Steven M. Freishtat
About Steven M. Freishtat
Steven M. Freishtat, age 50, is Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Elme Communities, responsible for finance, investor relations, and research operations. He joined Elme in November 2015 and was promoted to CFO in March 2023; prior roles include CapitalSource (VP, Corporate Finance) and Marriott International. He holds a B.S. in Finance from Indiana University and an MBA from Emory’s Goizueta Business School . Company performance framing his incentive design: 2024 same-store revenue growth was 3.3% with Core FFO/share at $0.93 (meeting target); multifamily NOI growth was 4.3% (below target); net debt/Adj. EBITDA was 5.7x (between target and threshold). Cumulative TSR over 2020–2024 measured $65.06 vs 2019 base = $100, while Core FFO in 2024 was $81.8 million and Adjusted EBITDA $120.3 million .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Elme Communities | EVP & CFO | Mar 2023–present | Leads finance, IR, research operations |
| Elme Communities | VP, Finance | 2020–2023 | Senior finance leadership supporting strategy and scaling ops |
| Elme Communities | Sr. Director, Finance | 2018–2020 | Finance leadership across analytics and planning |
| Elme Communities | Director, Finance | 2017–2018 | Finance management |
| Elme Communities | Finance Manager | 2015–2017 | Finance operations |
| CapitalSource Inc. | VP, Corporate Finance | 2004–2015 | Corporate finance expertise before Elme |
| Marriott International | Finance roles | n/d | Early career experience |
External Roles
No external directorships are disclosed in Mr. Freishtat’s 2025 proxy biography .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary rate ($) | $325,000 | $325,000 |
| Salary paid per SCT ($) | $307,791 | $325,000 |
2024 STIP design and payout:
- STIP target opportunity: 75% of salary; threshold 41%, high 133% .
- 2024 payout: $254,150 (104.3% of target) based on company and individual results .
| 2024 STIP performance metric | Threshold | Target | High | Actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core FFO/share | $0.90 | $0.93 | $0.96 | $0.93 |
| Multifamily NOI growth | 3.3% | 5.3% | 7.3% | 4.3% |
| Net debt / Adjusted EBITDA | 6.0x | 5.5x | 5.0x | 5.7x |
| 2024 Initiatives (points) | 5 | 7 | 9 | 8.75 |
STIP metric weights: 30% Core FFO/share; 20% Multifamily NOI growth; 15% Net debt/Adj. EBITDA; 10% 2024 Initiatives; 25% individual objectives .
Performance Compensation
2024 LTIP structure and targets (CFO):
- Award mix: 60% performance-based (relative TSR), 40% time-based RSUs vesting ratably over three years .
- LTIP target as % of salary: Threshold 95%; Target 135%; High 196% .
- Relative TSR hurdles: vs FTSE Nareit Residential subset (60% weight) and a Committee-selected peer group (40% weight); Threshold 33rd percentile, Target 51st, High 76th .
2024 grants (2/14/2024):
| Element | Value |
|---|---|
| Time-based RSUs granted (#) | 12,004 |
| Time-based grant-date fair value ($) | $170,577 |
| Performance-based (TSR) at target ($) | $263,250 |
| Performance-based (TSR) at max ($) | $461,500 |
Outstanding equity at 12/31/2024 (CFO):
| Category | Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Unvested time-based shares | 13,473 sh; $205,733 | 9,472 vest 12/15/2025; 4,001 vest 12/15/2026 |
| Unearned performance shares (indicative) | 20,858 sh; $318,500 | Based on plan valuation assumptions at 12/31/2024 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Metric | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 48,835 common shares (as of 4/11/2025) |
| Shares outstanding (record date) | 88,158,657 |
| Ownership % | ~0.06% (48,835 / 88,158,657) |
| Unvested vs unearned | 13,473 unvested time-based; 20,858 unearned performance shares (12/31/2024) |
| Exec stock ownership guideline | EVPs: 2.0x base salary; 5 years to comply |
| Anti-hedging/anti-pledging | Hedging and pledging prohibited; margin loans prohibited |
Approximate value of holdings: Using 12/31/2024 share price of $15.27, owned shares equate to ~ $746k (48,835 × $15.27), exceeding 2.0x 2024 base salary of $325k, indicative of guideline alignment (valuation based on filing data) .
Vesting and potential selling pressure:
- Scheduled time-based vesting: 9,472 shares on 12/15/2025; 4,001 on 12/15/2026 .
- Performance share settlement contingent on multi-year TSR; change-in-control provisions may accelerate vesting (see Employment Terms) .
Employment Terms
- Severance plan (non-CIC): Executive Officer Severance Pay Plan provides severance pay and continuation of employer-paid medical benefits; amounts depend on service; separate from CIC agreements .
- Change-in-control (CIC) agreements: Double-trigger cash benefits—24 months base salary continuation (CFO), annual bonus during continuation (≥ of 3-year average or target), and up to 18 months COBRA; immediate vesting of all equity upon CIC; awards under STIP/LTIP prorated or settled per plan terms .
- Estimated payments as of 12/31/2024:
| Scenario | Cash ($) | Equity ($) | SERP ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIC + termination | 1,137,500 | 308,144 | 93,002 | 1,538,646 |
| CIC only (single-trigger equity) | — | 308,144 | — | 308,144 |
| Without cause / For good reason (no CIC) | 175,000 | 239,932 | 93,002 | 507,934 |
- Proposed Transactions (Portfolio Sale and Liquidation): Proxy estimates single-trigger acceleration of LTIP performance awards on closing; indicative payout assumptions of ~82% (2023–2025), 174–179% (2024–2026), and 174–179% (2025–2027) of target; equity vests at CIC regardless of termination . Golden parachute (illustrative) for CFO: cash severance $1,137,500; pro-rated STIP $196,969; equity acceleration $1,560,857; pension/NQDC $131,166; perquisites/benefits $53,138; total $3,079,630 .
- Clawback and tax gross-ups: Clawback policy adopted consistent with SEC/NYSE; Company states it does not provide CIC tax gross-ups .
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 operating outcomes: same-store revenue growth 3.3%; retention 66%; Core FFO/share at target ($0.93); multifamily NOI growth 4.3%; net debt/Adj. EBITDA 5.7x; led to 2024 STIP payout at ~104% of target for CFO ($254,150) .
- TSR context: Five-year cumulative TSR (2019–2024) $65.06 on a $100 base, reflecting sector and company pressures; 2024 Core FFO $81.8m; 2024 Adjusted EBITDA $120.3m .
- Transaction execution: During the strategic review, CFO updated the Board on financing alternatives and negotiated competitive debt commitments to support the portfolio sale to Cortland; the Transaction Committee determined engagement of GS Bank for debt financing would not impair Goldman Sachs’ advisory objectivity .
- Capital return/liquidation plan: On Q2 2025 calls and related materials, CFO detailed anticipated liquidating distributions (net of estimated expenses and liabilities) and timing assumptions for asset sales; workforce reductions disclosed after portfolio sale closing .
Compensation Committee Analysis
- Program design: Strong pay-for-performance orientation with balanced STIP and relative TSR in LTIP; caps in place; anti-hedging/pledging and ownership guidelines; clawback policy adopted .
- Shareholder alignment: Say-on-pay support exceeded ~94–96% in 2022–2024; independent consultant (Ferguson Partners) advises on a 12-company peer group; base salary targeted near median; total direct compensation can reach 75th percentile for top-level performance .
Equity Ownership & Alignment (Supplemental)
| Item | 2024 values |
|---|---|
| All other compensation (benefits detail) | Life insurance $2,985; 401(k) match $9,625; SERP contribution $45,273; dues $1,019; parking $2,760; total $61,662 |
| SERP balance (12/31/2024) | $93,002 |
Employment Terms (Supplemental – Vesting Mechanics)
- STIP at CIC: Pro-rated performance through CIC date; payout based on actuals .
- LTIP at CIC: All time-based vests; TSR awards paid based on actual performance to CIC; strategic components at ≥ target; for qualifying terminations, post-2023 grants use actual performance as of termination date with proration .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Ownership, anti-hedging/pledging, and 2x salary guideline (EVP) indicate meaningful alignment; approximate value of holdings suggests compliance progress .
- Near-term selling pressure: Scheduled vesting (9,472 in 2025; 4,001 in 2026) plus potential single-trigger acceleration of performance awards upon the portfolio sale closing could increase supply, though timing and actual TSR outcomes drive performance share issuance .
- Retention risk: Cash severance is double-trigger under CIC, but equity features single-trigger vesting at CIC under the Proposed Transactions—this may reduce post-closing retention incentives for equity but cash continuation and role in wind-down partially mitigate .
- Pay governance: High say-on-pay support, clawback, no CIC gross-ups, and balanced metrics are positives; however, single-trigger equity acceleration at CIC is a governance trade-off to monitor .
- Execution capability: CFO’s direct role in arranging debt financing for the sale process and transparent disclosures on costs/distributions support confidence in transaction execution .
Citations: **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:5]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:36]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:37]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:45]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:49]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:50]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:51]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:52]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:53]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:54]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:57]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:58]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:59]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:62]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:63]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:64]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:67]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:68]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:70]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:72]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:73]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:74]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:75]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:76]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:77]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:79]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:88]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000041_elme-20250417.htm:89]** **[104894_0001104659-25-092947_tm2524468-2_defm14a.htm:72]** **[104894_0001104659-25-092947_tm2524468-2_defm14a.htm:75]** **[104894_0001104659-25-092947_tm2524468-2_defm14a.htm:113]** **[104894_0001104659-25-087888_tm2524468-1_prem14a.htm:72]** **[104894_0001104659-25-087888_tm2524468-1_prem14a.htm:111]** **[104894_2058584_7]** **[104894_0001193125-25-174544_d51387ddefa14a.htm:5]** **[104894_0000104894-25-000132_elme-20251110.htm:2]**