Brendan Keating
About Brendan Keating
Brendan J. Keating, age 61, is FTI Consulting’s Chief Accounting Officer and Controller, roles he has held since March 2019; he previously served as Vice President – Assistant Controller from 2011 to 2019 and Senior Vice President of Accounting Policy and Reporting at Discovery, Inc. from 2008 to 2011 . Company performance context for his tenure includes 2024 Adjusted EPS of $7.99 and net income of $280.1 million, with pay-versus-performance TSR of $172.72 for 2024 on a $100 base and CAP tracked per SEC rules .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| FTI Consulting | Chief Accounting Officer & Controller | Mar 2019 – present | Company-level financial reporting leadership and control oversight |
| FTI Consulting | Vice President – Assistant Controller | Sep 2011 – Mar 2019 | Consolidation, reporting and accounting policy support |
| Discovery, Inc. | SVP, Accounting Policy & Reporting | 2008 – 2011 | Accounting policy and external reporting leadership |
External Roles
No external directorships or roles disclosed for Brendan Keating in the latest proxy. Skip.
Fixed Compensation
FTI discloses detailed compensation only for Named Executive Officers (NEOs); Brendan Keating was not a 2024 NEO, so his base salary, target bonus and payouts are not individually disclosed .
Performance Compensation
While Keating’s individual awards are not disclosed, FTI’s 2024 incentive architecture for non-CEO NEOs (for context) was:
| Metric | 2024 Program Design | Weighting / Targets | Payout Mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive Pay (AIP) | Cash incentive | Adjusted EPS 33.33%; Adjusted EBITDA 33.33%; Individual performance 33.34% | Other NEOs’ AIP target opportunity increased to 1.25x base salary in 2024; thresholds at 50%, target 100%, max 150% of target |
| Long-Term Incentive Pay (LTIP) | RSAs + Performance RSUs | RSAs 40% of LTIP; Performance RSUs 60% of LTIP for other NEOs | RSAs vest pro rata over 3 years; Performance RSUs based on Relative TSR with 3-year period ending 12/31/2026; threshold 50%, target 100%, max 150% of target |
| CEO AIP form of payment | Cash 75%; RSAs 25% | N/A | For reference only; CEO-specific |
Vesting schedules and dates used in 2024 LTIP context:
- RSAs: three-year pro rata vesting
- Performance RSUs: Relative TSR measured vs adjusted S&P 500; performance period ends December 31, 2026
- No automatic single-trigger acceleration on Change in Control at plan level
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Insider Trading Policy prohibits hedging, pledging, short selling, derivatives on FCN stock, margin purchases, and similar transactions for officers and employees, supporting alignment and reducing selling pressure risk .
- Compensation Recoupment (Clawback) Policy authorizes recovery of incentive-based compensation from CEO and other covered executive officers upon material restatement for the prior three completed fiscal years, consistent with NYSE listing standards .
- Executive Officer Equity Ownership policy is measured and disclosed for CEO and NEOs (7.0x salary for CEO; 3.0x for other NEOs in 2024); coverage and compliance for non-NEO executive officers like Keating is not specified in the proxy .
Beneficial ownership for Brendan Keating is not enumerated in the Security Ownership table (which covers NEOs and directors), so vested/unvested share counts, options status, and ownership % are not disclosed .
Employment Terms
- CEO: Severance equals 2.0x base salary plus target bonus upon termination without Cause or resignation with Good Reason; pro-rata AIP based on actual financials and prior-year individual performance; non-compete 18 months .
- Other NEOs (CFO, CSTO, GC, CHRO): At-will Officer Employment Letters with severance upon certain terminations and Change in Control (18-month window); non-solicit restrictions 12 months .
- Brendan Keating’s employment agreement terms, severance multiple, and change-of-control specifics are not disclosed in the proxy; no individual contract summary is provided for him .
Performance & Track Record
Company pay-versus-performance and financial context during Keating’s tenure:
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Shareholder Return ($ on $100 base) | 100.96 | 138.64 | 143.50 | 179.97 | 172.72 |
| Peer Group TSR ($ on $100 base) | 121.91 | 162.44 | 137.76 | 160.36 | 199.53 |
| Net Income ($000) | 210,682 | 234,966 | 235,500 | 274,892 | 280,088 |
| Adjusted EPS ($) | 5.99 | 6.76 | 6.77 | 7.71 | 7.99 |
Context on 2024 AIP metric setting and rigor:
- 2024 Adjusted EBITDA target of $442.6M vs 2023 actual $424.8M; threshold/max set at −20%/+20% of target ($354.0M/$531.1M) .
- 2024 Adjusted EPS target $8.12 vs 2023 actual $7.71; threshold/max $6.50/$9.74 .
- Company emphasized multi-year performance; noted record revenues and adjusted EPS in 2024 .
Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking, pay inflation risk)
- 2023 peer group used to inform 2024–2025 pay: includes Booz Allen Hamilton, Exponent, ICF International, Jefferies Financial Group, LPL Financial, among others across consulting, financial services, and asset management .
- Adjustments noted: peer group changes and TSR methodology corrections by third-party provider; most important measures linking CAP were Adjusted EPS, Adjusted EBITDA, and TSR .
- CEO target compensation ranked ~45th percentile; other NEOs ~28th percentile vs peers in 2024 .
Say-On-Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say-on-pay (for 2023 compensation) received ~99% approval; outreach to top 20 shareholders representing ~70% of outstanding shares informed program design .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Anti-hedging and pledging rules reduce misalignment risk for officers and employees .
- NYSE-compliant clawback adopted; strengthens pay-for-performance discipline .
- Delinquent Section 16(a) reporting: only one late filing for Ms. Boglioli and one for Mr. Linton due to administrative error; no mention of Keating indicating no reported delinquencies in 2024 .
- Equity plan governance: no option repricing or cash buyouts of underwater options without shareholder approval; no evergreen provisions; annual non-employee director comp capped; no automatic single-trigger acceleration on change of control .
Equity & Incentive Plan Utilization
- Burn rate averaged 0.95% over 2022–2024; share reserve increased by 676,000, with plan extended to June 4, 2035; shares available for future grants as of March 6, 2025 were 559,549 .
Investment Implications
- Role-critical control: As CAO/Controller since 2019, Keating oversees core accounting and reporting, which aligns with strong company-level execution on Adjusted EPS and net income; however, lack of individual compensation and ownership disclosure limits a precise pay-for-performance and skin-in-the-game assessment for him specifically .
- Structural alignment: Company-wide policies prohibiting hedging/pledging and applying clawbacks mitigate misalignment and reduce selling-pressure risk from executives, supporting governance quality signals for traders and PMs .
- Vesting and change-of-control: Rigorous performance RSU design tied to Relative TSR over multi-year windows and no single-trigger acceleration indicates incentive durability; but Brendan-specific grants and vesting schedules are not disclosed, tempering visibility on his personal retention incentives .
- Monitor disclosures: Absent Form 4 analytics and beneficial ownership details for Keating, trading signals tied to insider activity remain limited; focus monitoring on future proxies and 8-K Item 5.02 updates for any changes to his role, awards, or agreements .
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