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Miguel Vizcarrondo

Executive Vice President, Chief Product & Innovation Officer at EVERTECEVERTEC
Executive

About Miguel Vizcarrondo

Executive Vice President at Evertec since 2012 and Chief Product & Innovation Officer since August 2022. Previously Chief Commercial Officer for Puerto Rico and the Caribbean (2021–Aug 2022) and Head of Merchant Acquiring & Payment Processing (2012–2021). Prior to Evertec (joined 2010), he spent 14 years at Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, culminating as SVP of Merchant Acquiring Solutions (2006–2010). He holds a B.S. in Management (Finance) from Tulane University and is age 52 as of the 2025 proxy filing date . Company performance context: in 2024, revenue rose ~21.7% YoY and Adjusted Net Income rose ~15%, and 2024 Adjusted EBITDA of ~$339.2M exceeded a $327.4M target; 2024 PSUs earned at 136% of target before a three‑year TSR modifier applies .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact / scope
EvertecEVP; Chief Product & Innovation Officer2022–presentLeads product and innovation agenda
EvertecEVP; Chief Commercial Officer, PR & Caribbean2021–Aug 2022Commercial leadership in PR/Caribbean
EvertecEVP; Head of Merchant Acquiring & Payment Processing2012–2021Led acquiring and processing businesses
EvertecJoined company2010Joined from Banco Popular de Puerto Rico
Banco Popular de Puerto RicoSVP, Merchant Acquiring Solutions2006–2010Led merchant acquiring; 14 years at BPPR overall

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
Banco Popular FoundationMemberCurrentCommunity service involvement
Puerto Rico American Football AlliancePresidentCurrentYouth sports league leadership

Fixed Compensation

Metric2021202220232024 (approved/effective)
Base salary (as of 12/31 for each year; USD)$370,800 $381,924 $393,382 (effective 7/1/2023) $405,183 (effective 7/1/2024)
Salary actually paid (Summary Comp; USD)$365,400 $376,362 $387,653 — (not a 2024 NEO)
Target annual cash incentive (% of salary)85% (NEO design) 85% (NEO design) 85% — (not disclosed for 2024)
Actual annual incentive cash paid (USD)$376,038 $325,124 $450,904

All other compensation (perquisites and plan match) – 2023 detail:

Component (2023)Amount
401(k)/savings plan match$4,950
Club membership$5,085
Other payments (gifts, event tickets, training, etc.)$14,929
Total “All other compensation”$24,964

Notes: 2023 incentive weighting for Vizcarrondo: Corporate 50%, Business Metric 30%, Individual 20%. Payout breakdown: Corporate $226,797; Business $143,188; Individual $80,919 .

Performance Compensation

Annual cash incentive design (alignment)

  • Corporate metrics: Adjusted Net Income (60%) and Revenues (40%); payouts 50%–150% of target with linear interpolation .
  • Illustrative 2024 corporate outcome: Corporate score 128.54% (ANI above target; revenue ~0.7% below target) .

Long‑term incentives (RSUs/PSUs)

  • Performance‑based RSUs earned on one‑year Adjusted EBITDA with a relative TSR modifier (+/‑25%) over a 3‑year period vs Russell 2000; time‑based RSUs vest ratably over 3 years; dividend equivalents accumulate and pay only on vest .

Grants and outcomes (Miguel Vizcarrondo):

Grant yearAward typeGrant dateShares grantedGrant date FV (USD)Vesting schedule
2023Time‑based RSUs2/24/202314,149 $520,000 1/3 each on 2/24/2024, 2/24/2025, 2/24/2026
2023Performance RSUs2/24/202318,279 (target) $780,000 Vests 2/24/2026; earned on 2023 EBITDA, then TSR modifier over 3 years
2024Time‑based RSUs2/29/202414,392 Included in $1,300,000 total LTI 1/3 each on 2/28/2025, 2/28/2026, 2/28/2027
2024Performance RSUs2/29/202419,959 (target) Included in $1,300,000 total LTI; Monte Carlo $39.08 Vests 2/28/2027; earned on 2024 EBITDA at 136% prelim, then TSR modifier to 2027

Outstanding and scheduled vestings from prior awards (as of 12/31/2023):

AwardShares unvestedKey dates
Time‑based RSUs (3/2/2021 grant)4,493 Last tranche vested 3/2/2024
Time‑based RSUs (2/25/2022 grant)8,362 Tranches on 2/25/2023, 2/25/2024, 2/25/2025
Time‑based RSUs (2/24/2023 grant)14,149 2/24/2024, 2/24/2025, 2/24/2026
Performance RSUs (3/2/2021 grant)18,029 Vested 3/2/2024; 2021 EBITDA payout 200% x TSR 1.15 = 230%
Performance RSUs (2/25/2022 grant)16,564 Vests 2/25/2025 (subject to TSR modifier)
Performance RSUs (2/24/2023 grant)18,279 Vests 2/24/2026 (subject to TSR modifier)

No stock options are outstanding for NEOs; equity is delivered in RSUs/PSUs .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Metric201920202021202220232024
Beneficial ownership (shares)110,732 128,531 98,546 89,397 106,580 141,921
Ownership as % shares outstanding<1% each year (company disclosure)
Shares pledgedNone (company table indicates none pledged)
Unvested time‑based RSUs (12/31/2023)27,004
Unearned performance RSUs (12/31/2023)52,872

Stock ownership guidelines: EVPs must hold stock equal to 3x base salary; 5‑year compliance window; counts include direct shares, unvested time‑based RSUs, and plan shares (but exclude unearned PSUs). All NEOs were in compliance as of the 2024 proxy; in 2025, all independent directors and NEOs were in compliance . Anti‑pledging and anti‑hedging policies prohibit pledging and hedging Evertec securities (exceptions to pledging require pre‑clearance and financial capacity) .

Insider selling pressure indicators (near‑term supply):

  • 2024–2027 vesting cadence includes time‑based tranches each February and performance tranches in 2025 and 2026 (and 2027 for 2024 PSUs), creating predictable liquidity windows tied to vest dates noted above .

Employment Terms

  • Employment agreements: Only the CEO has an employment agreement; other NEOs (which have included EVPs) participate in the Executive Severance Policy rather than individual contracts .
  • Severance (non‑CIC): For participating NEOs, upon termination without Cause or resignation for Good Reason outside 24 months post‑CIC: cash severance equal to 1x base salary; pro‑rata annual bonus based on actual performance; any earned but unpaid bonus; and up to 18 months of company‑paid health coverage (COBRA) .
  • Change‑in‑control (double‑trigger): If terminated without Cause or for Good Reason within 24 months following a CIC: cash severance equal to 2x (base salary + target bonus); pro‑rata target bonus; any earned but unpaid bonus; and up to 18 months of company‑paid health coverage .
  • Equity on separation: Outside CIC, time‑based RSUs pro‑rata vest; PSUs pro‑rata settle after performance period based on actual results. Following CIC + qualifying termination, time‑based RSUs fully vest; PSUs fully vest at actual performance for completed components and at target for incomplete components .
  • Restrictive covenants (Severance Policy): 12‑month post‑termination non‑compete (with specified geographic scope), 12‑month non‑solicit, confidentiality and non‑disparagement provisions .
  • Clawback: Applies to all incentive compensation for covered officers, enabling recoupment within a 3‑year lookback in case of certain triggers, including restatements .
  • Pension/deferred comp: The company does not provide defined benefit pensions or non‑qualified deferred compensation to NEOs .

Investment Implications

  • Pay‑for‑performance alignment: Incentive design ties a majority of variable pay to Adjusted EBITDA (PSUs) with a relative TSR modifier and to annual Adjusted Net Income/Revenue for cash bonuses, with demonstrated over‑target results (e.g., 2021 PSUs paid at 230%; 2024 PSUs prelim earned at 136% before TSR) supporting execution credibility .
  • Ownership/retention: Rising beneficial ownership and compliance with stringent ownership guidelines, combined with anti‑pledging/hedging policies and a robust clawback, indicate strong alignment and lower governance risk. Predictable February vesting cycles (2025–2027) create identifiable but measured potential selling pressure windows .
  • Severance/CIC economics: Standard market‑median severance and double‑trigger CIC terms (2x cash + equity acceleration mechanics) balance retention with shareholder protections; restrictive covenants further mitigate transition risk .
  • Governance backdrop: While 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approval declined (62.2%) due to a CEO‑specific one‑time award, the company committed to avoid future non‑performance special awards and enhanced disclosure; core program remains performance‑weighted—supportive for evaluating broader team incentives, including EVPs .

Appendix: Additional Reference Tables

Annual Cash Incentive—2023 Breakdown (Vizcarrondo)

Target bonus %Corporate weightBusiness weightIndividual weightTarget ($)Actual payout ($)Corporate ($)Business ($)Individual ($)
85% 50% 30% 20% $334,375 $450,904 $226,797 $143,188 $80,919

Outstanding Equity—12/31/2023 (Vizcarrondo)

CategorySharesMarket value reference
Unvested time‑based RSUs27,004 Valued at $40.94/sh as of 12/29/2023 (company reference)
Unearned PSUs (target)52,872 Valued at $40.94/sh as of 12/29/2023 (company reference)

None of the NEOs had outstanding stock options at year‑end 2023 .