Travis K. Edmondson
About Travis K. Edmondson
Chief Banking Officer of FirstBank (FB Financial Corporation) since 2020; previously East Tennessee Regional President (2018–2020). Joined FirstBank in 2017 via the acquisition of Clayton Bank & Trust, where he began in 2006 and became CEO in 2013. Age 45 as of March 28, 2025; 5 years in current role, with responsibilities across financial centers, commercial real estate, and private banking. Company performance in 2024 featured Adjusted EPS +13.0%, Adjusted net income +12.9%, PPNR +20.0%, and 1-year TSR 31.4% (97th percentile of peer group), which inform incentive outcomes and pay-for-performance alignment .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| FirstBank | Chief Banking Officer | 2020–present | Leads banking operations; drives customer experience and credit outcomes . |
| FirstBank | East Tennessee Regional President | 2018–2020 | Oversaw financial centers, CRE, and private banking across the region . |
| Clayton Bank & Trust | Chief Executive Officer | 2013–2017 | Led bank prior to acquisition; operational and strategic leadership . |
| Clayton Bank & Trust | Various roles (joined 2006) | 2006–2013 | Progressed into leadership; foundation of banking career . |
External Roles
- No external board or public-company directorships disclosed for Mr. Edmondson .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 335,000 | 400,000 | 415,000 |
| Target Cash STIP ($) | 250,000 | 250,000 | 352,750 |
| Actual Cash STIP Paid ($) | 75,000 | 122,857 | 551,172 |
| Implied Target Bonus % of Base | 74.6% (250k/335k) | 62.5% (250k/400k) | 85.0% (352.75k/415k) |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 27,312 | 18,946 | 20,823 |
Performance Compensation
| Year | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Basis | Payout % of Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Adjusted EPS (non-GAAP) | 40% | $3.40 | $3.01 | Interpolated schedule | — |
| 2023 | PPNR (non-GAAP) | 40% | $229.9mm | $181.0mm | Interpolated schedule | — |
| 2023 | Individual Performance | 20% | N/A | N/A | Committee assessment | — |
| 2023 | Total STIP Outcome | — | — | — | Weighted composite | 49% |
| 2024 | Adjusted EPS (non-GAAP) | 75% | Thresholds/targets (max $3.61=200%) | $3.40 | Interpolated schedule | — |
| 2024 | MBO/Individual | 25% | N/A | 130% for Edmondson | Committee assessment | — |
| 2024 | Total STIP Outcome | — | — | — | Weighted composite | 156.3% |
Notes:
- 2023 EPS/PPNR weighting 40/40 with 20% individual; payouts ranged 0–150% per metric . 2024 shifted to 75% EPS and 25% MBO with 0–200% payout curve for EPS .
- Individual 2024 MBO highlights for Edmondson: coaching processes, low net charge-offs (<15 bps), and customer experience measurement implementations .
Equity Grants (PSUs/RSUs)
| Grant Year | Grant Date | Total Shares Granted | PSUs (Shares) | RSUs (Shares) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Feb 28, 2022 | 5,626 | 2,813 | 2,813 | 250,020 |
| 2023 | Feb 24, 2023 | 10,494 | 5,247 | 5,247 | 390,062 |
| 2024 | Feb 23, 2024 | 9,832 | 5,899 | 3,933 | 350,019 |
PSU frameworks:
- 2023 PSUs vest based on Core ROATCE percentile vs comparator group (0–200% payout) over 2023–2025 .
- 2024 PSUs vest based on Core ROATCE percentile and Adjusted Tangible Book Value thresholds over 2024–2026 (each metric 0–200%) .
- 2022 PSU performance (2022–2024 period) certified at 96.1% of target based on Core ROATCE (normalized capital) .
Vesting Schedules (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Award Type | 2025 Vesting (shares) | 2026 Vesting (shares) | 2027 Vesting (shares) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs | 6,938 (Jan 4: 3,000; Apr 1: 3,938) | 6,498 (Jan 4: 3,000; Apr 1: 3,498) | 3,933 (Apr 1) |
| PSUs (at target) | 2,813 (Q1) | 5,247 (Q1) | 5,899 (Q1) |
Note: RSUs generally vest in three equal annual tranches beginning the first day of the quarter after grant; dividends accrue but are paid only upon vesting .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Mar 1, 2024 | Mar 1, 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Beneficially Owned Shares | 23,624 | 32,202 |
| Ownership % of Outstanding | ~0.05% (23,624 / 46,896,628) | ~0.07% (32,202 / 46,689,911) |
| Unvested RSUs (shares) | 17,281 | 28,738 |
| Unvested PSUs (shares at target) | 10,491 | 13,959 |
| Pledged Shares | None disclosed for Edmondson (Holmes footnote only) | |
| Hedging Policy | Hedging prohibited; pledging discouraged and not counted toward ownership guidelines | |
| Ownership Guidelines | Executives: 3x base salary; 5-year compliance window; unvested performance awards excluded |
Employment Terms
| Provision | 2024 Proxy Terms | 2025 Proxy Terms |
|---|---|---|
| Agreement Term | 3 years, auto-renews annually | 3 years, auto-renews annually |
| Severance (no cause / good reason) | 2x base + greater of target prior-year or target current-year bonus; 18 months benefits | 2x base + greater of target or 3-year average bonus; 18 months benefits |
| Change-in-Control (CIC) severance | 2x base + greater of target or prior-year bonus; double-trigger | 2.5x base + greater of target or 3-year average bonus; double-trigger |
| Equity treatment (termination) | For Edmondson: time-based awards fully vest; PSUs deemed fully achieved at maximum target (non-CIC) | Time-based awards fully vest; PSUs: pro-rata vest based on actual performance (non-CIC); under CIC, vest at greater of target or actual at termination |
| Restrictive covenants | Confidentiality, non-compete (1 year), employee/customer non-solicit | Confidentiality, non-compete (1 year), employee/customer non-solicit |
| Excise tax | “Cutback” to avoid 4999 excise if beneficial; no tax gross-ups | “Cutback” to avoid 4999 excise if beneficial; no tax gross-ups |
Change signal: CIC multiple increased to 2.5x in 2025 and non-CIC PSU vesting standardized to pro-rata vs 2024’s max-payout provision for certain NEOs—reduces windfall risk and tightens pay-for-performance alignment .
Perquisites and Other Compensation (2024)
| Component | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| 401(k) Match | 10,350 |
| Automobile Expenses | 7,500 |
| Disability Insurance Premiums | 2,079 |
| Other Personal Benefits (club dues / life insurance) | 894 |
| Total Perquisites and Other | 20,823 |
Risk Indicators & Trading Signals
- Section 16(a) timeliness: Proxy notes five tax-withholding transactions not timely disclosed on Form 4 in 2024, including Edmondson—indicative of routine RSU vesting with withhold-to-cover; no pattern of discretionary selling disclosed .
- Upcoming supply from vesting: Meaningful RSU and PSU tranches vesting in Q1 2025–2027 could create periodic sale/withholding flows; Q1 vest dates are typical for PSUs (certification) and April 1 tranche dates for RSUs .
- Pledging/hedging: Hedging barred, pledging discouraged; no pledging disclosed for Edmondson—positive alignment signal .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shift: 2024 raised Edmondson’s target cash incentive to $352,750 with EPS-weighted STIP (75%) and individualized MBOs (25%), producing a 156.3% payout on stronger company performance—heightens performance sensitivity vs 2023’s EPS/PPNR framework (49% payout) .
- Long-term equity: Balanced RSU/PSU awards, with 2024 PSUs adding Adjusted TBV alongside Core ROATCE—tightens alignment with tangible value creation in the rate/credit cycle .
- CIC/severance: 2025 increased CIC multiple (2.5x) and standardized PSU post-termination vesting (pro-rata non-CIC; greater of target/actual under CIC)—reduces overpayment risk and aligns outcomes to realized performance .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Skin-in-the-game: Beneficial ownership increased from 23,624 (2024) to 32,202 (2025) shares; unvested RSUs/PSUs represent significant future ownership contingent on performance and service .
- Guidelines: Required ownership of 3x base salary; compliance status not disclosed. Company requires executives to hold awarded shares until guidelines are met (tax withholdings excepted) .
Employment Terms
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Start at FirstBank | Joined in 2017 via Clayton Bank acquisition; CBO since 2020 . |
| Contract Term | 3 years, auto-renewal annually . |
| Non-compete / Non-solicit | 1-year non-compete and non-solicit post-termination . |
| Clawback | Mandatory recovery of excess incentive comp in restatement scenarios (3-year lookback) . |
Investment Implications
- Positive pay-for-performance alignment: 2024’s strong EPS/PPNR outcomes yielded higher STIP payout; 2024–2026 PSUs tied to ROATCE percentile and Adjusted TBV should reinforce long-term value creation discipline .
- Reduced windfall risk: 2025 standardization to pro-rata PSU vesting (non-CIC) and “greater of” vesting under CIC improves governance vs 2024’s max-payout clause for certain NEOs; however, CIC multiple increased to 2.5x for Edmondson, raising potential change-in-control costs .
- Vesting cadence implies periodic stock supply: April 1 RSU tranches and Q1 PSU certifications likely drive tax-withholding or sales; monitor Form 4s around these dates for selling pressure. Note prior late tax-withholding filings; track for compliance improvements .
- Ownership alignment maintained: No hedging and no pledging disclosed; meaningful unvested equity/PSUs keep incentives tied to multi-year performance horizons .