Amy Howe
About Amy Howe
Amy Howe, age 53, is Chief Executive Officer of Flutter’s U.S. division (FanDuel) since July 2021; she previously served as FanDuel President (February–July 2021). She holds a B.S. from Cornell University and an MBA from the Wharton School. In 2024, Flutter reported $14.05 billion in revenue (+19% YoY), $162 million in net income, $2,357 million Adjusted EBITDA, and $1,745 million Group Adjusted EBIT; since its primary NYSE listing a hypothetical $100 investment was worth $125.77 at year-end versus $134.90 for peers, framing executive pay-for-performance context during her tenure leading FanDuel’s U.S. operations .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| FanDuel (Flutter U.S. division) | Chief Executive Officer | Jul 2021–present | Leads North American Sportsbook, Casino, Racing, and Daily Fantasy businesses |
| FanDuel | President | Feb 2021–Jul 2021 | Oversaw core commercial functions across product lines |
| Live Nation Ticketmaster | President & COO | 2015–2021 | Led global ticketing operations and transformation |
| McKinsey & Company | Partner | Pre-2015 | Strategy and operating leadership experience |
External Roles
No current public company directorships disclosed for Amy Howe in the proxy .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Terms/Outcome |
|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $1,032,500 |
| Target Bonus (%) | 100% of salary; max 200% of target |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($) | $1,187,375 (115% of target) |
| Perquisites ($) | $118,000 for personal security; $11,538 pension-related |
Performance Compensation
2024 Annual Incentive Outcome (FanDuel CEO)
| Measure | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual (Unadjusted) | Achievement (% of target, Unadjusted) | Actual (Adjusted) | Achievement (% of target, Adjusted) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FanDuel Sports Adjusted Net Revenue ($m) | 31.2% | 3,930 | 4,624 | 5,317 | 4,368 | 25.45% | 4,368 | 25.45% |
| FanDuel Casino Adjusted Net Revenue ($m) | 7.8% | 968 | 1,139 | 1,310 | 1,407 | 11.70% | 1,407 | 11.70% |
| FanDuel Adjusted EBIT ($m) | 24.75% | 347 | 462 | 578 | 306 | 0.00% | 410 | 19.22% |
| Safer Gambling | 11.25% | See SG table | See SG table | See SG table | See SG table | 16.88% | — | 16.88% |
| Group Result | 25.0% | See Group table | See Group table | See Group table | See Group table | 23.01% | — | 29.87% |
| Total | 100% | — | — | — | — | 77.03% | — | 103.11% |
| Personal Performance Modifier | — | — | — | — | — | — | Final Payout: 115.00% of target | — |
Final Annual Incentive Payout for 2024: $1,187,375 (115% of target) .
Long-Term Equity Incentives Granted for 2024
| Award Type | Grant Date | Size / Target | Metric & Weighting | Performance Period | Vesting Mechanics | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Max Grant Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Performance Share Units (PSUs) | 8/19/2024 | 600% of base salary; target shares: 29,849 | 33.3% Group Adjusted EPS; 33.3% Group Net Revenue; 33.3% Relative TSR vs S&P 500 | 3 years | 50–200% of target shares vest based on performance | 6,747,728 | 12,390,000 |
| Annual RSUs | 4/2/2024 | 10,009 RSUs | Time-based | — | 33⅓% vest annually over 3 years | 2,000,000 | — |
| DSIP 2024 (legacy deferral of 2023 cash incentive) | 4/2/2024 | 2,419 RSUs | Time-based | — | Legacy mandatory deferral; DSIP discontinued from 2025 | 483,333 | — |
Notes:
- RSU vesting schedules: Annual RSUs (2022, 2023, 2024) vest 33⅓% annually; RSP 2021 vests 20% per year over 5 years .
- PSUs are performance-based with 3-year periods and can pay 50–200% of target shares .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 70,077 shares; Flutter had 176,740,036 shares outstanding on April 10, 2025 (≈0.04% ownership) |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Executive Officers must hold equity ≥3× base salary; CEO 6×; company states all executives are or expected to be in compliance within guideline timelines |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for directors, officers, employees under PDMR and Group Securities Dealing Codes; short sales also prohibited |
Outstanding and Unvested Awards (as of Dec 31, 2024):
| Award | Grant Date | Unvested Stock Awards (#) | Unearned PSUs (#) | Vesting Schedule |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VCP 2021 (modified to time-based in 2023) | 3/31/2023 (mod.) | 17,798 | — | 50% vested 2/5/2024; 50% vests 2/5/2025 |
| RSP 2021 (RSUs) | 12/6/2021 | 27,513 | — | 20% annually over 5 years |
| Annual RSU 2022 | 3/4/2022 | 5,383 | — | 33⅓% annually over 3 years |
| DSIP 2023 | 3/7/2023 | 1,105 | — | Legacy deferral; time-based vest |
| Annual RSU 2023 | 3/7/2023 | 8,358 | — | 33⅓% annually over 3 years |
| DSIP 2024 | 4/2/2024 | 2,419 | — | Legacy deferral; time-based vest |
| Annual RSU 2024 | 4/2/2024 | 10,009 | — | 33⅓% annually over 3 years |
| Flutter PSU 2024 | 8/19/2024 | — | 29,849 | 3-year performance; 50–200% payout vs targets |
Insider selling pressure view: multiple annual RSU tranches and RSP 2021 installments are scheduled to vest through 2025–2027, which can create periodic liquidity windows; hedging/pledging and short sales are prohibited, mitigating alignment risks .
Employment Terms
| Term | Key Details |
|---|---|
| Agreement & Amendments | Employment agreement dated Oct 27, 2021; supplemental side-letter dated Aug 13, 2024 |
| Fixed & Variable Pay | Base salary $1,032,500; annual incentive target 100% of salary (max 200% of target) |
| LTI Design | 2024 PSU grant at target equal to 600% of base salary; 2024 RSUs of $2,000,000; for 2025 RSUs equal 150% of base salary |
| Restrictive Covenants | 24-month post-termination non-compete; non-solicit of employees and key sports organizations; prohibits inducing counterparties to reduce/terminate business |
| Contract Term & Severance | No fixed term; employment terminable at any time; no severance entitlement on termination |
| Clawbacks | Awards subject to Executive Incentive Compensation Clawback Policy (adopted Sep 7, 2023) and Company Malus and Clawback Policy (2024) |
| Change-of-Control | No automatic single-trigger acceleration; minimum 1-year vesting; double-trigger structure; if awards are not assumed/substituted at change-of-control, they vest (performance awards at target or actual per committee) |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance linkage is strong: a significant portion of Howe’s compensation is at-risk, including PSUs at 600% of salary tied to EPS, Net Revenue, and relative TSR, and annual incentives aligned to divisional and Group metrics; 2024 payout was 115% of target, reflecting mixed but ultimately above-target outcomes after committee adjustments and personal performance modifier .
- Alignment safeguards: stringent ownership guidelines (≥3× salary), robust clawbacks, and prohibitions on hedging/pledging reduce misalignment and governance risk; DSIP deferrals were discontinued from 2025, simplifying cash/equity mix and potentially reducing forced equity selling dynamics .
- Retention/transition: 24-month non-compete and extensive non-solicit provisions support retention post-termination; absence of severance reduces parachute risk but could increase departure optionality in certain scenarios, balanced by meaningful unvested equity that typically requires continued service .
- Upcoming vesting cadence: staggered RSU and RSP tranches (2025–2027) and PSU performance cycles may create periodic trading windows; monitor Form 4s near vest dates for potential selling pressure and assess PSU payout trajectories vs EPS, Net Revenue, and relative TSR benchmarks .
- Performance context: Flutter’s 2024 financials and TSR provide the macro backdrop for PSU outcomes during Howe’s leadership of FanDuel; peer-relative TSR and Group metrics will directly influence PSU vesting, adding a portfolio-level signal for investors tracking execution in the U.S. segment .