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Diego Viglianco

Executive Vice President and Chief Information Officer at EVERTECEVERTEC
Executive

About Diego Viglianco

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer at Evertec since June 2021 (consultant from March 2021); age 55; MBA in Economy and Business Administration (ESEADE University, Argentina) and B.S. in Engineering (University of Salvador, Argentina) . In 2024, corporate incentive metrics (Adjusted Net Income, Revenue) paid out at 128.54% on strong execution; 2024 performance-based RSUs earned at 136% on Adjusted EBITDA before a 3-year TSR modifier, reflecting above-target operating performance . Management cited cost initiatives and integration execution (including Sinqia) as drivers of 21.7% revenue growth and 15% Adjusted Net Income growth in 2024 .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Interbanking S.A.Chief Executive OfficerJul 2019 – Feb 2021Led digital financial ACH/real-time payments company; executive leadership in payments infrastructure .
Prisma Medios de Pago S.A. (Argentina)CEO, Processing DivisionMar 2017 – Jun 2019Ran large-scale processing; operational leadership in LATAM payments .
MasterCard (Argentina; Miami, USA)Senior Management RolesNot disclosedSenior roles across markets; deep network and operating experience in cards/payments .
PROSA (Mexico)Senior Management RolesNot disclosedExperience in Mexican payments processing ecosystem .

External Roles

None disclosed .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Base Salary ($)362,500 422,500 456,750
Bonus ($) (Christmas bonus, plus 2022 special BBPR award)211,850 13,500 13,905
All Other Compensation ($)8,355 7,616 5,279
  • 2024 base salary was $463,500 at year-end (effective July 1, 2024) and was increased a further 3% effective 2025; target annual cash incentive is 85% of base salary .

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Incentive Design and 2024 Outcome (Diego Viglianco)

  • Weighting for 2024: Corporate 60%, Individual 40% (no business segment metric for COO) .
  • Corporate metrics, targets, and payout:
Metric ($000s)WeightThreshold (90%)Target (100%)Maximum (110%)Actual 2024Payout %Weighted Score
Adjusted Net Income60% 169,020 187,800 206,580 212,369 150.00% 90.00%
Revenues40% 763,470 848,300 933,130 842,113 96.35% 38.54%
Corporate Payout128.54%
  • 2024 actual bonus for Viglianco: Target 85% of salary ($393,975); payout $506,421; component breakdown Corporate $303,852; Individual $202,568 .

Long-Term Equity Incentives

  • Structure: Mix of performance-based RSUs (one-year Adjusted EBITDA goal; 3-year service; +/-25% relative TSR vs Russell 2000 over 3 years) and time-based RSUs (3 equal annual tranches) .
  • 2024 RSU grants (Feb 29, 2024): 25,486 Perf RSUs (Monte Carlo $39.08); 18,378 Time RSUs (close $36.13); total grant value $1,660,000; 2024 EBITDA achieved above target, earning 136% of target Perf RSUs before TSR modifier; time-based RSUs vest Feb 28, 2025/2026/2027 .
  • 2025 RSU grants (Feb 28, 2025): 26,681 Perf RSUs (Monte Carlo $43.85); 20,889 Time RSUs (close $37.34); total grant value $1,950,000; same EBITDA+TSR construct; time-based RSUs vest Feb 28, 2026/2027/2028 .
Grant YearGrant DateTypeUnits GrantedValuation ReferenceVesting
2024Feb 29, 2024Performance RSUs25,486 Monte Carlo $39.08 Earned 136% on 2024 Adj. EBITDA; vests Feb 28, 2027, subject to 3-year service and TSR modifier .
2024Feb 29, 2024Time RSUs18,378 Close $36.13 1/3 on Feb 28, 2025; 1/3 on Feb 28, 2026; 1/3 on Feb 28, 2027 .
2025Feb 28, 2025Performance RSUs26,681 Monte Carlo $43.85 Earned on 2025 Adj. EBITDA; TSR-modified; vests after 3-year service from grant .
2025Feb 28, 2025Time RSUs20,889 Close $37.34 1/3 on Feb 28, 2026; 1/3 on Feb 28, 2027; 1/3 on Feb 28, 2028 .

Multi-Year Compensation Summary (NEO SCT)

Component ($)202220232024
Stock Awards1,300,000 1,660,000 1,660,000
Non-Equity Incentive (Cash)310,031 482,462 506,421
Total Compensation2,192,736 2,586,078 2,642,355

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • Stock ownership guidelines: Executive Vice Presidents: 3x base salary; all NEOs in compliance as of proxy date .
  • Hedging/pledging: Prohibited; any pledge exception requires pre-clearance and ability to repay without the collateral; company reports none of the shares held by directors/NEOs are pledged .
  • Options: None outstanding for NEOs as of 12/31/2024 .
Ownership DetailAs of DateAmount
Beneficial Ownership (common shares)Record Date Mar 28, 20251,104 shares; each director/NEO holds <1% outstanding; none pledged .
Unvested Time-Based RSUsDec 31, 202434,606 units; market value $1,194,945 at $34.53 .
Unearned Performance RSUs (capable of vesting)Dec 31, 202465,391 units; payout value $2,257,951 at $34.53 (performance period pending/target-level placeholder) .
Stock Vested in 2024FY 202435,843 shares; value $1,302,468 .

Breakdown of outstanding grants at 12/31/2024:

  • Time-based RSUs by grant: 2022: 4,182 (vest Feb 25, 2025); 2023: 12,046 (vest 50% Feb 24, 2025; 50% Feb 25, 2026); 2024: 18,378 (vest one-third on Feb 28, 2025/2026/2027) .
  • Performance-based RSUs by grant: 2022: 16,564 (vest Feb 25, 2025; EBITDA met; TSR pending at target-level placeholder); 2023: 23,341 (vest Feb 24, 2026; target-level placeholder); 2024: 25,486 (vest Feb 28, 2027; EBITDA earned at 136% pre-TSR) .

Employment Terms

  • Contract: No individual employment agreement; covered by Evertec Group Executive Severance Policy (CEO has a separate agreement) .
  • Severance (outside Change in Control): Lump sum equal to current base salary; pro rata annual bonus based on actual performance; any earned but unpaid prior-year bonus; up to 18 months COBRA subsidy .
  • Severance (within 24 months after Change in Control; double trigger): Two times (base salary + target bonus); pro rata annual bonus at target for year of termination; any earned but unpaid prior-year bonus; up to 18 months COBRA subsidy .
  • Equity on termination (outside CIC): Time-based RSUs vest pro rata at termination; performance-based RSUs vest pro rata after performance period based on actual results .
  • Equity on termination (within 24 months after CIC; double trigger): Time-based RSUs vest in full; performance-based RSUs vest in full based on actual (completed components) and target (incomplete components) .
  • Restrictive covenants: 12-month non-compete within 10-mile perimeter of Evertec’s business in Puerto Rico or any other country where the company conducts business; 12-month non-solicit; confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions .
  • Clawback: Applies to officers including EVPs; recovery on restatement within a 3-year lookback across cash/equity incentives .
  • Insider Trading Policy: Prohibits hedging/short-term trading and pledging (with limited, pre-cleared exception for non-margin collateral) .

Vesting Schedules and Potential Selling Pressure

Time-based RSU scheduled vesting (units):

  • Feb 25, 2025: 2022 grant 4,182; 2023 grant 6,023 (half of 12,046); 2024 grant 6,126 (one-third of 18,378) .
  • Feb 25, 2026: 2023 grant 6,023 (remaining half); 2024 grant 6,126 (second third) .
  • Feb 28, 2027: 2024 grant 6,126 (final third) .

Performance-based RSU vesting (service condition; final shares subject to TSR modifier where applicable):

  • Feb 25, 2025: 2022 grant 16,564 at target-level placeholder pending TSR completion .
  • Feb 24, 2026: 2023 grant 23,341 at target-level placeholder pending TSR completion .
  • Feb 28, 2027: 2024 grant earned at 136% on 2024 Adjusted EBITDA before TSR; vest subject to 3-year service and TSR modifier .

Note: Insider Trading Policy restrictions and blackout windows apply; pledging and hedging are prohibited, and vesting does not mandate sale .

Compensation Structure Analysis (Pay-for-Performance)

  • Annual bonus emphasizes quantitative results: 60% Adjusted Net Income / 40% Revenue at the corporate level; 2024 payout was 128.54% driven by 15% ANI growth and 21.7% revenue growth (vs target ~22%) .
  • Long-term equity is majority performance-based (EBITDA with relative TSR modifier), with 3-year service-based vesting; 2024 performance RSUs earned at 136% pre-TSR, reinforcing operating leverage alignment .
  • Mix and risk: Caps on bonus (150% of target) and performance RSUs (250% of target) reduce excessive risk-taking; clawback and ownership guidelines further align incentives .

Say-on-Pay & Governance Context (Program-level)

  • 2024 Say-on-Pay approval fell to 62.2% (from 98.5% in 2023) due to a one-time CEO retention award; no special awards in 2024; committee enhanced disclosure and committed to performance-based design for any future special grants .

Expertise & Qualifications

  • 25+ years in payments processing across Argentina, Mexico, and the U.S.; senior roles at MasterCard and PROSA; CEO roles at Interbanking and Prisma Processing Division; MBA and engineering education .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Significant unvested and performance-contingent equity (100k+ units combined at 12/31/24) ties outcomes to EBITDA and TSR; compliance with 3x salary ownership guideline; no pledging allowed, reducing alignment risk .
  • Retention: Double-trigger CIC economics (2x cash + equity acceleration) and multi-year vesting across 2025–2027 support retention but also create identifiable vest “windows” (notably Feb 2025 and Feb 2026) that can increase liquidity/supply around those dates .
  • Performance signal: 2024 corporate and EBITDA outcomes exceeded targets, yielding above-target cash and equity payouts; ongoing TSR modifier adds market-discipline to realized equity, balancing operational achievement with shareholder returns .