Paola Pérez
About Paola Pérez
Paola Pérez, age 41, serves as Executive Vice President and Group Head of Puerto Rico; she has been EVP since February 2018, previously Chief Administrative Officer (March 2020–August 2022) and Senior Vice President of People and Culture (August 2017–February 2018). She joined EVTC in 2011 as Director of Internal Audit; prior roles include External Reporting Manager for the Latin America region at Chartis and senior auditor at PwC. She holds a B.S. in Accounting from Fairfield University, is a CPA, and is a board member of the nonprofit Lectores para el Futuro . Company performance underpinning incentives: 2024 revenue increased 21.7% YoY and Adjusted Net Income grew 15% ; 2024 Adjusted EBITDA was ~339.2–340.2m with performance-based equity payout at 136% before the TSR modifier ; since 2019, a $100 investment in EVTC was $104.30 at year-end 2024 vs $293.87 for the peer index .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| EVTC | Executive Vice President, Group Head of Puerto Rico | Aug 2022–present | Leads Puerto Rico segment execution |
| EVTC | Chief Administrative Officer | Mar 2020–Aug 2022 | Oversight of administrative functions |
| EVTC | SVP People and Culture | Aug 2017–Feb 2018 | Human capital leadership |
| EVTC | Director of Internal Audit | 2011–2017 | Internal controls and audit |
| Chartis | External Reporting Manager, Latin America | Pre-2011 | Regional external reporting |
| PwC | Senior Auditor | Pre-2011 | Assurance and audit |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lectores para el Futuro (nonprofit) | Board Member | Not disclosed | Community literacy advocacy |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $393,382 | $405,183 |
| Salary Paid ($) | — | $399,283 |
| Christmas/Other Bonus ($) | — | $16,883 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | — | $24,677 |
| All Other Compensation breakdown ($) | — | Matching contributions: $5,175; Other payments: $19,502 |
- 2025 base salary increase: 3% for Ms. Pérez approved on Feb 20, 2025 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Structure and 2024 Outcomes
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payment Score | Weighted Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Net Income ($000s) | 60% | 169,020 | 187,800 | 206,580 | 212,369 | 150.00% | 90.00% |
| Revenues ($000s) | 40% | 763,470 | 848,300 | 933,130 | 842,113 | 96.35% | 38.54% |
| Corporate Performance Metric Payout | — | — | — | — | — | — | 128.54% |
| Executive | Target Cash Incentive (%) | Corporate (%) | Business Metric (%) | Individual (%) | Target Cash Incentive ($) | Actual Cash Incentive Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Paola Pérez | 85 | 20 | 60 | 20 | 344,406 | 424,888 |
| Payout breakdown ($) | — | 88,541 | 247,807 | 88,541 | — | — |
- Design details: Segment heads (Ms. Pérez) have business metrics at 60%, corporate 20%, individual 20% . Negative modifiers can reduce payouts for compliance/budget shortcomings; no positive modifiers .
Long-Term Equity Incentives
Design anchors: Performance-based RSUs earned on one-year Adjusted EBITDA with a three-year service period and a relative TSR modifier vs Russell 2000 (+/-25%) over the three years post grant; time-based RSUs vest in equal installments over 3 years .
| Grant Date | Vehicle | Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual (AEBITDA) | Payout (before TSR) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 29, 2024 | Performance-based RSUs | Adjusted EBITDA | 311.0m | 327.4m | 360.1m | 339.2m | 136% | Vests Feb 28, 2027; TSR modifier +/-25% |
| Feb 29, 2024 | Time-based RSUs | Time-based | — | — | — | — | — | Vests in 3 equal installments on Feb 28, 2025/2026/2027 |
| Feb 28, 2025 | Performance-based RSUs | Adjusted EBITDA + TSR modifier | — | Above 2024 target (exact goal not disclosed) | — | — | — | Earned per 2025 AEBITDA; 3-year service; TSR modifier; vest after service period |
| Feb 28, 2025 | Time-based RSUs | Time-based | — | — | — | — | — | Vests in 3 equal installments on Feb 28, 2026/2027/2028 |
| 2024 Plan-Based Awards (Ms. Pérez) | Shares/Units | Grant Date | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time-based RSUs | 14,392 | Feb 29, 2024 | 520,000 |
| Performance-based RSUs (Threshold/Target/Max) | 8,982 / 19,959 / 49,898 | Feb 29, 2024 | 780,000 |
| 2025 Equity Incentive Grant (Ms. Pérez) | Performance-based RSUs (#) | Time-based RSUs (#) | Total (#) | Total Award Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 28, 2025 | 17,787 | 13,926 | 31,713 | 1,300,000 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (direct/indirect shares) | 6,965 |
| Shares Outstanding (Record Date) | 64,028,083 |
| Ownership as % of Outstanding | ~0.0109% (6,965 / 64,028,083) |
| Unvested Time-based RSUs (# / $) | 30,597 / $1,056,514 |
| Unearned Performance-based RSUs (# / $) | 47,157 / $1,628,331 |
| Options Outstanding | None |
| Shares Acquired on Vesting in 2024 (# / $) | 34,201 / $1,262,701 |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines (EVP) | 3x annual base salary; all NEOs in compliance |
| Pledging/Hedging | None of management’s shares are pledged; hedging and pledging prohibited by policy (limited pre-clearance exception for non-margin loans) |
Vesting Schedules (Ms. Pérez)
| Grant Type | Grant Date | Units | Vesting Schedule |
|---|---|---|---|
| Time-based RSUs | Feb 25, 2022 | 2,251 | One pending vest on Feb 25, 2025 |
| Time-based RSUs | Aug 5, 2022 | 4,521 | One pending vest on Feb 25, 2025 |
| Time-based RSUs | Feb 24, 2023 | 9,433 | Two substantially equal installments on Feb 24, 2025 and Feb 25, 2026 |
| Time-based RSUs | Feb 29, 2024 | 14,392 | Three equal installments on Feb 28, 2025/2026/2027 |
| Performance-based RSUs | Feb 25, 2022 | 8,919 | Eligible earn based on one-year Adjusted EBITDA; vest Feb 25, 2025 subject to TSR modifier |
| Performance-based RSUs | Feb 24, 2023 | 18,279 | Eligible earn based on one-year Adjusted EBITDA; vest Feb 24, 2026 subject to TSR modifier |
| Performance-based RSUs | Feb 29, 2024 | 19,959 | Eligible earn based on one-year Adjusted EBITDA; vest Feb 28, 2027 subject to TSR modifier |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Detail |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | None; only CEO has an A&R Employment Agreement |
| Severance Policy (non-CIC) | Lump-sum severance equal to current annual base salary; pro rata annual bonus for year of termination based on actual performance; earned but unpaid prior-year bonus; company-paid health insurance for 18 months (subject to COBRA election and premium co-pay) |
| RSU treatment (non-CIC) | Time-based RSUs vest pro rata as of termination; performance-based RSUs vest pro rata after performance period based on actual results |
| Restrictive Covenants | 12-month non-compete within a 10-mile perimeter of EVTC’s business in PR or any other country where EVTC did business in preceding 12 months; 12-month non-solicit of service providers; non-disparagement; confidentiality |
| Clawback Policy | Applies to cash incentives and equity (incl. RSUs); recoupment for restatements and other Triggering Events over a 3-year lookback; forfeiture, cancellation, future offsets, or direct repayment at Board discretion |
| Insider Trading Policy | Prohibits speculative trading, hedging, and pledging (limited pre-clearance exception for non-margin collateralized loans with demonstrated capacity) |
| Tax Gross-ups | Company policy: no excise tax gross-ups |
Potential Payments (Hypothetical as of Dec 31, 2024; assumes stock price $34.53)
| Trigger | Severance ($) | PB RSUs Capable of Vesting ($) | Accelerated RSU Vesting ($) | Health Insurance ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Good Reason Resignation / Termination without Cause | 749,589 | 912,421 | 531,831 | 22,931 | 2,216,772 |
| Change in Control + Good Reason / Termination without Cause | 1,843,583 | — | 3,132,979 | 22,931 | 4,999,493 |
| Death or Disability | — | — | 3,132,979 | 1,000,000 | 4,132,979 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: Program balances cash and equity, short- and long-term, with capped payouts (annual cash at 150% of target; performance RSUs at 250%) and multi-year vesting, mitigating excessive risk . “What we don’t do” includes no hedging/pledging, no excise tax gross-ups, no guaranteed bonuses, and no special executive retirement plans .
- Metrics and rigor: Annual cash incentives emphasize Adjusted Net Income and Revenue with 2024 corporate payout 128.54% on targets set higher than 2023; segment heads like Ms. Pérez carry 60% business metric weighting then corporate/individual at 20%/20%, aligning pay with business unit performance .
- Equity design: Performance RSUs earned at 136% on 2024 Adjusted EBITDA target with +/-25% TSR modifier vs Russell 2000; three-year service period embeds retention .
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 Say-on-Pay approval declined to 62.2% vs 98.5% in 2023, driven by a one-time, non-performance award to the CEO in Dec 2023; the committee engaged shareholders and committed to avoid additional CEO special awards during the retention period and to default to performance vesting in extraordinary cases .
Compensation Peer Group
- Peer group updated Dec 2024: removed Black Knight, EVO Payments, MoneyGram; added nCino, Payoneer Global, Shift4 Payments, Verint Systems; median pay positioning maintained; industry M&A necessitated inclusion of tangential FinTech peers .
Investment Implications
- Alignment signals: Ms. Pérez’s annual incentive is heavily tied to segment business metrics and corporate Adjusted Net Income/Revenue; long-term incentives driven by Adjusted EBITDA and relative TSR with multi-year service, supporting pay-for-performance and retention .
- Retention and vesting overhang: Significant unvested/uneared RSUs (time-based 30,597; performance-based 47,157 as of 12/31/24) plus 2025 grants (31,713 total) create predictable vest calendars that can contribute to periodic sell pressure from net share settlement, evidenced by 34,201 shares vested with $1.26m value realized in 2024 . Policy prohibits hedging and pledging, limiting adverse alignment risks .
- Ownership and skin-in-the-game: Direct beneficial ownership of 6,965 shares (~0.0109% of 64,028,083 outstanding) is small but EVPs must maintain 3x salary ownership and all NEOs were in compliance, with unvested time-based RSUs counting toward guidelines (performance RSUs do not) .
- Downside protections and CIC economics: Non-CIC severance equals base salary plus pro-rata bonus with 18 months health coverage; double-trigger CIC produces materially higher cash and accelerated vesting (total hypothetical $5.0m) which could incentivize stability absent a qualifying event .
- Governance sensitivity: The 2024 Say-on-Pay drop highlights investor scrutiny; continued adherence to performance-based awards, capped payouts, and robust clawback/insider policies should support investor confidence in incentive integrity .