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Yat Sun Or

Chief Scientific Officer at ENANTA PHARMACEUTICALSENANTA PHARMACEUTICALS
Executive

About Yat Sun Or

Yat Sun Or, Ph.D. (age 73) has served as Enanta’s Chief Scientific Officer since November 1999. He holds a Ph.D. in Organic Chemistry from the University of Chicago and completed postdoctoral fellowships at Ohio State University and Indiana University; prior roles include leadership positions at Abbott Laboratories (1985–1999) and cardiovascular drug discovery at Schering-Plough, with two Abbott Chairman’s Awards for research leading to immunosuppressant and antibacterial drugs . Over the last four fiscal years, Enanta’s pay-versus-performance table shows challenging TSR outcomes in 2023–2024 and negative net income, underscoring a tough backdrop for incentive realization and equity value creation during the period .

TSR and net income context (company-level):

MetricFY 2021FY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Value of initial $100 investment (Enanta TSR)124 113 24 23
Net Income (Loss), $000s(78,996) (121,755) (133,816) (116,045)

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Enanta PharmaceuticalsChief Scientific OfficerSince Nov 1999Leads R&D strategy; CSO through shifting equity incentives toward options and performance units to align with R&D milestones and relative TSR .
Abbott LaboratoriesLeadership roles in discovery1985–1999Two Chairman’s Awards; research led to immunosuppressant/antibacterial drug discovery/development .
Schering-PloughCardiovascular drug discovery teamPre-1985Early-stage cardiovascular discovery experience .

External Roles

  • No external public company directorships or committee roles for Dr. Or are disclosed in ENTA’s proxy/executive officer section .

Fixed Compensation

Multi-year cash compensation and targets:

ItemFY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Salary ($)486,525 501,250 537,050
Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($)224,010 199,695 181,166
All Other Compensation ($)19,211 19,218 21,892
Total ($)1,992,111 2,469,600 1,222,705

Base salary approvals (calendar year basis):

Calendar Year202220232024
Base Salary ($)505,000 525,200 541,000

Annual variable cash compensation structure (NEOs except CEO):

  • Target bonus opportunity as % of salary: 40% (2022–2024) .
  • Weighting: 70% corporate objectives, 30% individual objectives; CEO is 100% corporate .
ElementWeightingTarget (as % of Salary)Notes
Corporate Objectives (R&D-heavy)70% 40% Objectives are pre-set; payout capped at 150% of target; actual payout shown in fiscal tables above reflects a 25%/75% calendar-year blend methodology .
Individual Objectives30% 40% CEO recommends individual assessments to Comp Committee .

Performance Compensation

Summary of equity grants and structures (focus on FY 2024 grants to Dr. Or):

Award TypeGrant DateThreshold (#)Target (#)Maximum (#)Exercise/StrikeGrant Date FV ($)Vesting / Performance
Stock Options11/22/2023$8.99 422,664 Time-based; vests quarterly in 16 equal tranches over 4 years .
rTSRUs12/19/20232,750 5,500 8,250 54,395 2-year performance; vest 0–150% based on Enanta TSR vs Nasdaq Biotech Index; threshold = 40th percentile for 50% payout; measurement compares avg closing prices in last 60 trading days of 2023 vs 2025 .
PSUs (annual)12/19/2023825 5,500 8,250 — (not probable at grant) 2-year R&D milestones across 3 categories; 0–150% payout; eligible by 12/31/2025 .
PSUs (one-time, achieved)1/4/2024460 5,538 Granted because milestone was achieved at grant; settlement per plan .

Performance realization track record (all NEOs, including Or):

  • PSUs granted Dec 2021: 70% vested at 12/31/2023; PSUs granted Dec 2022: 150% vested at 12/31/2024; PSUs granted Dec 2023: next eligible 12/31/2025 .
  • rTSRUs granted Dec 2021: vested at 127% at 12/31/2023; rTSRUs granted Dec 2022: 0% at 12/31/2024; rTSRUs granted Dec 2023: eligible 12/31/2025 .

Compensation philosophy, peer benchmarking, and 2024 changes:

  • Program targets ~50th percentile of peers for base, target cash, and equity; emphasis on at-risk pay tied to R&D objectives and 2-year PSU/rTSRU performance cycles .
  • Starting FY 2024, time-based equity shifted to all options and sized below 50th percentile given stock declines; performance awards sized to 20% of the 50th percentile equity level (split evenly PSUs/rTSRUs) .
  • 2024 rTSRUs require rank at least 40th percentile to earn 50%; no vest if no stock price increase over measurement period .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial ownership (as of Dec 16, 2024):

HolderShares Beneficially Owned% Outstanding
Yat Sun Or, Ph.D.594,509 2.79%

Notes:

  • Beneficial ownership excludes PSUs and rTSRUs not issuable within 60 days of Dec 16, 2024 .
  • Company prohibits insider hedging and pledging; also prohibits purchases on margin and pledging as collateral by executives and directors .

Outstanding equity awards (as of Sept 30, 2024) — Dr. Or:

Options

Grant DateExercisableUnexercisableExercise PriceExpiration
11/20/201436,500 $44.00 11/20/2024
11/20/201533,000 $31.42 11/20/2025
11/18/201635,000 $30.00 11/18/2026
11/17/201723,500 $48.52 11/17/2027
11/16/201820,000 $81.20 11/16/2028
11/18/201930,000 $63.35 11/18/2029
11/20/202028,875 1,925 $43.57 11/20/2030
11/19/202119,525 8,875 $75.33 11/19/2031
11/23/202219,687 25,313 $45.00 11/23/2032
11/22/202316,125 69,875 $8.99 11/22/2033
  • Unexercisable tranches vest quarterly in equal 1/16 increments over four years from grant .

Time-based RSUs (unvested)

Grant DateUnits UnvestedMarket Value (at $10.36)
11/20/20201,900 $19,684
11/19/20213,400 $35,224
11/23/202215,750 $163,170

Performance/market-based units (unearned as of 9/30/24)

Grant DateUnits (Type)Market/Payout Value
12/22/20226,500 (a) $67,340
12/22/20226,500 (b) $67,340
12/19/20235,500 (c) $56,980
12/19/20235,500 (d) $56,980

Plan-level supply and structure (alignment/overhang context):

  • As of Dec 31, 2024: 4,758,263 shares reserved for outstanding options; 346,154 for outstanding RSUs; 267,645 for PSUs/rTSRUs at target; total 7,283,492 under equity plans or reserved; weighted average option exercise price $41.57; remaining term 7.3 years .

Policies and controls:

  • Hedging/pledging prohibited; option repricing requires shareholder approval; clawback adopted effective Oct 2, 2023, requiring recovery of incentive comp for certain restatements over prior three completed fiscal years .

Potential selling pressure signals:

  • Quarterly option vesting creates regular unlock cadence .
  • 2023-granted PSUs/rTSRUs are next eligible at 12/31/2025 with settlement in the following February (historical practice), creating a potential early 2026 issuance event; 2022 grants already settled (PSUs 150% at 12/31/2024; rTSRUs 0%) .
  • In connection with an October 2025 offering, executive officers agreed to a 60-day lock-up; permitted transfers include tax-withholding sell-to-cover and existing Rule 10b5-1 plans, limiting near-term sales during the restricted period .

Employment Terms

Change-in-control and severance economics:

  • If Dr. Or is terminated without cause or constructively terminated within 12 months after a change in control: lump sum equal to 12 months base salary, plus 100% of target annual bonus, and up to 12 months of benefit continuation; all unvested options/RSUs vest; PSUs vest at target (double-trigger acceleration) .
  • If terminated without cause (outside 12 months post-CIC) or voluntary for good reason: lump sum equal to 6 months base salary and up to 6 months of benefits .

Say-on-Pay, Peer Group, and Governance Considerations

  • 2024 say-on-pay support was ~79%; Comp Committee responded by moderating FY 2025 equity awards and contextualized high 2023 accounting grant values as stock price-driven .
  • Compensation targets ~50th percentile of peers; Alpine Rewards LLC serves as independent consultant; 2024 peer group composition and criteria updated to align with Enanta’s scale and pipeline stage .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance design tightened in FY 2024: time-based equity concentrated in options sized below 50th percentile, with performance equity now 20% of targeted equity at 50th percentile—heightening dependence on R&D milestone execution and relative TSR outcomes for upside; this is positive for alignment but increases realization risk in weak biotech markets .
  • Near-term selling pressure appears constrained by (a) policy prohibitions on hedging/pledging, (b) quarterly vesting cadence rather than large annual RSU cliffs, and (c) the 60-day lock-up around the Oct 2025 offering; larger potential issuance/supply event likely post-12/31/2025 upon PSU/rTSRU determination and typical February settlement cycle .
  • Retention risk: severance for non-CEO NEOs (including Or) is relatively standard (6 months outside CIC; 12 months + target bonus and full acceleration on double-trigger within CIC window), which is adequate but not unusually protective; longevity since 1999 suggests strong institutional knowledge, but negative TSR and net income could affect motivation if equity remains out-of-the-money at higher legacy strikes .
  • Governance: Clawback, no hedging/pledging, and no option repricing without shareholder approval are favorable; say-on-pay at ~79% signals room for improved investor alignment but not acute opposition, and the committee has adjusted award sizing accordingly .