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Mohammed Abbas

Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer at FRESH DEL MONTE PRODUCEFRESH DEL MONTE PRODUCE
Executive

About Mohammed Abbas

Mohammed Abbas, 49, is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Fresh Del Monte Produce (FDP) since February 1, 2022, with prior leadership roles across MENA and Asia Pacific, including General Manager positions in Saudi Arabia and UAE . Company performance tied to Abbas’s incentive plans included 2024 adjusted EBITDA of $275.4 million vs a $261.0 million target (PSU metric), a three‑year LTIP net sales growth actual of 0.7% vs a 19.2% target, and a 2024 total shareholder return (TSR) value of $105.78 on an initial $100 investment . His 2024 Senior Executive AIP payout was 117% of target, with PSUs earned at 100% of target and vesting over three years, underscoring pay-for-performance alignment to EBITDA, ROE/ROA, cash flow, EPS and individual operational objectives .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
Fresh Del Monte Produce (Asia Pacific & Middle East Region)Senior Vice PresidentOct 2019–Jan 2022
Fresh Del Monte Produce (Middle East & North Africa)Vice PresidentJan 2016–Nov 2019
Fresh Del Monte Produce (MENA)Vice President, Fresh ProduceApr 2015–Dec 2015
Del Monte Saudi ArabiaGeneral ManagerJun 2009–Mar 2015
Del Monte Foods UAEGeneral ManagerJan 2007–May 2009

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
None disclosed in the proxy for Abbas

Fixed Compensation

Multi-year summary compensation for Mohammed Abbas:

MetricFY 2022FY 2023FY 2024
Salary ($)517,541 833,654 850,000
Stock Awards ($)432,068 689,381 724,500
Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($)303,071 101,150 731,425
All Other Compensation ($)344,998 19,543 19,239
Total ($)1,597,678 1,643,728 2,325,164

Performance Compensation

Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Senior Executives (2024)

MetricWeightingTargetActualPayoutNotes
Return on Equity24.5% (35% of 70%) Company-set target Above target Contributes to 127% of financial portion Threshold 80%; max 150%
Earnings per Share31.5% (45% of 70%) Threshold 86%; target set Above target Contributes to 127% of financial portion Threshold 86%; max 150%
Free Cash Flow ($mm)14.0% (20% of 70%) Company-set target Achieved at maximum Contributes to 127% of financial portion Threshold 80%; max 150%
Individual Performance Objectives30.0% 100% total across 4–8 goals 80–95% achievement range Drives total payout varianceGoals tailored to role
Abbas AIP Target Opportunity ($)425,000
Abbas AIP Payout ($)496,400 (117% of target)

Performance Stock Units (PSUs) – 2024 Grant

MetricTargetActual% EarnedVesting
Adjusted EBITDA (FY 2024)$261.0 million $275.4 million 100% (NEOs cap), CEO 105.5% Equal tranches over 3 years starting Mar 1, 2025

Abbas 2024 PSU target grant fair value: $724,496; target shares 29,729; threshold 20,810; vesting capped at 100% for NEOs; FMV at grant $24.37 per share .

Long-Term Cash Incentive Plan (LTIP) – 2022–2024 Cycle Results

MetricWeightThresholdTargetActual% Earned
Net Sales Growth (2024 Net Sales / 2021 Net Sales)15% 15.4% 19.2% 0.7% —% (below threshold)
ROE (Net Income / Average Equity)45% 5.3% 6.6% 7.2% 100%
Net Operating Cash Flow / Average Equity40% 8.6% 10.8% 9.3% 86%
Abbas LTIP Payout79% of target; $235,025 paid

LTIP metric design: 2022–2024 and 2024–2026 cycles use Net Sales Growth (15%), ROE (45%), and Net Operating Cash Flow/Average Equity (40); 2023–2025 replaces ROE with ROA (EBIT/Average Assets) at 45% .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Total Beneficial Ownership45,560 shares; <1% of 47,854,123 shares outstanding (as of Apr 14, 2025)
Unvested Awards (12/27/2024)2024 PSUs: 30,836 units; MV $1,020,044
2023 RSUs: 7,638 units; MV $252,663
2022 RSUs: 3,064 units; MV $101,354
2022 PSUs: 3,529 units; MV $116,730
Vested PSU Awards (settlement rules)PSUs from 2016–2021 fully vested; will be settled 6 months after termination
Upcoming Vesting SchedulePSUs granted Mar 1, 2024 vest equally on Mar 1 of 2025, 2026, 2027
RSUs vest on Mar 2, 2025 and Mar 2, 2026
Stock OptionsNone outstanding; no exercises in 2024
2024 Stock Vested11,841 shares vested; value realized $288,565; 5,064 shares withheld for taxes
Hedging/Pledging PolicyHedging prohibited; officers prohibited from pledging stock subject to ownership guidelines
Pledging StatusNo pledging disclosed for Abbas; CEO has pledged shares (context only)

Employment Terms

ScenarioKey TermsAmounts
General Severance (U.S. policy)Up to 26 weeks based on years of service Abbas severance payment: $425,000 (seniority date Feb 20, 2007)
Termination in Absence of Change of ControlSeverance only$425,000 total; no equity acceleration disclosed
Termination Upon Change of ControlSeverance plus equity accelerationSeverance: $425,000; Equity Acceleration: $2,108,410; Total: $2,533,410

Note: Footnote confirms Abbas’s severance is calculated using his seniority date of February 20, 2007 (joined FDP in Dubai) .

Investment Implications

  • Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: 2024 PSUs tied to EBITDA exceeded target with NEOs capped at 100% earned and vest evenly through 2027, while the AIP blends ROE/EPS/FCF with individualized operating goals—Abbas’s payout at 117% indicates balanced financial and operational execution .
  • Retention risk appears contained near term: Material unvested PSUs/RSUs with scheduled vesting in 2025–2027, plus older PSUs settling only post-termination, create meaningful deferred value and reduce immediate exit incentives .
  • Insider selling pressure: 2024 vesting totaled 11,841 shares for Abbas, with 5,064 shares withheld for taxes; continued vesting events in 2025–2027 may add supply, though hedging/pledging restrictions mitigate adverse alignment risks .
  • Ownership alignment: Abbas’s beneficial stake is 45,560 shares (<1%), below levels that typically signal high personal leverage to equity outcomes; alignment leans more on performance-linked equity and cash incentive structures rather than outright ownership .
  • Change-of-control economics: Equity acceleration and severance ($2.53 million total) under CoC termination provide downside protection; absence of disclosed tax gross-ups for Abbas and modest cash severance relative to CEO suggests governance-friendly design for non-PEO NEOs .