Miguel Vizcarrondo
About Miguel Vizcarrondo
Executive Vice President at Evertec since 2012 and Chief Product & Innovation Officer since August 2022. Previously Chief Commercial Officer for Puerto Rico and the Caribbean (2021–Aug 2022) and Head of Merchant Acquiring & Payment Processing (2012–2021). Prior to Evertec (joined 2010), he spent 14 years at Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, culminating as SVP of Merchant Acquiring Solutions (2006–2010). He holds a B.S. in Management (Finance) from Tulane University and is age 52 as of the 2025 proxy filing date . Company performance context: in 2024, revenue rose ~21.7% YoY and Adjusted Net Income rose ~15%, and 2024 Adjusted EBITDA of ~$339.2M exceeded a $327.4M target; 2024 PSUs earned at 136% of target before a three‑year TSR modifier applies .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact / scope |
|---|---|---|---|
| Evertec | EVP; Chief Product & Innovation Officer | 2022–present | Leads product and innovation agenda |
| Evertec | EVP; Chief Commercial Officer, PR & Caribbean | 2021–Aug 2022 | Commercial leadership in PR/Caribbean |
| Evertec | EVP; Head of Merchant Acquiring & Payment Processing | 2012–2021 | Led acquiring and processing businesses |
| Evertec | Joined company | 2010 | Joined from Banco Popular de Puerto Rico |
| Banco Popular de Puerto Rico | SVP, Merchant Acquiring Solutions | 2006–2010 | Led merchant acquiring; 14 years at BPPR overall |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Banco Popular Foundation | Member | Current | Community service involvement |
| Puerto Rico American Football Alliance | President | Current | Youth sports league leadership |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 (approved/effective) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary (as of 12/31 for each year; USD) | $370,800 | $381,924 | $393,382 (effective 7/1/2023) | $405,183 (effective 7/1/2024) |
| Salary actually paid (Summary Comp; USD) | $365,400 | $376,362 | $387,653 | — (not a 2024 NEO) |
| Target annual cash incentive (% of salary) | 85% (NEO design) | 85% (NEO design) | 85% | — (not disclosed for 2024) |
| Actual annual incentive cash paid (USD) | $376,038 | $325,124 | $450,904 | — |
All other compensation (perquisites and plan match) – 2023 detail:
| Component (2023) | Amount |
|---|---|
| 401(k)/savings plan match | $4,950 |
| Club membership | $5,085 |
| Other payments (gifts, event tickets, training, etc.) | $14,929 |
| Total “All other compensation” | $24,964 |
Notes: 2023 incentive weighting for Vizcarrondo: Corporate 50%, Business Metric 30%, Individual 20%. Payout breakdown: Corporate $226,797; Business $143,188; Individual $80,919 .
Performance Compensation
Annual cash incentive design (alignment)
- Corporate metrics: Adjusted Net Income (60%) and Revenues (40%); payouts 50%–150% of target with linear interpolation .
- Illustrative 2024 corporate outcome: Corporate score 128.54% (ANI above target; revenue ~0.7% below target) .
Long‑term incentives (RSUs/PSUs)
- Performance‑based RSUs earned on one‑year Adjusted EBITDA with a relative TSR modifier (+/‑25%) over a 3‑year period vs Russell 2000; time‑based RSUs vest ratably over 3 years; dividend equivalents accumulate and pay only on vest .
Grants and outcomes (Miguel Vizcarrondo):
| Grant year | Award type | Grant date | Shares granted | Grant date FV (USD) | Vesting schedule |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Time‑based RSUs | 2/24/2023 | 14,149 | $520,000 | 1/3 each on 2/24/2024, 2/24/2025, 2/24/2026 |
| 2023 | Performance RSUs | 2/24/2023 | 18,279 (target) | $780,000 | Vests 2/24/2026; earned on 2023 EBITDA, then TSR modifier over 3 years |
| 2024 | Time‑based RSUs | 2/29/2024 | 14,392 | Included in $1,300,000 total LTI | 1/3 each on 2/28/2025, 2/28/2026, 2/28/2027 |
| 2024 | Performance RSUs | 2/29/2024 | 19,959 (target) | Included in $1,300,000 total LTI; Monte Carlo $39.08 | Vests 2/28/2027; earned on 2024 EBITDA at 136% prelim, then TSR modifier to 2027 |
Outstanding and scheduled vestings from prior awards (as of 12/31/2023):
| Award | Shares unvested | Key dates |
|---|---|---|
| Time‑based RSUs (3/2/2021 grant) | 4,493 | Last tranche vested 3/2/2024 |
| Time‑based RSUs (2/25/2022 grant) | 8,362 | Tranches on 2/25/2023, 2/25/2024, 2/25/2025 |
| Time‑based RSUs (2/24/2023 grant) | 14,149 | 2/24/2024, 2/24/2025, 2/24/2026 |
| Performance RSUs (3/2/2021 grant) | 18,029 | Vested 3/2/2024; 2021 EBITDA payout 200% x TSR 1.15 = 230% |
| Performance RSUs (2/25/2022 grant) | 16,564 | Vests 2/25/2025 (subject to TSR modifier) |
| Performance RSUs (2/24/2023 grant) | 18,279 | Vests 2/24/2026 (subject to TSR modifier) |
No stock options are outstanding for NEOs; equity is delivered in RSUs/PSUs .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Metric | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (shares) | 110,732 | 128,531 | 98,546 | 89,397 | 106,580 | 141,921 |
| Ownership as % shares outstanding | <1% each year (company disclosure) | |||||
| Shares pledged | None (company table indicates none pledged) | |||||
| Unvested time‑based RSUs (12/31/2023) | 27,004 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Unearned performance RSUs (12/31/2023) | 52,872 | — | — | — | — | — |
Stock ownership guidelines: EVPs must hold stock equal to 3x base salary; 5‑year compliance window; counts include direct shares, unvested time‑based RSUs, and plan shares (but exclude unearned PSUs). All NEOs were in compliance as of the 2024 proxy; in 2025, all independent directors and NEOs were in compliance . Anti‑pledging and anti‑hedging policies prohibit pledging and hedging Evertec securities (exceptions to pledging require pre‑clearance and financial capacity) .
Insider selling pressure indicators (near‑term supply):
- 2024–2027 vesting cadence includes time‑based tranches each February and performance tranches in 2025 and 2026 (and 2027 for 2024 PSUs), creating predictable liquidity windows tied to vest dates noted above .
Employment Terms
- Employment agreements: Only the CEO has an employment agreement; other NEOs (which have included EVPs) participate in the Executive Severance Policy rather than individual contracts .
- Severance (non‑CIC): For participating NEOs, upon termination without Cause or resignation for Good Reason outside 24 months post‑CIC: cash severance equal to 1x base salary; pro‑rata annual bonus based on actual performance; any earned but unpaid bonus; and up to 18 months of company‑paid health coverage (COBRA) .
- Change‑in‑control (double‑trigger): If terminated without Cause or for Good Reason within 24 months following a CIC: cash severance equal to 2x (base salary + target bonus); pro‑rata target bonus; any earned but unpaid bonus; and up to 18 months of company‑paid health coverage .
- Equity on separation: Outside CIC, time‑based RSUs pro‑rata vest; PSUs pro‑rata settle after performance period based on actual results. Following CIC + qualifying termination, time‑based RSUs fully vest; PSUs fully vest at actual performance for completed components and at target for incomplete components .
- Restrictive covenants (Severance Policy): 12‑month post‑termination non‑compete (with specified geographic scope), 12‑month non‑solicit, confidentiality and non‑disparagement provisions .
- Clawback: Applies to all incentive compensation for covered officers, enabling recoupment within a 3‑year lookback in case of certain triggers, including restatements .
- Pension/deferred comp: The company does not provide defined benefit pensions or non‑qualified deferred compensation to NEOs .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Incentive design ties a majority of variable pay to Adjusted EBITDA (PSUs) with a relative TSR modifier and to annual Adjusted Net Income/Revenue for cash bonuses, with demonstrated over‑target results (e.g., 2021 PSUs paid at 230%; 2024 PSUs prelim earned at 136% before TSR) supporting execution credibility .
- Ownership/retention: Rising beneficial ownership and compliance with stringent ownership guidelines, combined with anti‑pledging/hedging policies and a robust clawback, indicate strong alignment and lower governance risk. Predictable February vesting cycles (2025–2027) create identifiable but measured potential selling pressure windows .
- Severance/CIC economics: Standard market‑median severance and double‑trigger CIC terms (2x cash + equity acceleration mechanics) balance retention with shareholder protections; restrictive covenants further mitigate transition risk .
- Governance backdrop: While 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approval declined (62.2%) due to a CEO‑specific one‑time award, the company committed to avoid future non‑performance special awards and enhanced disclosure; core program remains performance‑weighted—supportive for evaluating broader team incentives, including EVPs .
Appendix: Additional Reference Tables
Annual Cash Incentive—2023 Breakdown (Vizcarrondo)
| Target bonus % | Corporate weight | Business weight | Individual weight | Target ($) | Actual payout ($) | Corporate ($) | Business ($) | Individual ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 85% | 50% | 30% | 20% | $334,375 | $450,904 | $226,797 | $143,188 | $80,919 |
Outstanding Equity—12/31/2023 (Vizcarrondo)
| Category | Shares | Market value reference |
|---|---|---|
| Unvested time‑based RSUs | 27,004 | Valued at $40.94/sh as of 12/29/2023 (company reference) |
| Unearned PSUs (target) | 52,872 | Valued at $40.94/sh as of 12/29/2023 (company reference) |
None of the NEOs had outstanding stock options at year‑end 2023 .