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Matthew D'Onofrio

Matthew D'Onofrio

Chief Executive Officer at Evoke PharmaEvoke Pharma
CEO
Executive
Board

About Matthew D'Onofrio

Matthew J. D’Onofrio, age 55, is Evoke Pharma’s co‑founder and has served as Chief Executive Officer and director since March 2024; prior roles include President/COO (Feb 2023–Mar 2024), EVP/Chief Business Officer (2010–2023), and EVP Corporate Development (2007–2010) . He holds a B.S. in Chemistry (San Diego State University) and an MBA (University of Southern California), with 30+ years of pharmaceutical experience at Victory Pharma, Vertex Pharmaceuticals, and Eli Lilly . Pay-versus-performance disclosures show Evoke’s TSR proxy index value fell from $40.61 (2022) to $15.91 (2023) to $5.58 (2024), while net losses were $8.2M (2022), $7.8M (2023), and $5.4M (2024) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Evoke PharmaChief Executive Officer and DirectorMar 2024–present Led commercialization/finance execution; compensation tied to corporate objectives
Evoke PharmaPresident & Chief Operating OfficerFeb 2023–Mar 2024 Operational leadership; transition to CEO
Evoke PharmaEVP & Chief Business Officer2010–2023 Business development, partnerships
Evoke PharmaEVP, Corporate DevelopmentMar 2007–2010 Corporate development, M&A groundwork

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Victory PharmaVice President, Business DevelopmentNot disclosed Specialty pharma BD leadership
Vertex PharmaceuticalsDirector and Head of West Coast Business DevelopmentNot disclosed Directed partnership efforts across La Jolla facility/assets
Eli Lilly & CompanyVarious commercial roles~10 years (not itemized) Global corporate BD, commercial experience

Fixed Compensation

MetricFY 2023FY 2024FY 2025 (Approved)
Base Salary ($)$450,000 $615,000 $645,000 (approved Jan 2025)
Target Bonus %50% prior to May 2024; not explicitly stated for 2023 60% (after May 2024 promotion) Not disclosed
Actual Bonus ($)$281,250 $321,030 Not disclosed
Option Awards ($, ASC 718)$78,000 $281,762 Not disclosed
All Other Compensation ($)$48,121 $54,571 Not disclosed
Total Compensation ($)$857,371 $1,272,363 Not disclosed

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Bonus Mechanics (FY 2024)

MetricWeightingTargetActualPayoutNotes
Corporate objectives (commercial development, cash/financial objectives) 100% 60% of base salary 87% corporate achievement $321,030 (87% × 60% × $615,000) Qualitative/quantitative guidelines; cash management within budget

Equity Awards Outstanding (as of 12/31/2024)

Grant DateAward TypeSharesExercise PriceFair ValueVestingExpiration
Aug 7, 2024 Stock options64,840 (unexercisable) $5.27/share $281,762 50% at 18 months; remaining 50% monthly over next 18 months (service-based) Aug 7, 2034
  • Underwater options cancellation: In Nov 2024, D’Onofrio voluntarily canceled 9,202 options with exercise prices $48.12–$385.92; no repricing, reducing overhang and signaling discipline .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemValue
Total beneficial ownership (shares)9,820 (as of Mar 24, 2025)
% of shares outstanding* (less than 1%; 1,492,858 shares outstanding base)
Vested vs unvested options (12/31/2024)64,840 unexercisable; no exercisable disclosed in that table
Shares pledged as collateralNot disclosed
Stock ownership guidelinesNot disclosed
Hedging/insider trading policyCompany-wide Insider Trading Compliance Policy adopted by the board

Change-of-control equity treatment at Merger Effective Time (assumption date Nov 10, 2025): “Single-trigger” cancellation and cash payment for unvested options at $11.00 minus exercise price; D’Onofrio: 134,840 unvested option shares; cash consideration $830,033 . 280G excise tax cutback applies to parachute payments to avoid 4999 excise tax, reducing amounts if necessary .

Employment Terms

Employment Agreement Economics (as amended in connection with Merger)

ScenarioBase Salary SeveranceBonus Severance2025 Target BonusHealth & Welfare (COBRA)Life InsuranceOutplacementNotes
Termination without cause/for good reason (no CoC) 12 months of monthly base salary Not specified (non‑CoC) Not applicable 12 months of COBRA premiums 12 months premiums $15,000 Equity accelerates to the portion that would have vested in 12 months
Double-trigger within 24 months of change of control 24 months of monthly base salary 2× bonus for year of termination Additional payment equal to 2025 target bonus if unpaid 24 months of COBRA premiums 12 months premiums $15,000 100% acceleration of all outstanding stock awards (if T-3 months to T+12 months window)

Quantified severance and benefits under double-trigger (assumed Effective Time Nov 10, 2025):

ComponentAmount ($)
Base Salary Severance$1,290,000
Bonus Severance$774,000
2025 Bonus$387,000
Health & Welfare (incl. COBRA; plus life insurance and outplacement)$139,519 (incl. $121,789 health/welfare + $2,730 life + $15,000 outplacement)
Total Cash Severance/Benefits$2,451,000 cash + $139,519 perqs/benefits = per table categories

Transition Services Agreement (post-Merger)

TermAmount/Detail
Monthly consulting retainer$50,000/month
Original Transition Period6 months from Effective Time (extendable by mutual agreement)
Transition services bonus$375,000 (if service continues through Original Expiration Date)
Aggregate retainer through Original Expiration Date$300,000
Total potential transition compensation$675,000 (retainer + bonus)
Agreement date referencesTransition Services Agreement dated Nov 3, 2025; tied to Merger closing

Eligibility for severance/acceleration conditioned on execution/non‑revocation of a general release and continued compliance with restrictive covenants .

Board Governance and Director Service

  • Board independence: all directors independent except D’Onofrio (CEO), mitigating dual‑role concerns; board separates CEO and Chair roles, with Cam L. Garner as Chair .
  • Board meetings: six in 2024; each director attended ≥75% of meetings/committees during service; all directors attended 2024 annual meeting .
  • Committees: Audit (Reed—Chair; Smeal; Widder); Compensation (Brady—Chair; Hill; Pyszczymuka); Nominating & Governance (Hill—Chair; Widder; Pyszczymuka). D’Onofrio is not listed as a member of any committee, supporting independence of oversight .
  • Director pay: Non‑employee directors elected to forego cash compensation for 2024; D’Onofrio did not receive additional director compensation beyond executive pay .

Director Compensation Program (Non‑Employee)

ItemProgram Detail
Initial option grant (new director)5,833 options; vest in three equal annual installments
Annual grants (each non‑employee director)1,000 options; committee chair/member add‑ons by role; vest on first anniversary
2024 cash feesForegone by all non‑employee directors
Underwater optionsNov 2024 cancellation of 15,785 high‑strike options by non‑employee directors

Compensation Peer Group (2024 Review)

Peer group used for benchmarking (no fixed percentile targeting; committee used judgment): Agile Therapeutics; Akebia Therapeutics; Aquestive Therapeutics; Assertio Holdings; BioXcel Therapeutics; Cara Therapeutics; Cumberland Pharmaceuticals; Curis; DURECT Corp; Eagle Pharmaceuticals; EyeNovia; Jaguar Health; Nektar Therapeutics; NovaBay; Puma Biotechnology; RedHill Biopharma; Scorpius Holdings; scPharmaceuticals; Talphera; TherapeuticsMD; Trevena; Verastem; Verrica Pharmaceuticals .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix shift: Total compensation rose from $857,371 (2023) to $1,272,363 (2024), driven by higher base ($450k→$615k), higher bonus ($281k→$321k), and larger option grant ($78k→$282k), increasing at‑risk exposure via equity while elevating fixed pay for CEO duties .
  • Performance alignment: 2024 bonus tied 100% to corporate goals; payout at 87% achievement indicates formulaic approach rather than pure discretion .
  • Equity discipline: Cancellation of deeply underwater options (Nov 2024) avoided repricing optics; 2024 option grant priced at market ($5.27) with standard vesting cadence .
  • Change‑of‑control safeguards: 280G cutback limits parachute tax exposure; single‑trigger cash-out for options at $11.00 creates liquidity in merger but may reduce post‑close equity alignment .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • Dual role: CEO + director; independence mitigated by separate chair and independent committees .
  • Retention risk: Employment terminates at close; consulting for 6 months with $50k/month and $375k bonus; substantial double‑trigger severance could incentivize exit over long‑term retention .
  • Option cash‑out: Single‑trigger monetization of unvested options ($830,033) at $11 less strike may drive near‑term liquidity vs. long‑term ownership .
  • Governance positives: No repricing; independent committee oversight; directors waived cash fees; 280G cutback provision .

Equity Ownership & Alignment Details (Change-of-Control Quantification)

ComponentAmount ($)
Cash Severance (base + bonus + 2025 bonus)$2,451,000
Equity (unvested option cash consideration at $11 less strike)$830,033
Perquisites/Benefits (COBRA, life, outplacement)$139,519
Transition Retainer + Bonus$675,000
Total Potential Package (excluding 280G cutback effects)$4,095,552

Employment Contracts, Covenants, and Other Terms

  • Amended and restated employment agreement executed in connection with merger; includes severance terms and change-of-control double‑trigger benefits; equity acceleration rules; standard confidentiality, non‑compete, and non‑solicit covenants; release requirement .
  • Transition Services Agreement effective upon Merger close; if Effective Date does not occur, D’Onofrio remains CEO under the Employment Agreement .
  • SOX 906 certification signed by D’Onofrio as CEO for Q3 2025 10‑Q .

Performance & Track Record

YearTSR Proxy Index Value (initial $100 investment)Net Loss ($M)
2022$40.61 $(8.2)
2023$15.91 $(7.8)
2024$5.58 $(5.4)
  • 2024 corporate achievements used for bonuses included commercial milestones and maintaining adequate cash resources within budget .

Investment Implications

  • Near-term insider selling/liquidity pressure is elevated due to single‑trigger option cash‑out and substantial double‑trigger severance, plus six‑month consulting retainer/bonus; this reduces long‑term equity alignment post‑merger .
  • Governance structure limits CEO influence over compensation via independent committees and separate chair, with no repricing and disciplined option practices; peers used for benchmarking without percentile ratcheting .
  • Pay-for-performance linkage is formulaic (87% achievement), but sustained negative TSR and losses may constrain future payouts if corporate objectives tighten; watch for any revisions to bonus metrics post‑merger .
  • Retention risk is high given role termination at close; transition agreements provide short‑term continuity but imply leadership turnover; monitor 8‑K updates and definitive merger timeline for execution risk .