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Tammy S. LoCascio

Chief Operating Officer at FIRST HORIZONFIRST HORIZON
Executive

About Tammy S. LoCascio

Senior Executive Vice President—Chief Operating Officer of First Horizon (FHN). In late 2024 her responsibilities expanded to include several business units formerly part of Specialty Banking, signaling elevated execution scope and operating accountability . Company performance context for 2024: one-year total shareholder return was +47.66%, total loans grew 2.0% YoY, and CET1 ended at 11.2% (management emphasized safety/soundness, profitability, and growth) . Compensation programs emphasize pay-for-performance using adjusted PPNR, credit quality (NPA and NCO), strategic execution for annual bonuses, and three-year ROTCE rank vs KRX with TSR modifier for PSUs, aligning incentives to value creation and risk discipline .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
First Horizon CorporationSEVP—Chief Operating OfficerNEO since 2022; responsibilities expanded in late 2024Broadened remit to include units formerly in Specialty Banking, tied to operational quality and efficiency initiatives

External Roles

  • Not disclosed in company filings reviewed .

Fixed Compensation

Component2024 DetailSource
Base Salary$725,000
Target Bonus (% of salary)100%
Target Bonus ($)$725,000
Actual Bonus Paid (2024)$725,000
Perquisites and Other (2024)$77,392 (Perqs $27,422; 401k/Restor. match $45,977; Life Ins. $3,993)
Deferred Comp (2024)Exec contrib $22,800; Company $22,800; Earnings $191,193; YE Balance $942,711

Performance Compensation

2024 Annual Cash Incentive – Metrics, Targets, Outcomes, Payout

MetricWeightTargetActualFactor/OutcomeNotes
Adjusted PPNR vs Budget50%$1,313–$1,451m$1,298m97% underlying → rounded to 100% corporateTarget band introduced for 95–105% of budget
NPA Ratio12.5%0.775% (grid-based)0.96%63% for this sub-factorCredit factor averages NPA and NCO sub-factors
NCO Ratio12.5%0.30% (grid-based)0.18%140% for this sub-factorNo “sudden NCO event” penalty in 2024
Strategic Initiatives25%QualitativeDetermined at target100%Progress on quality initiatives, IT roadmap, retail strategy, efficiency
Final Corporate Rating100.00% (rounded from 99.02%)Very modest discretionary round-up
  • Individual rating for LoCascio: 100%; bonus paid at target ($725,000) .

Long-Term Incentives (LTI) – Structure and 2024 Grants

  • PSU design: 3-year performance; vest based on FHN’s adjusted ROTCE averaged over the period ranked vs KRX banks; outcome modified by 3-year TSR rank vs KRX; payout 0–150% for ROTCE multiplied by 75–125% TSR modifier (max 187.5%); 2024 PSU vest date May 12, 2027 .
  • RSU design: time-based, 3-year cliff vest (March 2, 2027) .
  • 2024 targeted retention awards (5-year): PSUs and RSUs granted to address retention risk; vest May 12, 2029 (RPSU) / March 2, 2029 (RRSU) .
Award (Grant 2/12/2024)Units (Target)Grant-Date Fair Value ($)Vesting
Annual PSUs59,548837,8405/12/2027 (3-year)
Annual RSUs39,699558,5653/2/2027 (3-year)
Retention PSUs (5-year)82,1351,155,6395/12/2029 (5-year)
Retention RSUs (5-year)54,757770,4313/2/2029 (5-year)
  • LTI mix for NEOs in 2024: PSUs 60% / RSUs 40% (at target) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetailSource
Beneficial Ownership (1/31/2025)256,537 shares; includes right to acquire 12,492 shares via options exercisable within 60 days
Unvested RSUs at 12/31/2024164,178 units; $3,306,545 (at $20.14)
Unvested PSUs (target) at 12/31/2024216,468 units; $4,359,666 (at $20.14)
Stock Options (legacy)3,686 options @ $15.43 exp. 3/2/2026; 8,806 options @ $15.90 exp. 3/2/2027
Stock Ownership GuidelinesExecutives must retain 50% of after-tax shares (75% if below minimums); in 2024 assessment all active NEOs except CFO exceeded minimums—LoCascio was in compliance
Hedging/PledgingHedging prohibited without approval; no approvals granted to date. No pledging disclosed for LoCascio in ownership tables reviewed

Vesting calendar (potential selling-pressure windows):

  • March 2, 2027: 39,699 RSUs; May 12, 2027: up to 59,548 PSUs (0–187.5% of target) subject to performance .
  • March 2, 2029: 54,757 RRSUs; May 12, 2029: up to 82,135 RPSUs (0–187.5% of target) subject to performance .

Employment Terms

ProvisionLoCascio TermsSource
Employment AgreementNone disclosed (only CEO has an employment agreement)
CIC Severance PlanDouble-trigger; 2.5x (salary + “bonus amount” average) if terminated without cause or resign for good reason within 36 months post-CIC; no excise tax gross-up; restrictive covenants apply
CIC Potential Payout (hypothetical at 12/31/2024)Cash severance $3,197,917; Pro-rated bonus $725,000; Stock awards $8,721,945; Savings restoration $219,076; Health & welfare $24,659; Other $25,000; Total $12,913,597
ClawbacksMandatory recovery for erroneous financial data and for certain misconduct; SEC-compliant erroneously awarded comp recovery policy
Termination (non-CIC)PSUs/RSUs generally forfeit on resignation/discharge; pro-rata or accelerated treatment may apply on death/disability/retirement per plan terms

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Pay mix and rigor: Target annual bonus at 100% of salary with 50% weight on adjusted PPNR, 25% on credit (NPA/NCO), and 25% strategic execution; 2024 corporate rating rounded to 100% despite PPNR below target and NPA above target, offset by NCO outperformance and strategic progress .
  • Long-term alignment: Majority of LTI in PSUs linked to 3-year ROTCE rank vs KRX and TSR modifier; retention awards extended to 5-year vest and include performance conditions, indicating focus on long-horizon alignment and retention amid competitive talent risk .
  • Peer benchmarking and governance: Committee targets TDC near peer medians; uses independent consultant (Meridian); say-on-pay approval 97% in 2024; no repricing, no below-market options, no CIC single-triggers or tax gross-ups (plan-level) .

Performance & Track Record

  • Company TSR and financials during her COO tenure period: 2024 TSR +47.66%; adjusted PPNR slightly below target; NPA rose to 0.97% while NCO improved to 0.18%; management executed on operational quality, technology transformation, and retail strategy initiatives underpinning long-term efficiency and growth plans .
  • Incentive outcomes: 2024 corporate rating 100% and individual rating 100% yielded LoCascio’s bonus at target ($725,000) .

Compensation Peer Group (Benchmarking)

  • 2024 peer set includes 17 regional banks (e.g., CFG, FITB, FHN positioning at $82B assets) with Committee goal to align TDC with peer medians; NYCB removed from 2025 peers after financial difficulties .

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • Say-on-pay support: 97% FOR at 2024 annual meeting, reflecting investor acceptance of program design and outcomes .
  • Ongoing engagement: Management and directors engaged large shareholders on governance and compensation topics .

Related Party Transactions and Risk Indicators

  • No related-party red flags noted for LoCascio in proxy disclosures reviewed; company maintains procedures for related party oversight and prohibits hedging without approval; no LoCascio pledging disclosed .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: High at-risk pay with PSU metrics tied to ROTCE rank and TSR; ownership guidelines and retention of after-tax shares reinforce alignment; LoCascio is in compliance with guidelines .
  • Retention risk vs. selling pressure: Significant 5-year retention grants (RPSUs 82,135; RRSUs 54,757) concentrate vesting in 2029; near-term cliff vests in 2027 (annual PSUs/RSUs) could create event-driven liquidity windows, especially if performance outcomes push PSU payouts above target .
  • Governance quality: Double-trigger CIC, no tax gross-ups, robust clawbacks, and strong say-on-pay support reduce governance risk; however, 2024 corporate rating rounding to 100% despite mixed KPI outcomes warrants monitoring of Committee discretion in future cycles .
  • Execution focus: Expanded COO remit alongside company-wide operational quality and technology initiatives ties LoCascio’s incentives to tangible efficiency and risk outcomes; watch adjusted PTI becoming the primary 2025 annual bonus driver (75% weight), increasing earnings sensitivity of cash incentives .