Donald Bobo Jr
Edwards LifesciencesAbout Donald Bobo Jr
Edwards Lifesciences’ Corporate Vice President since 2007, Donald E. Bobo, Jr. (age 63) leads corporate strategy and corporate development, with executive oversight of heart failure initiatives and U.S. healthcare solutions; he joined Edwards in 1995 after roles at American Hospital Supply and Baxter in R&D, business development, operations, and general management . Edwards’ 2024 sales were $5.4B, up 9% underlying, and 2021 PBRSUs paid at 117.11% on relative TSR, underscoring pay-for-performance alignment that frames Bobo’s incentive design . The company’s 2024 AIP funded at 99% on 80% financial achievement and 124% KODs, with 2025 metrics shifting to 60% revenue/40% EPS to focus on profitable growth .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Edwards Lifesciences | Corporate Vice President (Strategy & Corp Dev; previously VP/GM Surgical Structural Heart; led TMTT strategy; global valve manufacturing) | 2007–present (at Edwards since 1995) | Advanced pipeline and portfolio; led strategy/business development; built TMTT strategy and strengthened surgical heart operations |
| American Hospital Supply; Baxter Healthcare | R&D, business development, operations, general management | Pre-1995 | Broad operating foundation across functions prior to Edwards |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| AdvaMed (Advanced Medical Technology Association) | Board member | Since May 2023 | Industry advocacy and policy engagement |
| California Life Sciences Association | Board & executive committee; Chair of the Board | Since 2015; Chair 2017–2018 | State-level industry leadership |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | 692,745 | 721,939 | 737,054; 2024 base set to $736,751 in program terms |
| Target annual bonus ($) | — | — | 565,000 (“Incentive Pay Objective”) |
| Actual annual bonus paid ($) | 351,624 | 504,060 | 576,131 |
| Perquisites/other comp ($) | 47,243 | 45,673 | 51,932 (incl. 401k match $17,250; EDCP match $32,719; perqs $1,963) |
Notes
- No broad-based pension; EDCP allows elective deferral and company match above 401(k) limits .
- Clawback policy in place; no hedging/pledging allowed .
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024 design and results
| Measure | Weight | Min | Target | Max | Actual | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Underlying revenue growth | 50% | 4% [25%] | 11.5–12% [100%] | 19% [175%] | 8.9% | Contributed to 80% financial multiplier |
| Adjusted EPS ($) | 30% | 2.55 [25%] | 2.85–2.88 [100%] | 3.18 [175%] | 2.76 | Contributed to 80% financial multiplier |
| Adjusted FCF ($m) | 20% | 880 [25%] | 1,380 [100%] | 1,880 [175%] | 1,362 | Contributed to 80% financial multiplier |
| KODs (strategic) | — | — | 100% | 150% cap | 124% | KOD multiplier = 124% |
| Corporate funding | — | — | — | — | — | 99% (80% x 124%) |
Bobo’s 2024 AIP outcome
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Target bonus ($) | 565,000 |
| Actual payout ($) | 576,131 |
| Payout vs target | 102% (calc: 576,131 / 565,000; sources cited) |
Long-Term Incentives (granted May 7, 2024) – mix 50% stock options, 25% RSUs, 25% PBRSUs
| Vehicle | Grant date | Quantity | Exercise/Ref price | Vesting | Grant-date fair value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock options | 05/07/2024 | 39,600 | $85.84 | Retirement-eligible monthly vest over 36 months; 7-year term | 1,149,042 |
| RSUs | 05/07/2024 | 6,700 (time-based) | — | 25% annually over 4 years | 575,128 (target value basis) |
| PBRSUs (relative TSR vs SPSIHE subset) | 05/07/2024 | 6,700 target | — | 3-year performance (0–175% payout); double-trigger CIC at target if terminated | 654,322 (accounting FV) |
Other performance equity context
- 2021 PBRSU cycle (through Apr 30, 2024) vested at 117.11% on relative TSR .
- 2025 AIP metric change: remove FCF, reweight to 60% revenue/40% EPS .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership and guideline alignment
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Shares owned outright (beneficially) | 206,297 |
| RSUs and option shares exercisable within 60 days | 246,435 |
| Total beneficial ownership | 452,732 |
| Ownership as % of common shares outstanding | ~0.077% (calc: 452,732 / 587,864,897; shares outstanding basis) |
| Stock ownership guideline | 3x salary for NEOs; all NEOs meet or comply via holding requirement |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for Section 16 officers and leadership team |
Outstanding equity (12/31/2024)
| Instrument | Exercisable | Unexercisable | Unvested RSUs (#) | Unearned PBRSUs target (#) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock options | 240,793 | 62,207 | — | — |
| RSUs/PBRSUs | — | — | 14,407 | 19,450 |
Insider activity and potential selling pressure
| Activity (2024) | Quantity/Value |
|---|---|
| Options exercised | 88,000 shares; $3,641,205 value realized |
| RSUs/PBRSUs vested | 10,626 shares; $907,853 value realized |
| ESPP purchases (2022–2024) | 769 shares; $79.28 weighted avg. price |
Vesting overhang
- Options: remaining 31,901 unexercisable vest monthly over 36 months (retirement-eligible schedule) —a systematic, steady vesting cadence.
- RSUs: 6,700 granted in 2024 vest 25% annually through 2028; additional unvested RSUs outstanding (14,407) provide multi-year retention .
- PBRSUs: 6,700 target from 2024 grant pay on 3-year relative TSR (0–175%) in 2027; separate outstanding cycles remain eligible per plan rules .
Deferred compensation
- EDCP: 2024 executive contribution $186,583; company contribution $32,719; year-end balance $12,864,879; 2024 EDCP earnings $2,419,566 .
Employment Terms
Severance and change-in-control (CIC)
- At-will employment; no severance for ordinary termination outside CIC beyond company severance plan eligibility .
- CIC severance: double-trigger; 2x base salary + 2x target bonus (or prior-year bonus if higher) + pro-rata bonus, accelerated vesting, and 3 years medical/dental; no excise tax gross-up (best-net cutback applies) .
- Estimated CIC benefits if terminated Dec 31, 2024 (illustrative, per proxy methodology):
| Component | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Salary severance | 1,473,502 |
| Bonus severance | 1,130,000 |
| Pro rata 2024 bonus | 563,456 |
| RSU acceleration | 1,066,495 |
| PBRSU acceleration | 1,439,884 |
| Medical/dental continuation | 46,221 |
| Outplacement | 50,000 |
| Total | 5,769,558 |
Equity treatment on separation
- Options: forfeiture if unvested; vested options retain post-termination window (up to 5 years for retirement-eligible) .
- RSUs/PBRSUs: double-trigger acceleration on CIC; otherwise unvested RSUs forfeit; PBRSUs remain eligible on death/disability/retirement (pro-rata) per plan .
Compensation Structure Signals
- Mix and trend: Heavy LTI tilt (options largest share) aligns wealth to stock price; 2024 NEO pay emphasizes performance-based equity (options/PBRSUs) consistent with strategy .
- Metrics: AIP blends growth, profitability, and execution (revenue/EPS/FCF+KODs); 2025 shift to revenue/EPS raises focus on profitable growth .
- Governance: Clawback policy; no hedging/pledging; double-trigger CIC; no excise tax gross-ups; strong say-on-pay support (91% in 2024) .
- Benchmarking: Comparator group includes Abbott, BDX, Boston Scientific, DexCom, Hologic, Illumina, Intuitive Surgical, Medtronic, ResMed, Stryker, Teleflex, Zimmer, among others; program targets competitiveness around market medians with heavy at-risk mix .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Significant unvested equity (options vesting monthly; RSUs/PBRSUs multi-year) and strict anti-pledging/hedging drive alignment and reduce risk of adverse hedging behavior .
- Overhang/selling pressure: 2024 exercises (88k options; $3.64m value) and ongoing monthly option vesting plus annual RSU cliffs create steady supply; however, ownership guidelines and multi-year PBRSU hurdles temper near-term exit incentives .
- Retention: Unvested equity stack, EDCP balance ($12.86m), and double-trigger CIC terms lower departure risk absent strategic change .
- Pay-for-performance: AIP funded at 99% on mixed financial outcomes (80%) but strong KOD execution (124%); PBRSUs tied to relative TSR (0–175%) keep upside contingent on peer outperformance .