Bryan Buckler
EvergyAbout Bryan Buckler
W. Bryan Buckler, age 51, was appointed Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Evergy effective October 1, 2024, after serving as CFO of OGE Energy and senior finance roles at Duke Energy; he holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Georgia and completed leadership programs at UNC–Chapel Hill and UC Berkeley . Evergy’s 2024 performance context under his finance remit includes net income of $885.8 million and a 76th percentile relative TSR rank for the year; adjusted EPS (non‑GAAP) was $3.81 versus GAAP EPS of $3.79 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| OGE Energy Corp. | Chief Financial Officer | 2021–2024 | Led treasury, IR, FP&A, internal audit and controller; public company CFO experience . |
| Duke Energy | VP, Investor Relations; Director, FP&A (2016–2019); Director, Regulated Accounting (2015–2016); prior leadership roles | 2009–2020 (14+ years) | Deep regulated utility finance, planning, accounting and IR expertise . |
| Ernst & Young LLP | Audit/Advisory | ~11 years | Foundational audit and accounting experience . |
External Roles
- No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Mr. Buckler as of appointment .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Terms / Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | $660,000 (annual) | Effective Oct 1, 2024. |
| Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) target | 80% of base salary | 2024 AIP was not prorated per offer . |
| 2024 AIP actual paid | $483,120 | Calculated as 91.5% of target; disclosed amount paid for 2024 . |
| Long‑Term Incentive (LTI) target | 225% of base salary | Annual March grant cycle; 75% performance‑based RSUs, 25% time‑based RSUs . |
| Deferred compensation (2024) | $96,624 executive contributions; end‑year balance $96,624 | Eligible for match and DCP participation . |
| Perquisites/other (2024) | 401(k) match $14,977; reimbursed transition expenses $30,623; total “All Other” $51,014 | Offer provided up to $100,000 for temporary housing/transport through 9/30/2025 . |
Performance Compensation
2024 AIP Scorecard and Outcome
| Category | Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Weighted payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial | Adjusted EPS for Incentive Compensation (non‑GAAP) | 32.5% | $3.83 | $3.79 | 29.3% . |
| Financial | Adjusted NFOM Expense for Incentive Compensation (non‑GAAP, $mm) | 32.5% | $938.6 | $930.1 | 38.4% . |
| Safety | DART | 6.25% | 0.68 | 1.14 | 0.0% . |
| Safety | PVAR | 3.125% | 1.12 | 0.61 | 6.3% . |
| Safety | PSIF investigations on track | 3.125% | 90% | 100% | 3.1% . |
| Operations | SAIDI | 3.75% | 98 | 96 | 4.7% . |
| Operations | SAIFI | 3.75% | 1.01 | 1.03 | 3.0% . |
| Operations | Unplanned Commercial Availability | 7.5% | 93% | 88% | 0.0% . |
| Customer | JD Power Residential | 2.25% | 0.40 vs leader | 0.61 | 0.0% . |
| Customer | Call Center Survey (1–5) | 2.625% | 4.24 | 4.22 | 2.2% . |
| Customer | Business Customer Satisfaction (%) | 2.625% | 92.5% | 96.2% | 4.6% . |
| Total | — | 100% | — | — | 91.5% of target . |
- Mr. Buckler’s 2024 AIP payout of $483,120 reflects 91.5% of his $528,000 target (not prorated per offer letter) .
2024 LTI Structure and Mr. Buckler’s Grants
| Grant type | Grant value | Units | Performance period / vesting | Performance metrics |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Inducement Time‑Based RSUs | $1,800,000 | 29,471 units | 50% vests 10/1/2025; 50% vests 10/1/2026 . | Service‑based. |
| Inducement Performance‑Based RSUs (PBRSUs) | $1,200,000 | 19,648 units | Performance period 1/1/2024–12/31/2026; vests 3/1/2027, subject to performance . | 60% relative TSR vs EEI Index; 33.3% 3‑yr cumulative adjusted EPS; 6.7% environmental MW additions; 0–200% payout; TSR capped at 100% if absolute TSR negative . |
- Companywide LTI plan uses 75% PBRSUs and 25% time‑based RSUs with three‑year cliff vesting; PBRSUs assessed over a rolling three‑year period .
- Historical LTIP (2022–2024 tranche) paid out at 18.2% of target (0% on relative TSR, 12.2% on EPS, and a 90% payout for the environmental component per Committee discretion), underscoring performance stringency .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 0 common shares directly; 36,611 share equivalents (RSUs that settle in stock); total share interest 36,611; <1% of shares outstanding . |
| Outstanding unvested awards at 12/31/2024 | Time‑based RSUs: 29,796 units ($1,833,943); PBRSUs (target): 19,648 units ($1,209,334) . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Executive officers must achieve ownership equal to 2–3x base salary (as applicable) within five years of appointment; all NEOs have met or are on track . |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for all employees and directors; no margin accounts or pledging allowed . |
| Clawback | SEC‑compliant clawback policy applies to cash and equity awards . |
Vesting schedule and potential liquidity windows:
- 50% of the 29,471 time‑based inducement RSUs vest on 10/1/2025 and 50% on 10/1/2026; standard tax‑withholding share sales may occur at vest dates .
Employment Terms
| Term | Economics / provisions |
|---|---|
| Employment status | At‑will; no employment agreement . |
| Relocation/transition | Up to $100,000 reimbursement for temporary housing and transportation through 9/30/2025 . |
| Severance Plan (non‑CIC) | If terminated without Cause (outside CIC): lump sum equal to 1x salary + 1x target bonus, plus pro‑rata current‑year target bonus, 12 months COBRA cash equivalent, pro‑rata vesting of equity (PBRSUs after performance period) . |
| Illustrative Severance (as of 12/31/2024) | Total estimated: $2,235,795; includes Salary $660,000; Bonus $528,000; Annual bonus (pro‑rata) $528,000; Pro‑rata vesting values for equity (PSUs $124,914; RSUs $342,930); COBRA $26,951; outplacement $25,000 . |
| Change‑in‑Control (CIC) | Double‑trigger; for CFO, 2x highest salary + 2x average bonus; accelerated vesting; 2 years benefits; no excise tax gross‑ups; restrictive covenants (confidentiality, non‑compete, non‑solicit, non‑disparagement) . |
| Illustrative CIC payout (as of 12/31/2024) | Total estimated: $6,108,093; includes 2x salary $1,320,000; 2x bonus $1,056,000; 2024 annual bonus $528,000; performance shares vesting $1,222,449; restricted stock vesting $1,833,944; benefits $78,700; retirement benefit enhancement $69,000; vacation — . |
Performance & Track Record
- 2024 pay-for-performance calibration: Corporate AIP paid at 91.5% of target, driven by strong NFOM control and near‑target Adjusted EPS; safety and generation availability underperformed .
- Relative performance: 2024 relative TSR ranked at the 76th percentile; prior 2022–2024 LTIP TSR component paid 0%, with total LTIP payout at 18.2%, signaling tough multi‑year hurdles and alignment stringency .
- Shareholder support: Say‑on‑Pay approval ~96% in 2024, indicating investor alignment with compensation design .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk profile: Heavy performance orientation (no stock options; majority PBRSUs; SEC‑compliant clawback; no gross‑ups; double‑trigger CIC) aligns with regulated utility best practice .
- Inducement awards: Front‑loaded time‑based RSUs ($1.8m) and PBRSUs ($1.2m) to replace forfeited prior‑employer equity; creates two near‑term vesting events (2025/2026) that may introduce modest selling pressure at vest for tax withholding but maintain long‑dated performance alignment through 2027 .
- Metric rigor: AIP and LTIP emphasize Adjusted EPS, NFOM, grid reliability, and relative TSR; 2025 AIP increases EPS weighting and refines ops and customer metrics, maintaining focus on earnings quality and reliability outcomes .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Ownership guidelines (2–3x salary within five years) and prohibited hedging/pledging promote alignment; Buckler is early in tenure with 36.6k share equivalents outstanding and clear milestones to reach guideline levels .
- Overhang and sell windows: Two sizable time‑based vest tranches (Oct 2025 and Oct 2026) and a PBRSU vest in Mar 2027 may create periodic liquidity events; however, majority of value is performance‑contingent (TSR/EPS/renewables) dampening near‑term sell pressure risk .
- Pay-for-performance signal: 2022–2024 LTIP payout at 18.2% demonstrates down‑cycle accountability, while 2024 TSR improvement and AIP at 91.5% support measured upside; this combination suggests a compensation framework that should not encourage excessive risk‑taking while still prioritizing EPS discipline and cost control .
- Downside/counterpoints: Minimal direct share ownership to date and sizable inducement time‑based RSUs reduce immediate “skin‑in‑the‑game” optics until guideline attainment; safety underperformance and fleet availability misses in 2024 warrant continued monitoring of operational KPIs under Buckler’s finance leadership .
Compensation and incentive details above are drawn from Evergy’s 2025 Proxy Statement (covering 2024) and the 8‑K announcing Mr. Buckler’s appointment and offer terms .