Ben Berry
About Ben Berry
Phillip “Ben” Berry is Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Enovis, serving as CFO since January 1, 2023 after joining the company in 2020 to lead finance for the medical technology segment and business units post-separation; he is 46 and holds an MBA from Kennesaw State University . Under the leadership team in 2024, Enovis delivered adjusted EPS of $2.84, adjusted EBITDA of $377M with 210 bps margin expansion, and reported sales growth of 23.5% (5.5% comparable), informing the pay-for-performance context for Berry’s incentives . Long-term PRSUs are tied to relative TSR vs the S&P Health Care Equipment Select Industry Index with a target at the 55th percentile and a cap at target if absolute TSR is negative, emphasizing above-median shareholder returns .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enovis Corporation | SVP & Chief Financial Officer | 2023–present | Company CFO; led finance teams and processes, contributed to improved operating performance and profit margins, and shaped growth strategy including acquisitions . |
| Enovis/Colfax (Medical Technology Segment; Recon and P&R segments post-separation) | CFO, segment and business units | 2020–2022 | CFO for medtech segment and business units after April 4, 2022 separation, strengthening finance operations and execution . |
| Novartis/Alcon | Finance leadership roles (strategy, operations, process improvement) | 18 years | Supported Alcon’s 2019 public company launch; progressive finance roles in strategy, operations, and business process improvement . |
External Roles
- No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed in company filings for Berry .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary (USD) | $531,443 | $586,250 |
| Target Bonus % of Salary | 75% | 75% |
| Actual AIP Bonus Paid (USD) | $526,125 | $375,351 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – FY 2024 structure and results
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Achieved | CPF (weighting-based) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Sales (as adjusted) | 40% | $2.056B | $2.141B | $2.313B | $2.108B | 80% |
| Adjusted EBITDA | 60% | $337M | $385M | $481M | $377M | 91% |
| Weighted Aggregate CPF | — | — | — | — | — | 87% |
AIP payout mechanics: Berry’s target bonus was 75% of base; with CPF 87% and his IPF of 97.5%, his FY 2024 cash bonus paid was $375,351 .
Long-Term Incentives (LTI) – Design
| LTI Component | Metric | Weighting | Payout Scale | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PRSUs | Relative TSR vs S&P Health Care Equipment Select Industry Index | 50% of annual grant | 30th pct=50%; 55th pct=100% target; >80th pct=200%; negative absolute TSR caps at target | Cliff vest at end of 3-year performance period |
| RSUs | Time-based | 50% of annual grant | n/a | Vest in 3 equal annual installments beginning first anniversary of grant |
FY 2024 Grants to Berry
| Award | Grant Date | Target/Units | Grant-Date Fair Value (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|
| PRSUs | Mar 4, 2024 | 16,534 target units | $1,415,641 |
| RSUs | Mar 4, 2024 | 16,534 units | $1,025,769 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (as of Mar 24, 2025) | 41,896 shares; <1% of class . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | SVP/CFO required ≥3x base salary; all NEOs achieved targets . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited . |
| 10b5-1 Trading Plans | Prior legal review/approval required under insider trading policy . |
As of Dec 31, 2024 – Outstanding Awards
| Type | Count/Detail | Valuation/Terms |
|---|---|---|
| Unvested RSUs | 23,530 units | Market value $1,032,496 as of 12/31/2024 ($43.88/share) |
| Unearned PRSUs (target) | 26,210 target units | Monte Carlo value $1,074,107 |
| Options (Exercisable) | 10,859 @ $33.48 exp 3/16/2027 ; 4,476 @ $76.34 exp 2/21/2028 ; 3,825 @ $57.62 exp 2/27/2030 | Standard option terms per plan; full vest 3 years per grant schedule |
| Options (Unexercisable) | 7,647 @ $57.62 exp 2/27/2030 | Vesting as scheduled |
| Stock Vested in FY 2024 | 5,992 shares; value realized $335,643 |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms |
|---|---|
| CFO Appointment | Effective Jan 1, 2023 . |
| Offer Letter (Dec 31, 2022) | Base salary $500,000; AIP target 75% of base; 2023 annual equity grant $1,200,000 mix of PRSUs, options, RSUs; enters standard CIC agreement . |
| Severance – Without Cause/Good Reason | Lump sum = 1x base salary + 1x target bonus; 12 months COBRA; pro rata AIP bonus for year of termination . |
| Change-in-Control (Double Trigger) | 2x base salary + 2x target bonus; equity treated per plan; agreement auto-renews annually . |
| Clawback Policy | Recovery of erroneously awarded incentive-based compensation for 3 prior years upon restatement; applies regardless of misconduct . |
| Non-Compete/Non-Solicit | Standard covenants included in executive agreements . |
| Perquisites (FY 2024) | Company match/contribution $13,800; financial planning $7,764; supplemental LTD premium $4,693; group term life premium $861 . |
| Pension/DB plan | Company does not maintain a defined benefit pension plan for senior executives . |
| Deferred Compensation | No NQDC contributions for Berry in FY 2024 per table . |
Potential Payments Table (illustrative as of 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Cash Severance (Base+Bonus) | Pro Rata AIP | Accelerated Options | Accelerated PRSUs | Accelerated RSUs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without cause/good reason | $1,032,500 | $442,500 | — | — | — |
| Death/Disability | — | $442,500 | $112,934 | $716,071 | $1,032,496 |
| Change-in-Control (double trigger) | $2,065,000 | — | $112,934 | $1,074,107 | $1,032,496 |
Vesting Schedules and Insider Selling Pressure
- RSUs vest in three equal annual installments beginning on the first anniversary of grant; for Berry’s 2024 grant, vesting begins March 4, 2025, March 4, 2026, and March 4, 2027, suggesting typical quarterly/annual vest-related liquidity windows .
- PRSUs cliff vest at the end of the 3-year performance period (2024 grant measured through 2027), with payout contingent on relative TSR performance .
- Options vest ratably over three years; full vesting dates by grant cohort per company schedule: 2020–2023 cohorts fully vest on February 24, 2023; February 21, 2024; February 16, 2025; and February 27, 2026, respectively, which can create recurring near-term selling/exercise windows as options approach full vest and expiry .
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 achievements include integration of LimaCorporate exceeding first-year targets, new product launches (AltiVate Reverse Glenoid), safety improvements (18% fewer reportable incidents; 34% TRIR improvement), and employee engagement score of 80%, supporting operational execution under CFO oversight .
- 2024 AIP corporate performance factor was 87% due to sales growth shortfall versus plan, with adjusted EBITDA near target, demonstrating discipline in cash bonus outcomes .
- Say-on-pay support at ~98% in 2024 underscores investor approval of the compensation framework’s alignment with performance .
Compensation Committee and Peer Benchmarking
- CHCM Committee (independent) oversees executive compensation; FW Cook serves as independent consultant; hedging/pledging prohibited; robust stock ownership and clawback policies in place .
- 2024 peer group includes medtech comparables (e.g., TFX, ZBH, STE, HOLX, COO); Berry’s 2024 LTI target increased 66.7% vs 2023 to bring his grant level closer to peer CFO medians after 2023 grants ran below median .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is intact: AIP metrics weighted toward EBITDA and sales produced below-target payouts (CPF 87%), while LTI emphasizes relative TSR with a cap in negative absolute TSR environments, curbing windfalls and encouraging sustained performance .
- Retention risk appears contained: CIC double-trigger economics (2x salary+bonus) and meaningful unvested RSUs/PRSUs ($~2.1M indicated value as of 12/31/2024) incentivize continuity; no pledging allowed; strong clawback and 10b5-1 oversight reduce governance risk .
- Trading signals: Annual RSU vesting cycles (beginning March 4 each year) and PRSU cliff dates (2027) can create predictable liquidity windows; FY 2024 showed no option exercises by Berry and modest share vesting, suggesting limited near-term selling pressure beyond standard tax-withholds .
- Alignment: Beneficial ownership of 41,896 shares (<1%), compliance with 3x salary ownership guidelines, and hedging/pledging bans support shareholder alignment without leverage risk .