Jeff McNeil
About Jeff McNeil
Jeff McNeil, 63, has served as an independent Class I director of Eos Energy Enterprises since 2023, with his term expiring at the 2027 annual meeting. He holds a B.S. from San Jose State University and brings four decades of operations and supply chain leadership across energy and technology, including senior roles at Enphase Energy, Energous, and Cypress Semiconductor, and prior board service at Upstart Power (2021–2024) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Committees/Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enphase Energy | Executive Vice President – Advisor | Apr 2023 – Jul 2024 | Strategic initiatives guidance |
| Enphase Energy | Chief Operations Officer | 2019 – 2023 | Operational excellence leadership |
| Enphase Energy | VP, Quality & Customer Support | 2018 – 2019 | Customer and quality systems |
| Energous Corporation | SVP, Operations | 2016 – 2018 | Operations leadership |
| Cypress Semiconductor | SVP, Worldwide Operations; VP, Planning | 1994 – 2012 | Global ops and planning leadership |
| Heraeus; DEC (later HPE); Seagate; Memorex | Operations/industry roles | Various | Manufacturing and technology experience |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Tenure | Public/Private |
|---|---|---|---|
| Upstart Power, Inc. | Director | 2021 – 2024 | Not disclosed as public in proxy |
Board Governance
- Independence: The Board determined McNeil is independent under Nasdaq and SEC rules .
- Committee assignments (2024): Audit Committee (member); Leadership Development & Compensation Committee (member). Not on Nominating & Corporate Governance .
- Committee chairs: Audit chaired by Jeff Bornstein (financial expert); Compensation chaired by Russell Stidolph .
- Board leadership: Independent Chair (Russell Stidolph). Independent directors hold executive sessions at least twice per year .
- Attendance: In 2024, the Board met 26 times; overall Board and committee attendance was 81%. All directors attended the 2024 annual meeting .
| 2024 Board Committees | Audit | Compensation (Leadership Development) | Nominating & Corporate Governance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jeff McNeil Membership | Yes | Yes | No |
| Meetings Held (2024) | 4 | 5 | 6 |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Cash Fees ($) | Committee/Chair Fees | Meeting Fees | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 25,000 | Not separately disclosed | Not disclosed | Non-employee directors received cash fees and RSU equity; no 2024 option grants |
Performance Compensation
- Director equity awards are RSUs with grant-date fair value; no performance-based PSU awards for directors are disclosed. Non-employee directors could elect cash settlement upon vesting for a portion of awards; some directors elected this, but McNeil’s elections are not identified in footnotes .
- No option awards were granted to non-employee directors in 2024; McNeil has legacy options outstanding (see Equity Ownership) .
| Year | Stock Awards ($) | Award Type | Performance Metrics Tied to Director Compensation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 137,368 | RSUs | None disclosed for directors |
Other Directorships & Interlocks
- Current public company boards: None disclosed for McNeil .
- Prior board role: Upstart Power (2021–2024) .
- Board composition includes three Preferred Directors appointed by the sole holder of Investor Preferred Stock (Cerberus affiliate CCM Denali), which can influence governance dynamics; these Preferred Directors are separate from McNeil and are reappointed annually by the preferred holder .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Four decades across energy storage, semiconductors, and operations, with deep experience in manufacturing, quality, and global supply chains .
- Education: B.S., San Jose State University .
Equity Ownership
| Reference Date | Shares Beneficially Owned | % of Outstanding | Shares Outstanding Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 31, 2024 | 345,956 | <1% | 216,698,063 |
| Mar 1, 2025 | 345,956 (includes RSUs) | <1% | 226,599,297 |
| Aug 12, 2025 | 424,903 | <1% | 279,213,528 |
| As of Dec 31, 2024 | RSUs Outstanding (units) | Options Outstanding (units) | Hedging/Pledging |
|---|---|---|---|
| McNeil | 78,947 | 82,452 | Company policy prohibits hedging and pledging by directors |
Governance Assessment
- Board effectiveness and independence: McNeil is an active member of both Audit and Compensation Committees, supporting oversight of financial reporting and executive pay; the Board confirms his independence alongside a majority independent Board and independent Chair with regular executive sessions—positive for investor confidence .
- Attendance and engagement: Overall Board/committee attendance of 81% in 2024 and full director presence at the annual meeting indicate engagement, though the aggregate rate suggests room for improvement in meeting participation; no individual attendance detail is disclosed for McNeil .
- Pay alignment: Director compensation skews toward equity via RSUs ($137,368 in 2024 versus $25,000 cash), supporting alignment; no performance-conditioned director equity is disclosed, and some directors could elect cash settlement at vesting—worth monitoring for dilution and cash usage, though McNeil’s election status is not specified .
- Ownership: McNeil’s beneficial stake is <1% and grew to 424,903 shares by Aug 12, 2025, with RSUs and options outstanding; the company’s anti-hedging/pledging policy strengthens alignment by limiting misaligned risk management behaviors .
- Conflicts and related parties: The proxy outlines robust related person transaction policies and lists certain relationships (e.g., B. Riley, Cerberus/CCM Denali); we did not find disclosures of related person transactions involving McNeil in the reviewed sections—neutral signal but should be revalidated in full 14A text and future filings .
- Board structure risk signal: Cerberus-affiliated CCM Denali held 36.4% of common on an as-converted basis as of Aug 12, 2025 and appoints three Preferred Directors annually, concentrating influence; while many directors, including McNeil, are independent, investors should monitor governance balance and minority protections .
RED FLAGS to monitor: Concentrated investor influence via Preferred Director rights and large ownership by CCM Denali ; aggregate attendance at 81% ; director equity cash-settlement elections by some peers may dilute alignment if broadly adopted .