Christopher G. Curran
Essent GroupAbout Christopher G. Curran
Christopher G. Curran (age 60) is President of Essent Guaranty, Inc. (since January 2022) and previously served as Essent’s Senior Vice President, Corporate Development (2011–2021). He has 25+ years in mortgage insurance, mortgage banking and financial services spanning operations, pricing, secondary marketing, capital markets, investor relations and corporate development; earlier roles include leadership at another mortgage insurer, JP Morgan Chase and Advanta, and he began his career as a CPA at Arthur Andersen. He holds a BS in accounting from LaSalle University . Company performance in 2024: net income $729 million ($6.85 diluted EPS), revenues ~$1.24 billion (+12% YoY), ROAE ~14%, and book value per share growth ~11%; the Company’s “pay vs. performance” disclosure reports 2024 BVPS growth of 13.2% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Essent Guaranty, Inc. | President | 2022–present | Leads U.S. MI platform (portfolio growth, pricing, unit economics, platform modernization, integration of title business) . |
| Essent Group Ltd. | SVP, Corporate Development | 2011–2021 | Corporate development, IR, capital markets; helped scale MI franchise from inception . |
| Another mortgage insurer | SVP, Pricing & Operations | Not disclosed | Pricing and operating discipline in MI; informs current unit economics focus . |
| JP Morgan Chase; Advanta Corp. | Leadership roles | Not disclosed | Mortgage banking, secondary marketing, capital markets . |
| Arthur Andersen LLP | CPA (Financial services, securitization) | Not disclosed | Technical accounting and securitization expertise . |
External Roles
No public company directorships or outside board roles are disclosed for Mr. Curran in the proxy .
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year compensation (Summary Compensation Table)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 650,000 | 650,000 | 650,000 |
| Stock Awards ($, grant-date fair value) | 1,075,442 | 1,028,320 | 1,177,114 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | 1,072,500 | 1,072,500 | 975,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 93,569 | 140,764 | 171,838 |
| Total ($) | 2,891,511 | 2,891,584 | 2,973,952 |
Compensation structure and targets
- Base salary: $650,000 (2024) .
- Target annual bonus: 100% of base salary (2024) .
- 2024 annual bonus outcome: $975,000 (150% of target) .
- Long-term equity target (2024): 200% of base salary; 50% time-based, 50% performance- and time-based .
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Plan design and outcomes (Curran)
| Component | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate goals (EPS/ROE) | Part of 75% corporate | $5.00 EPS @ 10% ROE | $6.00 EPS @ 12% ROE | $7.00 EPS @ 14% ROE | $6.85 EPS @ 13.6% ROE | Company-wide metric . |
| Total revenue | Part of 75% corporate | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.24B | Company-wide metric . |
| Group unit economics (new business 2024) | Part of 75% corporate | 10% | 13% | 16% | 15.8% | Company-wide metric . |
| Essent Re rev. (3rd-party) | Part of 75% corporate | $70M | $80M | $90M | $78.1M | Company-wide metric . |
| Strategic accomplishments | Part of 75% corporate | Committee judgment | Committee judgment | Committee judgment | Completed | Qualitative . |
| Individual goals (e.g., portfolio shaping, expense management, EDGE resiliency, AUS deployment, title integration) | 25% | N/A | N/A | N/A | Committee assessment | Curran-specific . |
| Payout (overall) | — | — | 100% of target | — | 150% of target | Curran’s bonus multiple . |
2024 Long-Term Incentive (LTI) – grant sizing and structure
| Grant year | Time-based RS/RSUs (shares) | Performance-based RS/RSUs at max (shares) | Vesting (time-based) | PSU Performance period | PSU vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 12,067 | 24,133 | 3 equal annual installments on Mar 1, 2025/2026/2027 | Jan 1, 2024 – Dec 31, 2026 | Earned shares (per grid) vest Mar 1, 2027 . |
PSU performance grid (applies to 2024 LTI)
| 3-yr Book Value/Share CAGR vs. Relative TSR (S&P 1500 Financial Services) | ≤25th pct | 50th pct | ≥75th pct |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12% | 100% | 150% | 200% |
| 11% | 75% | 125% | 175% |
| 10% | 50% | 100% | 150% |
| 8% | 25% | 75% | 125% |
| 7% | 0% | 50% | 100% |
| Notes: Straight-line interpolation between grid points; awards were granted at 200% of target and will be earned based on actual performance; earned shares vest March 1, 2027 . |
Other LTI mechanics
- Dividends on unvested awards accrue as dividend equivalent rights and are delivered only upon vesting .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (3/7/2025) | 289,462 shares; <1% of outstanding . |
| Unvested/time-based (included in above) | 34,065 restricted shares/RSUs subject to time-based vesting . |
| Performance-based outstanding (included in above) | 78,506 performance-based shares at maximum eligible to be earned . |
| Ownership guidelines | Senior executives: 2x base salary; all executives met guidelines as of 12/31/2024 . |
| Hedging/pledging | Hedging prohibited by policy; no disclosure of pledging in proxy . |
Vesting calendar and potential selling pressure indicators
| Grant | Type | Key vest dates | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2/8/2022 | Time-based | Final tranche Mar 1, 2025 | 4,919 shares unvested at 12/31/24 . |
| 2/8/2022 | Performance-based | Performance period 1/1/2022–12/31/2024; vested Mar 1, 2025 at 168% of target per Board certification | 24,788 unearned at 12/31/24; earned and vested 3/1/2025 (company-wide certification) . |
| 2/7/2023 | Time-based | Mar 1, 2025; Mar 1, 2026 | 10,381 unvested at 12/31/24 . |
| 2/7/2023 | Performance-based | 1/1/2023–12/31/2025; vest Mar 1, 2026 (to the extent earned) | 31,139 unearned at 12/31/24 . |
| 2/6/2024 | Time-based | Mar 1, 2025; Mar 1, 2026; Mar 1, 2027 | 12,067 granted time-based (at grant) (12,302 unvested at 12/31/24 incl. DERs) |
| 2/6/2024 | Performance-based | 1/1/2024–12/31/2026; vest Mar 1, 2027 (to the extent earned) | 24,133 granted at max (at grant) (24,603 unearned at 12/31/24 incl. DERs) |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms for Curran |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement term | Auto-renewing 1-year terms (original term expired Nov 5, 2016; renews unless 120-days notice) . |
| Base salary; target bonus | $650,000; target annual bonus = 100% of base salary . |
| LTI participation | Target LTI opportunity; mix includes performance- and time-based restricted share/RSU awards . |
| Severance (no CIC) | If terminated without cause or for good reason: lump sum 1.5x (salary + target bonus), pro-rata current-year bonus, COBRA-equivalent cash for 18 months, outplacement; time-based equity that would vest in 18 months accelerates; performance awards prorate and vest based on actual performance at period end . |
| CIC equity vesting (plan awards) | If CIC occurs after performance period: earned but unvested shares vest immediately. If CIC occurs before performance period end: awards convert/earn at target (150%); vest immediately if not assumed; if assumed, convert to time-based and vest by the original performance end date or upon qualifying termination (double trigger) . |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | 18 months post-employment for Curran (non-compete and non-interference) . |
| Clawback | NYSE-compliant clawback policy for erroneously awarded incentive compensation . |
| Hedging | Insider hedging prohibited . |
| Tax gross-ups | No excise tax gross-ups on CIC . |
Severance economics (illustrative, assuming 12/31/2024; $54.44 stock price)
| Scenario (as of 12/31/2024) | Total estimated value ($) |
|---|---|
| Termination without cause / good reason (no CIC) | 6,866,751 . |
| CIC with no termination | 3,625,436 (equity vesting only under plan terms) . |
| Termination without cause / good reason following a CIC | 7,789,501 . |
| Death or disability | 4,428,593 . |
Compensation Governance, Peer Group, and Say-on-Pay
- Peer group and pay positioning: 15-company financial/insurance peer set (e.g., Arch Capital, Enact, MGIC, NMI, Radian, Fidelity National Financial, First American, Old Republic, OneMain, RenaissanceRe, Stewart, W. R. Berkley, Mr. Cooper, PennyMac) with target cash pay between 25th–50th percentile and annual bonus opportunities targeted to median; Korn Ferry is the independent compensation advisor .
- 2024 say-on-pay: 72.5% approval; the Board engaged investors and added disclosure in response; program fundamentals otherwise maintained .
- Best practices: robust ownership guidelines; double-trigger for time-based awards on CIC; no hedging; NYSE clawback; no option repricing; no tax gross-ups .
Performance & Track Record (context)
- 2024 business outcomes: EPS $6.85; revenues ~$1.24B (+12%); ROE ~14%; MI IIF ~$244B (+2%); group unit economics on 2024 new business of 15.8%; Essent Re 3rd-party revenue $78.1M; BVPS growth ~11% (BVPS growth metric reported 13.2% in pay-vs-performance) .
- Industry/credit: MI default rate at 2.27% (vs 1.80% YE23), reflecting aging book and normalization; hurricane-related defaults added ~0.25% to default rate; persistency 86% supports earned premium duration .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and incentives: Curran’s mix is meaningfully at-risk—2024 bonus paid at 150% of target on corporate and individual performance, and PSUs tied to three-year BVPS CAGR and relative TSR (0–200% outcomes); rigorous ownership guidelines are met, and hedging is prohibited, reinforcing alignment .
- Retention risk: Contractual severance (1.5x salary+target bonus) plus prorated/accelerated equity in specified cases and 18-month non-compete reduce near-term flight risk; double-trigger CIC vesting terms are balanced and market-standard .
- Near-term supply/vesting overhang: Significant vest events occur March 1 each year through 2027 (2022 PSU cohort vested Mar 1, 2025 at 168% achievement; 2023 PSU cohort vests Mar 1, 2026, 2024 PSU cohort vests Mar 1, 2027), which can create periodic insider selling pressure depending on 10b5‑1 usage and window periods .
- Pay governance watchpoint: 2024 say-on-pay at 72.5% (below typical thresholds) signals shareholder sensitivity to design or disclosure; the committee engaged and enhanced disclosures, but investors may continue to scrutinize goal rigor and payout calibration .
- Execution risk: Company KPIs (EPS, revenue growth, unit economics, BVPS growth) were strong in 2024, but rising default rates and macro housing conditions are key variables that also influence achievement under incentive plans and long-term value creation .