David Campbell
EvergyAbout David Campbell
David A. Campbell is Chairman, President, and CEO of Evergy, Inc. (EVRG). He joined as President and CEO in January 2021 and was designated Chairman following the 2024 annual meeting; he currently serves on the Board’s Finance Committee. Age 56; education includes a B.A. (Yale), M.Phil. (Oxford), and J.D. (Harvard). Performance during his tenure shows GAAP net income of $891.9M (2021), $765.0M (2022), $743.6M (2023), and $885.8M (2024), while Evergy’s relative TSR rank versus EEI peers was 86th percentile (2021), 14th (2022), 27th (2023), and 76th (2024) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vistra Corp (NYSE: VST) | EVP & CFO | 2019–2020 | Led finance at a large power company; prior CFO experience supports Evergy’s capital allocation rigor . |
| InfraREIT, Inc. (NYSE: HIFR) | CEO & Director | 2014–2019 | Ran a rate‑regulated transmission REIT, strengthening Campbell’s regulated asset expertise . |
| TXU Corp / Energy Future Holdings | CEO, Luminant; CFO, TXU | Not disclosed | Oversaw generation operations and corporate finance at scale in Texas power markets . |
| McKinsey & Company | Partner | Not disclosed | Strategy and operations advisory background; foundation for execution discipline . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ESCO Technologies Inc. (NYSE: ESE) | Director; Audit & Finance Committee Member | 2024–present | Added public company board experience . |
| Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) | Board Member | Current | Industry technology and reliability leadership . |
| Edison Electric Institute (EEI) | Board Member | Current | Sector policy and peer benchmarking . |
| Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited | Board Member | Current | Nuclear risk governance . |
| Truman Library Institute; KC Area Development Council | Board Member | Current | Regional civic engagement . |
| Yale School of the Environment | Leadership Council Member | Current | ESG thought leadership . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 1,029,423 | 1,055,510 | 1,056,000 |
| CEO Pay Ratio | — | — | ~50:1 for 2024 |
Notes:
- Campbell does not receive additional director compensation for Board service (he is an officer; director compensation applies to non‑employees) .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024 Design and Results
| Metric | Weight (%) | Target | Actual | Payout Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EPS for Incentive Compensation | 32.5 | $3.83 | $3.79 | 29.3% |
| Adjusted NFOM Expense (Non‑Fuel O&M) | 32.5 | $938.6M | $930.1M | 38.4% |
| Safety – DART | 6.25 | 0.68 | 1.14 | 0.0% |
| Safety – PVAR | 3.125 | 1.12 | 0.61 | 6.3% |
| Safety – PSIF Investigations | 3.125 | 90% | 100% | 3.1% |
| Operations – SAIDI (minutes) | 7.5 | 98 | 96 | 4.7% |
| Operations – SAIFI | 7.5 | 0.96 | 1.03 | 3.0% |
| Ops – Unplanned Commercial Availability | 7.5 | 95% | 88% | 0.0% |
| Customer – JD Power Residential | 2.25 | 0.40 | 0.61 | 0.0% |
| Customer – Call Center Survey | 2.625 | 4.30 | 4.22 | 2.2% |
| Customer – Business Satisfaction | 2.625 | 95.0% | 96.2% | 4.6% |
| Weighted Payout | — | — | — | 91.5% |
| Executive | Base ($) | Target Bonus (% Salary) | Actual Payout (% of Target) | Actual Paid ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| David A. Campbell | 1,056,000 | 125% | 91.5% | 1,207,800 |
AIP governance highlights: modifier framework (none applied in 2024), diversified scorecard linking financial, safety, operations, and customer outcomes; plan risks assessed annually; clawback policy in place .
Long‑Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – 2024 Structure and Grants
- Vehicles: 75% performance‑based RSUs; 25% time‑based RSUs; cliff vest at 3 years; performance RSUs earned 0–200% based on 3‑yr goals .
- Performance metrics and targets:
- Relative TSR vs EEI Index: 60% weight; threshold 25th percentile, target 50th, stretch 70th, superior 90th; capped at 100% if absolute TSR is negative .
- 3‑yr cumulative adjusted EPS: 33.3% weight; threshold $11.74, target $12.07, stretch $12.25, superior $12.44 .
- Environmental (renewable MW adds): 6.7% weight; threshold 200MW, target 300–500MW, stretch 500MW+ with contracts, superior 650MW in‑service plus ≥300MW under contract by YE 2026 .
| Campbell’s 2024 LTIP Grants | Time‑Based RSUs | Performance‑Based RSUs (Target) |
|---|---|---|
| Grant Date Value ($) | 1,259,280 | 3,777,840 |
| Units Granted | 25,247 | 75,739 |
Historical performance equity vesting:
- 2022–2024 PBRSUs earned at 18.2% of target; Campbell vested 10,052 shares; value realized $618,701; accrued dividends $74,435 (vested at 12/31/2024 price $61.55) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficially Owned Shares | 108,960 shares (includes purchases on Mar 3, 2021 and Sep 23, 2021) . |
| Share Equivalents (settle in stock) | 75,994 RSUs; total interest 184,954; <1% of shares outstanding . |
| Unvested Time‑Based RSUs (12/31/24) | 78,603 units; market value $4,838,007 (at $61.55) . |
| Unearned Performance RSUs (Target) | 133,984 units; value $8,246,715 (at $61.55) . |
| Upcoming Vest Dates (Representative) | Campbell’s time‑based RSUs vest Mar 1, 2025; Mar 1, 2026; Mar 1, 2027; performance cycles 2023–2025 and 2024–2026 . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | CEO: 6x base salary; executives: 2–3x; all NEOs met or are on track; robust director guidelines (5x cash retainer) . |
| Hedging/Pledging Policy | Prohibited for all employees and directors; no margin accounts or pledging . |
Say‑on‑Pay and shareholder alignment:
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval ~96% .
- Pay mix heavily at‑risk; no stock options; standardized grant cycle; SEC‑compliant clawback .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | None; NEOs employed at will . |
| Executive Severance Plan (No CIC) | CEO: 2x salary + 2x target bonus + pro‑rata current year bonus + 24 months COBRA; pro‑rata vesting of equity; optional outplacement up to $25k . |
| CEO Severance Illustrative (12/31/24) | Total $15,381,305 (includes salary, bonuses, equity vesting, COBRA, vacation, outplacement) . |
| Change‑in‑Control (CIC) | Double‑trigger; CEO: 3x highest salary + 3x average bonus; full vesting of RSUs; health/welfare and retirement enhancements; no excise tax gross‑ups . |
| CEO CIC Illustrative (12/31/24) | Total $25,789,248 (includes salary/bonus multiples, equity vesting, benefits) . |
| Restrictive Covenants | CIC agreements include confidentiality, non‑competition, non‑solicitation, non‑disparagement, and assistance covenants (terms apply upon payment) . |
| Deferred Compensation | DCP allows deferrals (up to 50% salary, 100% AIP) at 6.16% 2024 Moody’s Baa rate; Campbell did not participate in 2024 . |
| Clawback Policy | Recovery of AIP and LTIP awards upon restatement or other inaccuracy; SEC‑compliant . |
Board Governance and Director Service
- Board structure uses combined Chair/CEO with Lead Independent Director (B. Anthony Isaac); executive sessions at each Board and committee meeting; independent committee chairs; 11 of 12 nominees independent (Campbell not independent as CEO) .
- Board meetings: 4 in 2024; incumbent nominees attended >75% of aggregate meetings/committees served .
- Committee service: Campbell serves on Finance Committee (members largely independent; CEO included for financial expertise) .
- Independence considerations: Combined roles mitigated by robust LID authority, executive sessions, majority independent Board, and committee oversight .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Year‑over‑year pay mix remains heavily performance‑weighted: majority of target compensation at risk; LTIP 75% PBRSUs (TSR/EPS/Environmental) .
- No options; avoids repricing risk and option‑driven selling pressure; grants follow standard annual cycle with average price conversion to avoid timing games .
- Peer benchmarking against regulated utility peers; target positioning around market median; independent consultant (Meridian) retained .
- 2024 AIP paid at 91.5% of target, balancing EPS, cost control (NFOM), reliability, safety, and customer experience outcomes .
Performance Snapshot
| Metric | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Income ($) | 891,900,000 | 765,000,000 | 743,600,000 | 885,800,000 |
| Relative TSR Rank (EEI peers) | 86th percentile | 14th percentile | 27th percentile | 76th percentile |
| Cumulative TSR (Index to $100) | 113 | 108 | 93 | 130 |
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging prohibited; mitigates misalignment risk .
- No excise tax gross‑ups; double‑trigger CIC; robust clawback; no stock options; standardized grant schedule; strong ownership guidelines .
- Governance mitigants for Chair/CEO dual role: LID, executive sessions, independent committee leadership .
Equity Vesting and Potential Selling Pressure
- Material RSU vest dates: Campbell has cliff vesting scheduled March 1, 2025, March 1, 2026, March 1, 2027; performance cycles end 2025 and 2026 (settle in March 2026/2027). 2022–2024 PBRSUs paid at 18.2% of target in March 2025 .
- No options outstanding; equity is RSU‑based, reducing option‑driven selling dynamics .
- Company policy prohibits hedging/pledging, limiting leverage‑related selling risks .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay support ~96% indicates broad investor approval of pay structure and outcomes .
- Annual frequency recommended and practiced; prior frequency vote in 2019 supported annual (~98%) .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)
| Peers (sample) | |
|---|---|
| Ameren, CMS Energy, DTE Energy, Entergy, Eversource, NiSource, OGE, Pinnacle West, Portland General, PPL, WEC Energy, Xcel, CenterPoint, Alliant, Black Hills . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High proportion of performance‑based equity tied to EEI‑relative TSR and cumulative adjusted EPS, plus environmental targets, indicates strong linkage to shareholder returns and regulatory‑construct execution .
- Retention and continuity: Double‑trigger CIC and sizable severance imply low near‑term retention risk; upcoming RSU cliffs in 2026/2027 sustain multi‑year alignment but may create mechanical supply around vest dates; no options reduce volatility from exercises .
- Governance: Chair/CEO dual role is mitigated by LID authority and independent committees; robust clawback and anti‑hedging strengthen oversight; high say‑on‑pay support lowers governance overhang .
- Performance: Net income recovery in 2024 and improved relative TSR rank support pay outcomes; ongoing capital plans and cost discipline embedded in AIP metrics suggest continued focus on regulated earnings and reliability KPIs .