Jon Lin
Chief Business Officer at EQIX
Executive
About Jon Lin
Jon Lin is Chief Business Officer at Equinix, appointed in September 2024 after leading Data Center Services and previously serving as President, Americas; he is 48 years old and has been with Equinix since 2009, following roles at Tata Communications and Verizon Business . Company performance context during his leadership period includes 2024 revenue growth of 7%, AFFO growth of 11% (as-reported), AFFO/Share of $35.02 (+9%), and a 3‑year stock price return of 24.47% through December 31, 2024 . Equinix’s pay program ties incentives to revenue, AFFO/Share, and relative TSR, with 2024 annual incentive payout at 94% of target and 2024 LTI financial PSUs earned at 95%, underscoring pay-for-performance alignment .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equinix | Chief Business Officer | 2024–present | Not disclosed |
| Equinix | EVP & GM, Data Center Services | 2021–2024 | Not disclosed |
| Equinix | Various management roles incl. President, Americas | 2009–2021 | Not disclosed |
| Tata Communications | Director, Advanced Solutions Group | 2006–2009 | Not disclosed |
| Verizon Business | Various roles incl. Senior Strategist, Security Products | 2002–2006 | Not disclosed |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in company filings reviewed.
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Year-end Base Salary ($) | 530,000 |
| Salary Earned in 2024 ($) | 466,923 |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | 90% |
| Target Bonus ($) | 424,082 |
| Annual Incentive Payout (% of Target) | 94% |
| Annual Incentive Paid ($) | 398,637 (paid as fully vested RSUs) |
| Annual Incentive RSUs (#) | 466 (priced at $854.99 on 3/12/2025) |
Notes: 2024 bonus paid in fully vested RSUs; Mr. Lin’s salary and bonus targets were prorated due to his September 2024 promotion .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Structure and 2024 Results
| Metric | Weight | 2024 Payout | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 50% | 87% | Narrow performance band; capped at target; both revenue and AFFO/Share must meet threshold for any funding |
| AFFO/Share | 50% | 107% | Focus on profit on a per-share basis |
| Strategic Modifier | ±10% | 97.4% applied | Environmental and social objectives (and 2024 digital services forecast adjustment) |
| Total AIP Payout | — | 94% of target | Paid in fully vested RSUs |
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – 2024 Grants and Mechanics
| Component | Weight within PSUs/RSUs | 2024 Targets and Results | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|
| Financial PSUs (Revenue, AFFO/Share) | 35% revenue / 35% AFFO | Revenue: Threshold $8,275.4M; Target $8,710.9M; Actual (adjusted) $8,653M → 99% of target; Payout 87% . AFFO/Share: Threshold $32.97; Target $34.70; Actual (adjusted) $34.89 → 101% of target; Payout 104%; Combined payout 95% . | One-year performance; 50% vests at certification (Feb 2025), 25% on Feb 15, 2026, 25% on Feb 15, 2027 (service-based) |
| rTSR PSUs | 30% | Measured vs S&P 500 Total Return Index beginning 2024; payout capped at target if absolute TSR negative | 3-year performance period; vest to extent earned |
| Service-based RSUs | 33% | Time-based service vesting | Three equal tranches on first trading day on/after Jan 15 of 2025/2026/2027 |
2024 Equity Award Sizing (Target)
| Name | Target Award Value ($) | Financial PSUs (#) | rTSR PSUs (#) | Service RSUs (#) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jon Lin | 4,000,000 | 2,183 | 929 | 1,533 |
2024 Grants of Plan-Based Awards – Jon Lin
| Grant | Grant Date | Target/Range | Shares/Units (#) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial PSUs (2024) | 03/07/2024 | 0–200% | Target 2,183; Max 4,366 | 1,977,929 |
| rTSR PSUs (2024–2026) | 03/07/2024 | 0–200% | Target 929; Max 1,858 | 998,545 |
| Service RSUs (2024) | 03/07/2024 | — | 1,533 | 1,388,990 |
| Promotion Service RSUs | 12/01/2024 | — | 1,640 | 1,609,627 |
| 2024 AIP (paid as RSUs) | 03/12/2025 | — | 466 | 398,425 |
Additional program context: For 2025, executives’ annual RSU grant at target is 47% financial (revenue and AFFO/Share), 20% rTSR, and 33% service-based .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership and Guidelines
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (3/25/2025) | 7,999 shares; less than 1% of shares outstanding |
| Pledged Shares | 4,316 shares (pledge made pre‑executive officer status; approved by Compensation Committee) |
| Ownership Guidelines | CEO 6x salary; other executives 3x salary; all executives compliant or within allowed timeframe as of 12/31/2024 |
| Hedging/Pledging Policy | Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited absent Compensation Committee exception |
2024 Stock Vested (Liquidity Events)
| Name | Shares Vested (#) | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Jon Lin | 4,214 | 3,689,003 |
Outstanding Equity Awards at FY2024 Year-End – Jon Lin
| Award Type | Unvested/Unearned (#) | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Service-based RSUs | 715 | 705,576 |
| Service-based RSUs | 916 | 892,569 |
| Service-based RSUs | 2,073 | 1,981,104 |
| Service-based RSUs | 751 | 741,102 |
| Service-based RSUs | 1,489 | 1,450,911 |
| Service-based RSUs | 1,533 | 1,465,042 |
| Service-based RSUs | 956 | 943,400 |
| Equity Incentive PSUs (unearned) | 2,236 | 2,178,803 |
| Equity Incentive PSUs (unearned) | 929 | 887,817 |
| Service-based RSUs (promotion) | 1,640 | 1,546,340 |
| Service-based RSUs | 215 | 214,017 |
Notes: Market values computed at $942.89 (12/31/2024 close) per SEC methodology; actual realized value depends on future performance and vesting .
Employment Terms
Severance and Change-in-Control (CIC) Economics
| Feature | Jon Lin |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | At‑will; severance agreement in place |
| No‑CIC Cash Severance | Not eligible for cash severance absent CIC (only certain NEOs receive this) |
| CIC Cash Severance (Double Trigger) | 200% of base salary + 200% of target bonus; COBRA premiums up to 24 months; “stay‑put” clause prohibits resignation for good reason in first 4 months post‑CIC |
| CIC Equity Acceleration | If awards assumed: 100% of target unvested RSUs vest upon qualifying termination (double trigger). If not assumed: full vesting on CIC. Financial PSUs convert to service-vesting; rTSR PSUs earned on shortened period then service-vest |
| Severance Agreement Term | 3-year term; auto‑renews for 3‑year periods unless non‑renewal notice; no tax gross‑ups |
| Restrictive Covenants | Non‑competition (during employment), non‑solicitation, cooperation, non‑disparagement |
Estimated Potential Payments (as of 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Base ($) | Bonus ($) | COBRA ($) | Total Cash/COBRA ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary Termination (no CIC) | — | — | — | — |
| Involuntary Termination following CIC | 1,060,000 | 954,000 | 55,118 | 2,069,118 |
| Equity Acceleration | Value ($) |
|---|---|
| Involuntary Termination following CIC | 15,646,388 |
| If Awards Not Assumed on CIC | 15,646,388 |
Performance & Track Record
| Measure | 2024 Result |
|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7% (as‑reported) |
| AFFO Growth | +11% (as‑reported) |
| AFFO/Share | $35.02; +9% YoY (as‑reported) |
| 3‑Year Stock Price Return (incl. dividends) | +24.47% through 12/31/2024 |
| 2022 rTSR PSU Payout | 84.8% vs Russell 1000 comparator for 3‑year period ended 12/31/2024 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Equity‑heavy, performance‑oriented mix: 67% of 2024 LTI at target in PSUs (financial + rTSR), with AIP tied 50%/50% to revenue and AFFO/Share and paid in vested RSUs, aligning with shareholder outcomes .
- Goal rigor and payout patterns: 2024 AIP funded at 94% and financial PSUs at 95%, reflecting near‑target corporate performance; rTSR PSUs include a cap when absolute TSR is negative to align with shareholder experience .
- Program governance: No single‑trigger vesting; independent compensation committee and consultant; clawback compliant with Rule 10D‑1; hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited absent exceptions .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Pledging: Jon Lin has 4,316 shares pledged as collateral (legacy pledge approved by the Compensation Committee) — a governance caution for alignment and potential margin risk .
- Liquidity windows: Significant scheduled vesting (AIP paid in vested RSUs; financial PSUs half vested at certification; service RSUs vesting in 2025–2027; promotion RSUs vest semi‑annually) could create periodic selling pressure absent retention elections .
- Severance caps and no gross‑ups: CIC cash severance at 2x salary+bonus, consistent with capped policy (≤2.99x) and no tax gross‑ups, moderating pay‑practice risk .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of performance‑based equity (financial PSUs and rTSR PSUs) plus AIP metrics anchored to revenue and AFFO/Share tie Jon Lin’s realizable pay to drivers of REIT‑tech investor value; 2024 outcomes (AIP 94%, PSUs 95%) show measured payouts near plan .
- Retention vs. liquidity: Multi‑year vesting across PSUs and RSUs, promotion awards, and double‑trigger CIC treatment create strong retention hooks; however, AIP paid in fully vested RSUs and regular vesting dates may produce episodic insider liquidity that can modestly elevate selling pressure around vest windows .
- Governance watchpoint: The approved share pledge is a notable red flag; while permitted by exception, it introduces counterparty and forced‑sale risk if collateral values fall, warranting monitoring alongside trading windows and any future Form 4 activity .
- Downside protection balance: No single‑trigger vesting, capped rTSR payouts when absolute TSR is negative, and the “stay‑put” clause post‑CIC collectively temper windfalls and encourage continuity through potential transactions .