Danny Dumas
FRESH DEL MONTE PRODUCEAbout Danny Dumas
Danny Dumas, age 56, is Senior Vice President, Sales, Marketing & Product Management (North America) at Fresh Del Monte Produce (FDP). He rejoined the company in September 2024 to lead North American sales, marketing, product management, technical services, and quality for port operations, bringing 35+ years of produce industry experience including a prior SVP role at Calavo Growers and industry leadership at United Fresh (now part of IFPA) . During his current tenure, FDP highlighted category growth and leadership hiring under his remit (e.g., avocados) and commercial initiatives in North America; company performance in 2024 improved materially with EBITDA of $273.9 million and net income of $142.2 million, supported by an 8.4% gross margin and capital returns (dividend increase and a $150 million repurchase authorization) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fresh Del Monte Produce | SVP, North American Sales, Marketing & Product Management | Apr 2019 – Aug 2020; rehired Sept 2024 – present | Led NA commercial strategy; oversight of sales/marketing/product; return aligned with push in value-added categories (e.g., salad kits) and sourcing initiatives (e.g., avocados) . |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce | VP, North American Sales & Product Mgmt (Bananas & Pineapple) | 2006–2010; 2014–2019 | Managed flagship categories, pricing and customer execution in NA . |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce | VP, Operations Europe & Africa | 2010–2013 | Regional operations leadership in EMEA . |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce | VP, Sales Canada; District Sales Manager, Canada | 1998–2014 (DSM 1998–Mar 2006; VP Sales Canada Mar 2013–Jan 2014) | Built Canadian market presence and key retail relationships . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Calavo Growers | Senior Vice President | Not disclosed | Senior leadership in avocados/produce; complements FDP’s avocado growth strategy . |
| United Fresh (now IFPA) | Chair/Committee leader in merger with PMA | Not disclosed | Helped drive the merger that formed the International Fresh Produce Association (IFPA), enhancing industry coordination and advocacy . |
| Private company venture | Founder/Operator | Not disclosed | Overhauled administrative operations to improve efficiency; launched a new venture (experience cited) . |
Fixed Compensation
- Base salary and individual compensation for Dumas are not disclosed in the 2025 proxy (he was not a 2024 NEO) .
- Executive share ownership guidelines require SVPs to hold 2x base salary in FDP shares within five years; executives must retain at least 50% of shares from vested RSUs until compliant .
- General severance program for executives (U.S.) provides up to 26 weeks based on tenure; there is no individual employment/severance agreement disclosed for Dumas .
Performance Compensation
Annual incentive plan (AIP) design (company-wide framework applied to senior executives; 2024 specifics shown below for NEOs other than CEO). The CEO has a separate AIP; non-CEO senior executives’ AIP allocates 70% to corporate metrics and 30% to individual objectives . FDP’s 2024 corporate metrics and outcomes:
| Metric | Weight (of Corporate) | 2024 Target | 2024 Actual | % Achieved | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Equity (Net Income / Avg Equity) | 35% | 5.70% | 7.30% | 127% | Threshold 4.60%; max 8.60% . |
| Earnings per Share | 45% | $2.11 | $2.44 | 116% | Threshold $1.81 (86% payout threshold); max $3.17 . |
| Free Cash Flow ($mm) | 20% | $126.0 | $203.0 | 150% | Threshold $101.0; max $189.0 . |
- Resulting corporate achievement factor for 2024: 127% (applied to the 70% corporate portion for senior executives) .
- Individual performance objectives for NEOs paid at 80–95% achievement; total AIP payout range for NEOs other than CEO: ~113–117% of target. CEO payout was 222% (different plan and multiplier) .
Long-Term Cash Incentive Plan (LTIP) structure for senior executives:
- Target award as % of base salary: CEO 100%; other participating NEOs 35%; 3-year cycles with threshold 80% and max up to 125% for cycles starting 2023; 2022–2024 cycle capped at 100% .
- LTIP metrics and weights (2022–2024 and 2024–2026 cycles): Net Sales Growth (15%), ROE (45%), Net Operating Cash Flow/Average Equity (40%) .
- LTIP metrics and weights (2023–2025 cycle): Net Sales Growth (15%), ROA (45%), Net Operating Cash Flow/Average Equity (40%) .
- 2022–2024 cycle payout for participating NEOs: 79% of target (Net Sales Growth below threshold; ROE at 100%; NOCF/Average Equity at 86%) .
Equity awards (PSUs) – design and 2024 outcome:
- 2024 awards were 100% PSUs tied to 2024 EBITDA; vest over three years equally if earned .
- Target EBITDA: $261.0 million; Actual: $275.4 million; Earned: CEO 105.5% (capped above target), other NEOs 100% (cap at target); vesting on the first, second, and third anniversaries of grant date (e.g., March 1, 2025–2027 for Mar 1, 2024 grants) .
Note: Dumas rejoined in September 2024; the proxy does not disclose his 2024 AIP/PSU awards. The above tables describe the plan mechanics and companywide outcomes that typically apply to SVPs; Dumas’s specific grants or payouts are not disclosed .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Individual beneficial ownership for Dumas is not itemized in the 2025 proxy; the table lists directors and NEOs individually and all directors/executive officers as a group (31.6% of shares) .
- Share ownership guidelines: SVPs 2x base salary within 5 years; must retain at least 50% of shares from RSU vesting until compliant .
- Hedging and pledging: Executives are prohibited from hedging; officers are prohibited from pledging shares subject to the share ownership guidelines under the Insider Trading Policy; the proxy also states executives are prohibited from pledging shares subject to guidelines and from short sales and hedging .
- Controlling ownership context: Chairman/CEO Mohammad Abu‑Ghazaleh beneficially controls/votes 31.2% (including irrevocable proxies and pledged shares), with additional family holdings; major institutions include BlackRock (12.4%), Vanguard (10.1%), Dimensional (7.9%) .
Employment Terms
- Start date (current role): Rehired September 2024 as SVP, Sales, Marketing & Product Management (North America) .
- Contract terms: No specific employment or severance agreement disclosed for Dumas. General executive severance policy provides up to 26 weeks based on years of service; CEO has a separate double‑trigger change‑of‑control agreement, but other executives (including SVPs) rely on the general policy unless otherwise disclosed .
- Clawbacks: FDP maintains both a Dodd-Frank compliant executive officer clawback for restatements and a broader employee recoupment policy covering inaccurate financials, misconduct, and restrictive covenant breaches with a 3-year lookback .
- Insider trading policy: Prohibits hedging and short sales, and restricts pledging of shares subject to the ownership guidelines; structured award timing to avoid grants near MNPI releases .
Performance & Execution Notes (Role-Specific)
- Category leadership under Dumas’s remit:
- Avocados: Identified as a key growth driver in North America; subsequent leadership appointments (e.g., VP Avocados reporting to Dumas) and strategic JV in Colombia to expand year-round avocado and lime supply support growth priorities .
- Value-added fresh-cut: Commercial leadership endorsements include launching Newman’s Own co-branded salad kits (Dumas quoted at launch) to differentiate in the salad kit aisle and align with purpose-driven branding .
- Leadership and hiring momentum: Company communications cited Dumas’s return as part of strengthening leadership to drive innovation and growth in key categories .
Board Governance and Compensation Oversight Context
- Compensation Committee comprised of independent directors; uses Willis Towers Watson as independent compensation consultant; targets pay positioning around the 50th percentile of a specified food/ag peer group; annual say‑on‑pay support ~95% in 2024 .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags (Policy/Contextual)
- Robust clawback regime and share ownership/retention guidelines reduce misalignment risk .
- Hedging/pledging restrictions mitigate adverse alignment; no pledging disclosed for Dumas individually (not itemized) .
- Related party transactions in 2024 involved entities affiliated with the CEO and directors (e.g., Arab Wings air charter), not tied to Dumas .
Investment Implications
- Near‑term operating leverage potential: Dumas’s commercial leadership in North America aligns to FDP’s stated growth vectors—avocados, value‑added fresh‑cut, and branded partnerships—evidenced by leadership hires, JV expansion, and co‑branded launches under his oversight .
- Pay‑for‑performance design: AIP and PSU structures are tied to ROE/EPS/FCF and EBITDA, respectively; clawbacks/share retention enhance alignment, though Dumas’s specific awards are undisclosed to date due to his September 2024 rehiring .
- Retention/overhang: SVP equity typically vests over three years, which can create periodic sellable supply but also supports retention; absent Form 4 detail, insider selling pressure for Dumas is unknown .
- Governance context: Concentrated voting control and related‑party transactions sit outside Dumas’s remit but frame governance risk; strong say‑on‑pay support and independent comp oversight partially offset concerns .
Key unknowns: Dumas’s specific base salary, bonus payouts, and equity grants/holdings are not disclosed in the 2025 proxy; monitor forthcoming proxies, Form 4 filings, and 8‑Ks for award and ownership detail .