Monica Vicente
FRESH DEL MONTE PRODUCEAbout Monica Vicente
Monica Vicente (age 59) is Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc. (FDP) since April 1, 2022; she previously served as VP, Corporate Finance (2003–2022) and earlier spent six years with Ernst & Young in assurance services . Under her tenure as CFO, 2024 results showed a sharp turnaround: net income attributable to FDP of $142.2 million (vs. a $11.4 million loss in 2023), EBITDA of $273.9 million, and gross margin expansion to 8.4% from 8.1% in 2023 . FDP also raised the quarterly dividend to $0.30 in Q1 2025 and authorized a $150 million repurchase program, signaling confidence in long‑term strategy execution .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc. | SVP & Chief Financial Officer | Apr 1, 2022 – Present | Leads global finance, FP&A, IR, procurement; key in capital allocation and performance plans . |
| Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc. | VP, Corporate Finance | 2003 – 2022 | Led regional finance, global FP&A, IR, procurement; also SEC reporting, controlling, tax, treasury . |
| Ernst & Young | Assurance Services | Six years (pre-2003) | Public company audit/controls grounding supporting CFO role . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Balchem Corporation | Director; Audit Committee member | Since Sept 2023 | Public company board and audit oversight experience . |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year compensation (NEO: CFO):
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Non-Equity Incentive ($) | All Other ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 486,200 | 493,417 | 396,874 (AIP $273,783; LTIP $123,091) | 6,651 | 1,383,142 |
| 2023 | 485,000 | 245,859 | — | 7,800 | 738,659 |
| 2022 | 446,285 | 99,416 | 197,153 | 32,759 | 775,613 |
2024 fixed and target incentive design (CFO):
- Base salary: $486,200 .
- Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) target: 50% of base salary; CFO target opportunity $242,500 .
- AIP payout: 113% of target; paid $273,783 .
- Long-Term Cash Incentive Plan (LTIP) target: 35% of base salary; 2024–2026 target opportunity $169,750 .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024
Structure and outcomes:
- Corporate metrics (70% weight) and Individual Performance Objectives (30% weight) for NEOs .
- Metrics and weights within the 70% corporate bucket: ROE (24.5%), EPS (31.5%), Free Cash Flow (14.0%); threshold payout at 80% of target for ROE/FCF and 86% for EPS; max 150% .
- Company Achievement Factor: 127% based on over‑target ROE/EPS and FCF at maximum .
- CFO AIP payout: 113% of target = $273,783 .
| Component | Weighting | Threshold Payout Level | Target Payout Level | Max Payout Level | 2024 Corporate Achievement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE (Net Income/Average Equity) | 24.5% of total target (within 70%) | 80% of target | 100% | 150% | Included in 127% company factor |
| EPS | 31.5% of total target (within 70%) | 86% of target | 100% | 150% | Included in 127% company factor |
| Free Cash Flow ($mm) | 14.0% of total target (within 70%) | 80% of target | 100% | 150% | Achieved at maximum; part of 127% factor |
| Individual Performance | 30% | N/A | N/A | 150% cap | NEOs ranged 80%–95% (CFO specific not disclosed) |
Note: The company-level targets used for AIP were aligned with CEO AIP design; CEO table shows ROE target 5.70%, EPS $2.11, FCF $126.0mm; corporate achievement was 127% on aggregate .
Performance Stock Units (PSUs) – 2024 Grant
- Instrument: PSUs with 1‑year performance based on EBITDA; earned PSUs vest ratably over 3 years beginning on the first anniversary of grant .
- Company 2024 EBITDA target: $261.0 million; actual: $275.4 million (105.5% of target) .
- Earned %: CFO and other NEOs capped at 100% of target (CEO earned 105.5%) .
| Grant Date | Type | Target Shares (CFO) | Performance Metric | Target | Actual | Earned % | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 1, 2024 | PSUs | 20,247 | EBITDA | $261.0mm | $275.4mm | 100% (NEOs capped) | 1/3 each on Mar 1, 2025, 2026, 2027 |
Long-Term Cash Incentive Plan (LTIP)
Design and recent outcomes:
- LTIP cycles cover 3 years; payouts linear from 80% threshold to 100% target (2022–2024 capped at 100%; 2023–2025+ max 125%) .
- Metrics and weights (2024–2026): Net Sales Growth (15%), ROE (45%), Net Operating Cash Flow/Average Equity (40%) .
- 2022–2024 Cycle payout: Company missed Net Sales Growth threshold; achieved ROE at 100% and NOCF/Avg Equity at 86%, resulting in 79% payout; CFO received $123,091 .
| Cycle | Metrics & Weights | CFO Target ($) | Payout % | CFO Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024–2026 | Net Sales Growth 15%; ROE 45%; NOCF/Avg Equity 40% | 169,750 | N/A (in progress) | N/A |
| 2023–2025 | Net Sales Growth 15%; ROA 45%; NOCF/Avg Equity 40% | N/A | In progress | N/A |
| 2022–2024 | Net Sales Growth 15%; ROE 45%; NOCF/Avg Equity 40% | N/A | 79% | 123,091 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Ownership, awards, guidelines, and restrictions:
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 10,808 ordinary shares (as of Apr 14, 2025) . |
| Shares outstanding | 47,854,123 (record date Apr 14, 2025) . |
| Ownership as % of SO | ~0.02% (10,808 / 47,854,123) . |
| Unvested outstanding awards (12/27/2024) | 2024 PSUs: 21,001; 2022 PSUs: 909; 2023 RSUs: 2,724; 2022 RSUs: 607 (counts include DEUs) . |
| Upcoming vesting schedule (illustrative) | 2024 PSUs vest in thirds: Mar 1, 2025–2027; 2023 RSUs vest Mar 2, 2025 and Mar 2, 2026; 2022 RSUs vest Mar 2, 2025; 2022 PSUs vest between Jul 6, 2023 and Mar 2, 2025 . |
| Options | Company has no outstanding options and has not been granting options; no option exercises in 2024 . |
| Ownership guidelines | CFO must hold shares = 2x base salary within 5 years; must retain 50% of shares from RSU vests until compliant; unearned PSUs count after earned; options (if any) do not count . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging prohibited; officers prohibited from pledging shares that are subject to ownership guidelines . |
| Pledging status | No pledges disclosed for Ms. Vicente in beneficial ownership footnotes . |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms |
|---|---|
| Appointment | SVP & CFO since April 1, 2022 . |
| Severance (no CIC) | Under general severance policy (max 26 weeks); table shows CFO severance $242,500 (approx. 26 weeks of 2024 base) . |
| Change in Control (CIC) | CFO severance $242,500 plus acceleration of equity ($834,945 using 12/27/2024 price) per plan rules; total indicative $1,077,445 . |
| Equity acceleration | 2022 plan accelerates upon death/disability; 2022 plan requires termination without cause within 24 months post‑CIC or non‑assumption to accelerate; performance awards earn at actual performance as of CIC then continue service‑based vesting unless terminated . |
| Clawbacks | Dodd‑Frank compliant executive officer clawback for restatements; broad company recoupment policy for inaccurate financials or misconduct (3‑year lookback) . |
| Hedging/Pledging policy | Prohibits hedging; prohibits pledging of shares subject to ownership guidelines . |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay mix and at‑risk weighting: For 2024, other NEOs (incl. CFO) had 62% of target direct compensation at risk (AIP, LTIP, equity), aligning pay with enterprise outcomes .
- Shift to PSU‑only equity: 2024 awards were 100% PSUs for all NEOs, keyed to EBITDA, with multi‑year vesting—reduces windfall risk and strengthens performance linkage vs. time‑based RSUs .
- AIP metrics emphasize capital efficiency and cash: ROE, EPS, and Free Cash Flow reinforce return/cash generation behaviors and align with shareholder value creation .
- LTIP revisions: Introduction of ROA in the 2023–2025 cycle and maintaining ROE/NOCF in 2024–2026 promote asset efficiency and cash returns over time .
- Governance and shareholder feedback: Independent Compensation Committee uses WTW as independent advisor; say‑on‑pay support ~95% in 2024 indicates low investor concern on pay practices .
Say‑on‑Pay, Peer Group, and Committee
- Say‑on‑Pay approval: ~95% support at 2024 AGM .
- Compensation peer group (Aug 2023 update): Added Dole plc and Mission Produce; removed Sanderson Farms; target pay levels around 50th percentile of peer benchmarks .
- Compensation Committee: Independent directors; oversees clawbacks, ownership guidelines, incentive design, and uses WTW as independent consultant (no conflicts) .
Performance & Track Record (context during CFO tenure)
- Financial improvement: 2024 net income attributable to FDP of $142.2 million vs. prior year loss; gross profit increased to $357.9 million; gross margin to 8.4% (from 8.1% in 2023) .
- EBITDA: $273.9 million (2024) vs. $124.1 million (2023), $241.8 million (2022) .
- Capital returns: Dividend increased to $0.30 per share in Q1 2025 and $150 million buyback authorized .
- TSR context: Company cumulative TSR value of $105.78 in 2024 vs. $81.18 in 2023 (per $100 initial investment framework) .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: CFO incentives are predominantly at‑risk with balanced short‑/long‑term levers (AIP: ROE/EPS/FCF; PSUs: EBITDA; LTIP: ROE/ROA/NOCF/Net Sales), supporting capex discipline, margin expansion, and cash generation .
- Supply/demand overhang: No options outstanding reduces potential forced selling from expirations; PSU vesting cadence (2024 grant vests 2025–2027) introduces predictable but modest periodic supply from vesting/withholding .
- Ownership/skin‑in‑the‑game: Direct beneficial ownership is modest at 10,808 shares (~0.02% of SO), but substantial unvested PSU/RSU exposure increases alignment; hedging prohibited and no pledges disclosed for the CFO .
- Retention risk: Cash severance is limited (c. 26 weeks), but multi‑year PSU vesting and ongoing LTIP cycles provide retention hooks; CIC provisions include equity acceleration per plan rules, a standard market feature .
- Governance: Strong support on Say‑on‑Pay (~95%), independent consultant engagement (WTW), and robust clawbacks mitigate governance overhangs and reduce risk of shareholder pushback on pay .
Overall, Monica Vicente’s compensation design emphasizes returns, earnings quality, and cash flow, aligning incentives with FDP’s margin and capital allocation focus under her CFO leadership—while modest direct ownership and multi‑year equity vesting temper near‑term insider selling pressure and support retention **[1047340_0000950170-25-058700_fdp-20250424.htm:55]** **[1047340_0000950170-25-058700_fdp-20250424.htm:58]** **[1047340_0000950170-25-058700_fdp-20250424.htm:67]** **[1047340_0000950170-25-058700_fdp-20250424.htm:5]**.