/pressure:

  • RSUs: equal tranches vest on Mar 9, 2026 and Mar 9, 2027 for 2024 grants; remaining tranche on Mar 9, 2026 for the May 15, 2023 grant .
  • PSUs: 2023 cycle cliff vest Mar 9, 2026; 2024 cycle cliff vest Mar 9, 2027, subject to performance (and caps/thresholds noted above) .

Employment Terms

  • Structure: No individual employment agreement (U.S. NEOs); Yung participates in the Executive Separation Plan; also party to an International Assignment Agreement for his U.K. assignment .

Severance and change-in-control (estimated payout if event occurred 12/31/2024; includes repatriation benefits in health/other for Yung):

ScenarioSalary Multiple / CashBonus TreatmentHealth/Other ($)EquityEstimated Total ($)
Termination without Cause / Resign for Good Reason2x base salary; lump sum $1,003,500 Pro rata annual bonus; shown as actual 2024 bonus $592,598 $83,652 (incl. UK repatriation) Continued vesting for 12 months; FMV of accelerated vesting $353,928 $2,033,678
Termination in connection with Change in Control (double trigger)2x base salary; $1,003,500 Prorated target bonus + greater of 100% target or annualized YTD; $1,086,430 $83,652 Immediate vesting: time-based 100%; performance-based pro rata at greater of target or to-date; $1,055,718 $3,229,300
Death/DisabilityEquity vests (PSUs at target); $1,604,260 $1,604,260

Key definitions and policies:

  • Good Reason: material reduction in base or target bonus; material reduction in authority; relocation >35 miles without consent; and change-in-control assumption failure in Separation Plan .
  • Change in Control: >50.1% beneficial ownership, sale of substantially all assets, liquidation, or transformative merger where pre-deal holders own 50% or less post-deal (plus Board change in Separation Plan) .
  • Clawbacks: misconduct-based clawback and exchange listing-compliant erroneous pay recovery policy covering equity and cash for Section 16 officers .
  • Hedging/pledging: prohibited; no margin purchases; additional insider restrictions apply .
  • International assignment benefits for Yung (2024): housing $190,241; transportation/travel $80,626; tax preparation $54,461; tax equalization $51,420; COLA and international health insurance $48,323 (USD amounts based on average 2024 FX 1.27778 USD/GBP) .

Total Reported Compensation (Summary Compensation Table)

Component ($)20232024
Salary$431,082 $493,832
Stock Awards$746,666 $899,960
Non‑Equity Incentive (KCP)$342,978 $592,598
All Other Compensation$377,429 $435,923
Total$1,898,154 $2,422,313

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Shift and mix: 2024 target LTI split 50% RSU / 50% PSU; no options granted in program—reduces leverage but improves retention/stability; grants follow an established calendar (March 9; with off-cycle dates May 15/Aug 15/Nov 15) to avoid MNPI timing .
  • Pay for performance: KCP funding cut via negative discretion given weak GAAP due to Cabot actions; 2022 PSUs failed to vest (both ROIC and TSR), highlighting rigor; 2023 TSR currently below threshold and ROIC at target trajectory as of 12/31/2024 .
  • Governance posture: anti-hedging/anti-pledging, robust clawbacks, no excise tax gross-ups; strong 2024 Say‑on‑Pay support (~98%) .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Execution risk in Europe: Cabot required ERC reduction and exits from two underperforming markets; negative GAAP impact but intended to improve predictability; Yung led ongoing transition/restructuring in his role .
  • Relative TSR underperformance: 18th percentile for 2022–2024 cycle; 0% PSU vesting signals alignment but also market underperformance risk .
  • Insider selling pressure: 2024 vesting of 10,369 shares ($520,005); additional RSU tranches set for Mar 2026 and Mar 2027; PSU outcomes remain performance‑dependent, potentially capping or eliminating supply if thresholds are not met .
  • Alignment safeguards: anti‑pledging and retention requirements mitigate hedging/selling; all NEOs meet ownership guidelines .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High equity mix with rigorous PSU hurdles (recent 0% vesting) and anti‑hedging/pledging policies support investor alignment; ownership guidelines (3x base for EVP) met by all NEOs .
  • Retention vs. performance: RSU ladders (Mar 2026/2027) and U.K. assignment benefits aid retention; however, European turnaround under Yung introduces execution risk, evidenced by Cabot restructuring and GAAP impacts in 2024 .
  • Pay-for-performance: 2024 KCP cut via negative discretion despite strong cash metrics; 2022 PSUs forfeited; 2023 TSR below threshold—compensation likely to remain sensitive to delivery on ROIC/TSR, especially in Europe .
  • Trading signals: Expectable March vesting supply from RSUs; PSU outcomes could constrain or expand equity issuance depending on ROIC/TSR through 2025–2027; anti‑pledging reduces collateral-driven selling risk .

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