Jorge Pelaez
Senior Vice President, Colombia, Ecuador, Central America and Brazil (CECAB) at 
FRESH DEL MONTE PRODUCE
FRESH DEL MONTE PRODUCEExecutive
About Jorge Pelaez
Jorge Pelaez is Senior Vice President, CECAB (Colombia, Ecuador, Central America and Brazil) at Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc., a role he has held since January 2025 after eight years as VP CECAB (2017–2024) and prior decades in banana operations leadership across multiple geographies; he is 62 years old . Company-level 2024 performance context: gross profit rose to $357.9 million (8.4% margin) and net income was $142.2 million; 2024 EBITDA used for PSU certification was $275.4 million versus a $261.0 million target, reflecting execution on asset optimization, pricing and operations initiatives . FDP increased its quarterly dividend to $0.30 in Q1 2025 and approved a $150 million buyback, signaling confidence in long-term strategy .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Region/Division | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fresh Del Monte Produce | SVP, CECAB | Jan 2025–present | Colombia, Ecuador, Central America, Brazil | Promoted from VP CECAB . |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce | VP, CECAB | Apr 2017–Dec 2024 | Colombia, Ecuador, Central America, Brazil | Regional leadership . |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce | General Manager | Feb 2015–Mar 2017 | Costa Rica Banana Division | Division leadership . |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce | Senior Operations Director | 2012–Jan 2015 | Costa Rica Banana Division | Operations leadership . |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce | Operations Manager | 2010–2011 | Costa Rica Banana Division | Operations leadership . |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce | General Manager | 2004–2009 | Cameroon Banana Division | Division leadership . |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce | Operations Manager | 1994–2003 | Brazil | Operations leadership . |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce | Various senior positions | 1984–1994 | Banana operations | Early leadership roles . |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in the 2025 proxy for Mr. Pelaez .
Fixed Compensation
- Individual base salary, target bonus, and actual bonus for Mr. Pelaez are not disclosed in the 2025 proxy (he was not a Named Executive Officer for 2024) .
- Program context (company-wide): Base salaries are reviewed annually, designed around median market targeting; no 2024 salary increases for the CEO or other NEOs except a 3% increase for the General Counsel based on market data .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (program design applicable to senior executives/NEOs)
| Element | Metric | Weighting/Allocation | Threshold | Target/Max | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Senior Executive AIP (non-CEO NEO design) | Return on Equity | 24.5% of total (35% of the 70% financial component) | 80% of target payout at 80% performance | 100%/150% | EPS threshold set at 86% of target; others at 80% . |
| Free Cash Flow ($) | 14.0% of total (20% of 70%) | 80% of target payout at 80% performance | 100%/150% | ||
| EPS | 31.5% of total (45% of 70%) | 86% of target earns 86% payout | 100%/150% | ||
| Individual Objectives | 30% of total | Based on individual goal achievement | Max 150% | 4–8 objectives typical . |
2024 results (company-level): Financial metrics achieved above target (Free Cash Flow at max); NEO payouts (non-CEO) ranged ~113%–117% of target combining corporate and individual performance .
Long-Term Cash Incentive (LTIP) – program framework
| LTIP Cycle | Metrics | Weights | Max Payout | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 | Net Sales Growth (3yr), ROE, Net Operating Cash Flow/Average Equity | 15%, 45%, 40% | 100% cap | Earned 79%: ROE 100%, NOCF/Average Equity 86%, Net Sales Growth below threshold . |
| 2023–2025 | Net Sales Growth (3yr), ROA (EBIT/Average Assets), Net Operating Cash Flow/Average Equity | 15%, 45%, 40% | 125% cap | ROA replaces ROE this cycle . |
| 2024–2026 | Net Sales Growth (3yr), ROE, Net Operating Cash Flow/Average Equity | 15%, 45%, 40% | 125% cap | Return to ROE . |
Equity Incentives (company design and 2024 certification)
| Instrument | Performance Metric | 2024 Target | 2024 Actual | Earned | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Stock Units (PSUs) | EBITDA | $261.0 million | $275.4 million | CEO 105.5% (capped at 125% potential); other NEOs 100% due to cap | Earned PSUs vest evenly over 3 years . |
Note: The proxy discloses PSU awards and outcomes for NEOs; Mr. Pelaez’s individual awards are not itemized in the proxy .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Executive Share Ownership Guidelines | CEO 5x salary; COO 3x; all SVPs 2x salary; achieve within 5 years; must retain at least 50% of shares from RSU vesting until in compliance . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging prohibited; officers are prohibited from pledging shares subject to the Share Ownership Guidelines; any pledges must comply with applicable laws and policy . |
| Beneficial Ownership Table Context | Proxy itemizes beneficial ownership for directors and NEOs; Mr. Pelaez is not individually itemized among those named holders; group of all directors and executive officers (16 persons) held 31.6% as of Apr 14, 2025 . |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms (as disclosed) |
|---|---|
| Severance | CEO has a separate double-trigger severance agreement with tax gross-up provisions tied to 280G (not expected to apply due to non-U.S. tax status) . |
| General Executive Severance Policy | For U.S. employees (including NEOs other than CEO), maximum 26 weeks severance based on years of service . |
| Clawbacks | Two policies: executive officer clawback for accounting restatements (no-fault, 3-year lookback) and an employee recoupment policy covering inaccurate financials or serious misconduct over a 3-year lookback . |
| Insider Trading | Prohibits trading on MNPI; restricts hedging; limits pledging and requires compliance; awards not granted around MNPI events . |
Governance, Related-Party, and Risk Indicators
- Strong compensation governance: at-risk pay mix, multi-year vesting of PSUs, robust ownership guidelines, independent compensation committee supported by Willis Towers Watson .
- Related-party transactions: 2024 expenses with Arab Wings ($427k) and Polygon ($162k) reviewed under policy; CEO and family affiliates have roles in these entities; audit committee oversight in place .
- Say-on-Pay annually conducted; Board recommends “FOR” .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: As an SVP, Mr. Pelaez is subject to a 2x salary ownership guideline with required post-vest retention and hedging/pledging constraints—signals alignment but exact personal holdings are not disclosed, limiting precision on “skin in the game” and potential selling overhang .
- Incentive levers: Company-wide incentive architecture emphasizes ROE/EPS/FCF in AIP and EBITDA for PSUs with 3-year vesting; this focuses management on profitability, returns, and cash generation, supportive for capital discipline in CECAB operations he oversees .
- Overhang/vesting cadence: Multi-year PSU vesting can create periodic liquidity events for senior executives (disclosed for NEOs); absence of Form 4 data for Mr. Pelaez in the proxy means insider selling pressure can’t be quantified here .
- Retention risk: Outside the CEO, disclosed severance is limited (max 26 weeks in U.S.), suggesting lower “golden handcuff” risk; retention likely relies on career progression, PSU value accretion, and ownership requirements rather than rich severance protections .
- Execution track record: Long-tenured operator (since 1984) across multiple geographies; company-level 2024 improvements in profitability and EBITDA target outperformance underpin near-term confidence in the operating model for regions under his remit .