Mohammed Abbas
About Mohammed Abbas
Mohammed Abbas, 49, is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Fresh Del Monte Produce (FDP) since February 1, 2022, with prior leadership roles across MENA and Asia Pacific, including General Manager positions in Saudi Arabia and UAE . Company performance tied to Abbas’s incentive plans included 2024 adjusted EBITDA of $275.4 million vs a $261.0 million target (PSU metric), a three‑year LTIP net sales growth actual of 0.7% vs a 19.2% target, and a 2024 total shareholder return (TSR) value of $105.78 on an initial $100 investment . His 2024 Senior Executive AIP payout was 117% of target, with PSUs earned at 100% of target and vesting over three years, underscoring pay-for-performance alignment to EBITDA, ROE/ROA, cash flow, EPS and individual operational objectives .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fresh Del Monte Produce (Asia Pacific & Middle East Region) | Senior Vice President | Oct 2019–Jan 2022 | — |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce (Middle East & North Africa) | Vice President | Jan 2016–Nov 2019 | — |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce (MENA) | Vice President, Fresh Produce | Apr 2015–Dec 2015 | — |
| Del Monte Saudi Arabia | General Manager | Jun 2009–Mar 2015 | — |
| Del Monte Foods UAE | General Manager | Jan 2007–May 2009 | — |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | None disclosed in the proxy for Abbas |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year summary compensation for Mohammed Abbas:
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 517,541 | 833,654 | 850,000 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 432,068 | 689,381 | 724,500 |
| Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation ($) | 303,071 | 101,150 | 731,425 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 344,998 | 19,543 | 19,239 |
| Total ($) | 1,597,678 | 1,643,728 | 2,325,164 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Senior Executives (2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Return on Equity | 24.5% (35% of 70%) | Company-set target | Above target | Contributes to 127% of financial portion | Threshold 80%; max 150% |
| Earnings per Share | 31.5% (45% of 70%) | Threshold 86%; target set | Above target | Contributes to 127% of financial portion | Threshold 86%; max 150% |
| Free Cash Flow ($mm) | 14.0% (20% of 70%) | Company-set target | Achieved at maximum | Contributes to 127% of financial portion | Threshold 80%; max 150% |
| Individual Performance Objectives | 30.0% | 100% total across 4–8 goals | 80–95% achievement range | Drives total payout variance | Goals tailored to role |
| Abbas AIP Target Opportunity ($) | 425,000 | — | — | — | — |
| Abbas AIP Payout ($) | — | — | — | 496,400 (117% of target) |
Performance Stock Units (PSUs) – 2024 Grant
| Metric | Target | Actual | % Earned | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA (FY 2024) | $261.0 million | $275.4 million | 100% (NEOs cap), CEO 105.5% | Equal tranches over 3 years starting Mar 1, 2025 |
Abbas 2024 PSU target grant fair value: $724,496; target shares 29,729; threshold 20,810; vesting capped at 100% for NEOs; FMV at grant $24.37 per share .
Long-Term Cash Incentive Plan (LTIP) – 2022–2024 Cycle Results
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Actual | % Earned |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Sales Growth (2024 Net Sales / 2021 Net Sales) | 15% | 15.4% | 19.2% | 0.7% | —% (below threshold) |
| ROE (Net Income / Average Equity) | 45% | 5.3% | 6.6% | 7.2% | 100% |
| Net Operating Cash Flow / Average Equity | 40% | 8.6% | 10.8% | 9.3% | 86% |
| Abbas LTIP Payout | — | — | — | — | 79% of target; $235,025 paid |
LTIP metric design: 2022–2024 and 2024–2026 cycles use Net Sales Growth (15%), ROE (45%), and Net Operating Cash Flow/Average Equity (40); 2023–2025 replaces ROE with ROA (EBIT/Average Assets) at 45% .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 45,560 shares; <1% of 47,854,123 shares outstanding (as of Apr 14, 2025) |
| Unvested Awards (12/27/2024) | 2024 PSUs: 30,836 units; MV $1,020,044 |
| 2023 RSUs: 7,638 units; MV $252,663 | |
| 2022 RSUs: 3,064 units; MV $101,354 | |
| 2022 PSUs: 3,529 units; MV $116,730 | |
| Vested PSU Awards (settlement rules) | PSUs from 2016–2021 fully vested; will be settled 6 months after termination |
| Upcoming Vesting Schedule | PSUs granted Mar 1, 2024 vest equally on Mar 1 of 2025, 2026, 2027 |
| RSUs vest on Mar 2, 2025 and Mar 2, 2026 | |
| Stock Options | None outstanding; no exercises in 2024 |
| 2024 Stock Vested | 11,841 shares vested; value realized $288,565; 5,064 shares withheld for taxes |
| Hedging/Pledging Policy | Hedging prohibited; officers prohibited from pledging stock subject to ownership guidelines |
| Pledging Status | No pledging disclosed for Abbas; CEO has pledged shares (context only) |
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Key Terms | Amounts |
|---|---|---|
| General Severance (U.S. policy) | Up to 26 weeks based on years of service | Abbas severance payment: $425,000 (seniority date Feb 20, 2007) |
| Termination in Absence of Change of Control | Severance only | $425,000 total; no equity acceleration disclosed |
| Termination Upon Change of Control | Severance plus equity acceleration | Severance: $425,000; Equity Acceleration: $2,108,410; Total: $2,533,410 |
Note: Footnote confirms Abbas’s severance is calculated using his seniority date of February 20, 2007 (joined FDP in Dubai) .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment is strong: 2024 PSUs tied to EBITDA exceeded target with NEOs capped at 100% earned and vest evenly through 2027, while the AIP blends ROE/EPS/FCF with individualized operating goals—Abbas’s payout at 117% indicates balanced financial and operational execution .
- Retention risk appears contained near term: Material unvested PSUs/RSUs with scheduled vesting in 2025–2027, plus older PSUs settling only post-termination, create meaningful deferred value and reduce immediate exit incentives .
- Insider selling pressure: 2024 vesting totaled 11,841 shares for Abbas, with 5,064 shares withheld for taxes; continued vesting events in 2025–2027 may add supply, though hedging/pledging restrictions mitigate adverse alignment risks .
- Ownership alignment: Abbas’s beneficial stake is 45,560 shares (<1%), below levels that typically signal high personal leverage to equity outcomes; alignment leans more on performance-linked equity and cash incentive structures rather than outright ownership .
- Change-of-control economics: Equity acceleration and severance ($2.53 million total) under CoC termination provide downside protection; absence of disclosed tax gross-ups for Abbas and modest cash severance relative to CEO suggests governance-friendly design for non-PEO NEOs .