Claudio Almeida Prado
EVERTECAbout Claudio Almeida Prado
Claudio Almeida Prado is Executive Vice President and Group Head of Brazil at Evertec, Inc., serving in this role since April 2024. He joined Evertec in November 2023 via Sinqia, where he had been Senior Vice President of Operations since October 2022. He is 61 years old and holds a degree in electronic engineering and a master’s degree in computer engineering from the University of São Paulo, and a management and leadership certification from MIT Sloan. Prior roles include COO and Executive Director of New Business at Grupo Fleury (Brazil), COO at Grupo Abril S.A., IT Director at Banco Real, and CIO roles at Banco Santander and Deutsche Bank in Brazil .
Under his regional leadership, Evertec executed Brazil expansion initiatives including the 2025 agreement to acquire a 75% stake in Tecnobank and subsequent closing, aligning with Evertec’s growth strategy in Brazil . The company’s long-term incentives are driven by Adjusted EBITDA with a relative TSR modifier, which links senior executive equity outcomes to performance; annual incentives blend corporate, business, and individual metrics, supporting pay-for-performance alignment at the EVP level .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sinqia (acquired by Evertec) | Senior Vice President of Operations | Oct 2022 – Nov 2023 (joined Evertec Nov 2023) | Led operations at a major Brazilian fintech platform later integrated into Evertec’s footprint . |
| Grupo Fleury (Brazil) | COO and Executive Director of New Business | Sep 2016 – Sep 2022 | Oversaw operations and new business initiatives at a leading healthcare services company . |
| Grupo Abril S.A. | Chief Operating Officer | Sep 2012 – Aug 2016 | Led operational transformation at one of Brazil’s largest media groups . |
| Banco Real | IT Director | (years not disclosed) | Directed IT function at a major Brazilian bank . |
| Banco Santander (Brazil) | Chief Information Officer | (years not disclosed) | Senior technology leadership at a global bank’s Brazil operations . |
| Deutsche Bank (Brazil) | Chief Information Officer | (years not disclosed) | Senior technology leadership at a global bank’s Brazil operations . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Evertec Brasil Informática S.A. | Director / Officer (no specific designation) | 2025–present (as of filings) | Signature on SPA and subsidiary documents evidences governance role in Brazil . |
| Sinqia S.A. | Director | 2025–present (as of filings) | Listed as Director in 10-Q subsidiary guarantor signatures . |
| Sinqia Tecnologia Ltda. | Director | 2025–present (as of filings) | Listed as Director in 10-Q subsidiary guarantor signatures . |
| Torq Inovação Digital Ltda. | Director | 2025–present (as of filings) | Listed as Director in 10-Q subsidiary guarantor signatures . |
Company Performance During Prado’s Tenure Window
| Metric | Q2 2024 | Q3 2024 | Q4 2024 | Q1 2025 | Q2 2025 | Q3 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($) | 211,978,000 | 211,795,000 | 216,395,000 | 228,792,000 | 229,607,000 | 228,587,000 |
| EBITDA ($) | 76,310,000* | 75,201,000* | 74,757,000* | 77,973,000* | 84,443,000* | 66,167,000* |
| Net Income ($) | 31,901,000 | 24,678,000 | 40,062,000 | 32,703,000 | 40,465,000 | 32,861,000 |
| *Values retrieved from S&P Global. |
Fixed Compensation
- Company does not disclose Prado’s specific base salary or target bonus in the 2025 proxy; he is not listed among named executive officers (NEOs) whose specific cash compensation is detailed .
- For context, EVP-level NEOs in 2024 carried target cash incentive opportunities of 85% of base salary (CEO 125%), illustrating the typical design at his level, though Prado’s specific target is not disclosed .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (framework and recent NEO calibration)
| Metric | Weighting example (2023/2024 NEOs) | Target mechanics | Actual payout illustration |
|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate performance | 75–90% for certain EVPs; CEO 90% (examples) | Company scorecard vs goals | CFO example actual payout $514,452 with 90% corporate, 10% individual (2023) . |
| Business metric | 0–60% for business leaders (example) | Segment/functional KPI attainment | Business-weighted payouts varied by role (e.g., 60% for certain NEOs) . |
| Individual performance | 10–25% | Leadership and strategic objectives | Individual component reflected in NEO payout mix . |
Notes: The proxy shows the annual cash incentive structure and realized payouts for NEOs; Prado’s personal targets and payout are not disclosed. The structure indicates material at-risk cash tied to corporate/biz/individual performance .
Long-Term Equity Incentives (PSUs/RSUs)
- Design: Performance-based RSUs earned on one-year Adjusted EBITDA, subject to a three-year service-vesting period, and adjusted by a relative TSR modifier (+/–25%) vs Russell 2000 over the three-year period; time-based RSUs vest in installments (generally over three years) .
- 2024 grants (NEO exemplars): EVPs received both performance-based and time-based RSUs; e.g., 25,486 PSUs and 18,378 time-based RSUs for select EVPs on Feb 29, 2024 (values driven by Monte Carlo and grant-date stock price) .
- 2025 grants (NEO exemplars): EVPs continued mix with similar design; PSUs/RSUs granted on Feb 28, 2025 vesting through 2028 for time-based tranches; PSUs earned on 2025 Adjusted EBITDA with TSR modifier and three-year service .
Vesting Schedules (recent grants)
| Grant | Instrument | Vesting |
|---|---|---|
| Feb 29, 2024 | Performance-based RSUs | Earned on 2024 Adjusted EBITDA; vest on Feb 28, 2027 after three-year service; TSR modifier +/-25% vs Russell 2000 . |
| Feb 28, 2025 | Time-based RSUs | Vest in three equal installments on Feb 28, 2026, 2027, 2028, subject to service . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: Executive Vice Presidents are required to hold shares equal to 3x base salary; CEOs 5x; SVPs 1x; Directors 5x cash retainer. Designated owners have 5 years to achieve compliance (or the later of remaining term or 3 years after promotion) .
- Anti-pledging/anti-hedging: Directors, executives, and employees are prohibited from pledging Evertec securities as collateral for loans or engaging in hedging transactions; limited pledge exceptions require pre-clearance and proof of repayment capacity without resorting to pledged securities .
- Beneficial ownership: The 2025 proxy discloses directors and NEOs’ ownership and states none of those shares are pledged; Prado is not enumerated among NEOs/directors in the table, so his specific holdings are not disclosed there .
Employment Terms
- Executive Severance Policy (for “other NEOs” as of Dec 31, 2024): Upon termination without cause or for good reason (outside a CIC window), benefits include lump-sum severance equal to current base salary, pro rata annual bonus (based on actual performance), any earned but unpaid bonus, and up to 18 months of company-paid health coverage subject to COBRA election; RSUs pro-rata vest (time-based) and PSUs vest pro-rata based on actual performance post-period upon qualifying termination with release .
- Change-in-control (CIC) treatment (NEO framework): Time-based and performance-based awards receive accelerated/prorated vesting upon qualifying CIC termination; CEO terms governed by separate A&R Employment Agreement; other NEOs governed by Severance Policy and plan documents .
Note: The proxy sets policy for NEOs; Prado’s participation under specific severance arrangements is not disclosed.
Governance, Say-on-Pay, and Committee Signals
- Say-on-pay support: At the May 22, 2025 Annual Meeting, shareholders approved the advisory vote on executive compensation (For: 57,296,416; Against: 1,750,410; Abstain: 84,681; broker non-votes excluded) .
- Compensation structure oversight: The Compensation Committee uses Adjusted EBITDA with a relative TSR modifier for PSUs and grants annual time-based RSUs, emphasizing pay-for-performance and retention .
Track Record, Value Creation, and Execution Risk
- Brazil expansion: Evertec agreed to acquire 75% of Tecnobank for approximately BRL 787 million (~USD 144–148 million), funded with existing liquidity; Prado appears on subsidiary signatory pages connected to this transaction, underscoring his operational leadership in Brazil. Closing occurred on Oct 1, 2025 after CADE approval .
- Financial context: During 2024–2025, Evertec revenue grew from ~$212 million per quarter in mid-2024 to ~$229 million in mid-2025, with quarterly net income ranging ~$25–40 million, framing the operating backdrop for Brazil execution; EBITDA fluctuated, reflecting integration and growth investments (see table above) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: The mix of PSUs (Adjusted EBITDA with a relative TSR modifier) and time-based RSUs aligns senior incentives with profitable growth and shareholder returns; EVP stock ownership requirement (3x salary) and prohibitions on pledging/hedging further enhance alignment and reduce governance risk .
- Retention risk: While Prado’s specific severance terms are undisclosed, the company-wide NEO Severance Policy provides meaningful protection and pro-rata vesting on termination without cause/for good reason, supporting retention at the EVP level; three-year vesting on equity serves as a retention mechanism .
- Execution catalyst: Prado’s leadership in Brazil coincides with M&A-driven expansion (Tecnobank) and ongoing integration of Sinqia-linked assets, offering growth optionality in a large market but also integration and regulatory execution risks; Brazil initiatives are likely key drivers of his performance evaluation and future PSU outcomes .
- Shareholder sentiment: Strong approval of say-on-pay in 2025 indicates broad investor support for Evertec’s compensation program, indirectly signaling confidence in incentive alignment across the senior team, including regional leaders .