Oliver L. Simpson
About Oliver L. Simpson
Oliver L. Simpson (age 43) is Executive Vice President and Chief Commercial Officer of Excelerate Energy (since November 2023). He joined the company in 2014, previously serving as Vice President, Commercial (2017–2023), and earlier held roles at Astrup Fearnley (LNG broking/chartering) and at TotalEnergies in Gas & Power trading. He holds an M.A. in Modern History from the University of St Andrews (Scotland) . During his tenure on the senior team in 2024, Excelerate highlighted a 117.7% year-over-year TSR increase and record net income ($153 million), with outperformance on safety and fleet reliability (99.9%) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excelerate Energy Limited Partnership (EELP) | Vice President, Commercial | 2017–2023 | Managed commercial shipping; supported/executed a wide range of transactions across LNG value chain . |
| Astrup Fearnley Group (affiliates) | LNG division roles incl. LNG chartering | Pre-2014 | Oversaw LNG chartering functions and broader broking/consulting responsibilities in LNG . |
| TotalEnergies (Gas & Power) | Trading and risk positions | 2004–2008 | Trading and risk management roles in London and Houston supporting gas and power activities . |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Simpson .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2023 | 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $365,000 | $460,000 | 26% increase effective Nov 1, 2024 on elevation to EVP & CCO . |
| Target Bonus (% of salary) | 60% | 65% (effective Nov 1, 2024) | 2024 bonus prorated for mid-year target change . |
| Actual STIP Payout | — | $289,400 | Based on 2024 plan results and individual goals . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (STIP) Design and 2024 Outcomes
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Stretch | Maximum | Actual | Payout as % of Target | Weighted Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Incentive Adjusted EBITDA | 50% | $259mm | $323mm | $356mm | $372mm | $338mm | 105% | 61.5% |
| Incentive Operating Expenses | 7.5% | $223mm | $202mm | $182mm | $172mm | $201mm | 101% | 7.8% |
| SG&A Expenses | 7.5% | $109mm | $99mm | $89mm | $85mm | $94mm | 105% | 9.5% |
| Safety Performance | 15% | — | — | — | — | — | 125% | 18.8% |
| Subtotal before Individual & Strategic | 80% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 97.6% |
| Individual & Strategic Goals | 20% | — | — | — | — | — | 135%–160% | Included in final payout |
- 2024 STIP payout for Simpson: $289,400; target % 65% (prorated), on $460,000 base .
- 2025 STIP weights revised to: Incentive Adjusted EBITDA 45%, Business Development 25%, Safety 10%, Individual/Strategic 20% .
Long-Term Incentives (LTI)
- Plan mix and vesting: 50% RSUs (ratable over 3 years), 50% PSUs (3-year cliff, performance Jan 1, 2024–Dec 31, 2026) .
- PSU metrics:
- Absolute TSR (ATSR) scale: 10%/15%/20% annualized TSR for 50%/100%/200% payout .
- Relative TSR (RTSR) vs Vanguard Energy ETF constituents; 25th/50th/90th percentiles for 50%/100%/200%; capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative .
| Grant | Grant Date | Type | Units | Grant-Date Value | Vesting/Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual LTI | 3/5/2024 | RSU | 13,342 | $200,000 | Ratable over 3 years . |
| Annual LTI | 3/5/2024 | PSU (ATSR) | 3,336 | $100,999 | 3-year ATSR goal, 0–200% payout . |
| Annual LTI | 3/5/2024 | PSU (RTSR) | 3,336 | $126,015 | 3-year RTSR goal, 0–200% payout . |
| Additional | 3/5/2024 | RSU | 11,148 | $166,667 | Ratable over 3 years . |
| Promotion LTI | 11/1/2024 | RSU | 5,444 | $130,000 | Ratable over 3 years . |
| Promotion LTI | 11/1/2024 | PSU (ATSR) | 1,361 | $88,247 | 3-year ATSR goal (same 2024–2026 period) . |
| Promotion LTI | 11/1/2024 | PSU (RTSR) | 1,361 | $109,370 | 3-year RTSR goal (same 2024–2026 period) . |
- Simpson’s 2024 “Stock Awards” (FASB ASC 718 fair value): $925,108 .
Stock Options
| Grant Date | Strike | Expiration | Exercisable | Unexercisable | Vesting Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4/13/2022 | $24.00 | 4/13/2032 | 2,310 | 3,468 | Annual installments over 5 years from grant . |
- In-the-money (12/31/2024): Share price $30.25; ITM per option $6.25; estimated ITM value on 2,310 exercisable ≈ $14,438; on total 5,778 ≈ $36,113 (calculated from values in ).
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership | 14,820 Class A shares (<1%) . |
| RSUs Unvested (12/31/2024) | 2,920 (3/31/2023 grant) + 24,490 (3/5/2024 grant) + 5,444 (11/1/2024 grant) = 32,854 total . |
| PSUs Outstanding (Unearned) | 1,460 (2023 RTSR) + 486 (2023 EBITDA Yr 1) + 486 (2024 EBITDA Yr 2) + 13,342 (2024 ATSR) + 13,342 (2024 RTSR) + 5,444 (Nov’24 ATSR) + 5,444 (Nov’24 RTSR) = 39,004 . |
| Options | 2,310 exercisable; 3,468 unexercisable; $24.00 strike; 2032 expiry . |
| Ownership Guidelines | Other Executive Officers: 2x annual base salary; 5-year window to comply (from Nov 7, 2022 or appointment) . |
| Compliance Status | “Each of our NEOs has achieved their required ownership level, or is on track...” . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Company policy prohibits hedging and pledging of Company securities . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms (Simpson and other NEOs unless noted) |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | No employment agreement; initial compensation via offer letters . |
| Executive Severance Plan | If terminated by Company other than for cause, death, disability: 1.5x (salary + target STIP) cash; pro-rata target STIP; benefits continuation 18 months; outplacement up to $10,000; subject to release . |
| Change-in-Control Severance | If terminated without cause/for good reason within 24 months post-CIC: 2.0x (salary + target STIP); pro-rata target STIP; benefits 24 months; outplacement up to $10,000 . (CEO multiples higher; not applicable to Simpson) . |
| Equity Acceleration | Death/disability: unvested options fully accelerate and remain exercisable 12 months; RSUs fully vest; PSUs vest at target . CIC + qualifying termination: options fully accelerate; RSUs fully vest; PSUs vest at greater of target or actual-to-date . |
| Clawbacks | Company Clawback & Forfeiture Policy (financial restatement or egregious conduct) and NYSE Rule 10D-1 Dodd-Frank clawback policy (3-year lookback) . |
| Insider Trading | Hedging and pledging prohibited; short-term speculative transactions prohibited . |
| Ownership & Retention | Stock Ownership & Retention Policy (2x salary for other executive officers; retention of 75% of net shares until compliant) . |
Company Performance Context
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($) | 2,472,973,000 | 1,158,963,000 | 851,437,000 |
| EBITDA ($) | 292,392,000* | 326,702,000* | 315,790,000* |
Values retrieved from S&P Global.*
Additional 2024 highlights: record net income $153 million (+21% YoY), Adjusted EBITDA $348 million, fleet reliability 99.9%, exceeded safety targets .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2025 Say-on-Pay: For 100,737,543; Against 83,309; Abstain 13,209; strong approval .
- 2024 Say-on-Pay: For 101,788,302; Against 282,837; Abstain 1,103,700 .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags (policy/structure)
- Hedging/pledging prohibited (reduces misalignment risks) .
- Robust clawbacks adopted (restatement and egregious conduct; NYSE 10D-1 compliance) .
- Controlled company status; compensation committee not fully independent under NYSE exemptions .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Simpson’s 2024 cash incentive tied primarily to Incentive Adjusted EBITDA, cost discipline, safety, and individual strategic goals; overall corporate achievement ~98% before individual goals, with individual performance 135%–160%—consistent with strong 2024 execution (TSR +117.7%, record net income, high reliability) .
- Medium-term alignment/retention: Significant unvested RSUs (32,854) and unearned PSUs (39,004) plus outstanding options vesting through 2027 create retention hooks and equity alignment; ownership guidelines (2x salary) and no-hedging/pledging add discipline .
- Change-in-control and severance economics: 1.5x cash severance outside CIC and 2.0x under CIC are moderate for a non-CEO; double-trigger equity treatment under CIC limits windfalls absent termination .
- Potential selling pressure: Unvested equity + policy restrictions reduce near-term discretionary selling; options are in-the-money at $30.25 vs $24 strike, but policy and vesting schedule temper realizable liquidity .
- Governance watchpoint: Controlled company exemptions (compensation committee not fully independent) merit ongoing monitoring for peer benchmarking rigor and target setting, despite strong Say-on-Pay support .
All citations correspond to SEC filings and company documents as referenced.