
Michael J. Nolan
About Michael J. Nolan
Michael J. Nolan is Chief Executive Officer of Fidelity National Financial (FNF), a role he has held since February 2022, after serving as President since 2016 and holding multiple operating roles at FNF since joining in 1983; he also serves on the board of F&G since August 2020 . He is 65 years old . Under his leadership amid a difficult mortgage cycle, FNF reported 2024 total revenue of $13.9 billion (excl. non‑cash investment losses) and net earnings of $1,391 million, returned ~$2.4 billion in dividends and ~$1.3 billion in buybacks over 2020–2024, and delivered a five‑year TSR of $158.17 on a $100 initial investment; Title adjusted pre‑tax margin was 15.1% in 2024 on adjusted revenue of $7,708 million .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| FNF | Chief Executive Officer | Feb 2022–present | Leads growth of title operations, overall financial performance, and investor relations . |
| FNF | President | Jan 2016–Jan 2022 | Oversaw enterprise operations through market cycles . |
| FNF | Co‑Chief Operating Officer | Sep 2015–Jan 2016 | Co‑led operational execution and integration . |
| Fidelity National Title Group (FNF) | President, Eastern Operations | Jan 2013–2015 | Ran Eastern title ops, cost and productivity initiatives . |
| FNF | EVP & Division Manager | May 2010–Jan 2013 | Managed direct and agency ops; Canada, 1031 exchange, relocation, LoanCare, ServiceLink . |
| FNF | Division/Regional Manager and other roles | 1983–2010 | Built multi‑region operating platform; execution across market cycles . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| F&G (Fidelity & Guaranty) | Director | Aug 2020–present | Receives F&G restricted stock retainer in lieu of cash . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 871,731 | 947,308 | 996,154 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 269,831 | 197,906 | 221,064 |
| CEO Target Annual Incentive (%) | — | — | 190% |
| CEO Target Annual Incentive ($) | — | — | 1,900,000 |
All Other Compensation (2024) – detail:
- ESPP matching contributions: $23,942; Executive medical: $83,949; 401(k) match: $10,350; Life insurance premiums: $1,143; F&G director retainer (paid in F&G stock): $101,680 .
Employment agreement baseline (on becoming CEO): three‑year term from Feb 1, 2022 with automatic annual extensions; base salary $900,000; target bonus 150% of salary; eligible for equity awards and executive benefits .
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan – Structure and 2024 Outcome
| Performance Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Result | Payout Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Revenue – Title Segment ($mm) | 25% | 6,151 | 6,650 | 7,149 | 7,708 | 200% |
| Adjusted Pre‑tax Margin – Title Segment (%) | 75% | 10.5% | 13.0% | 15.5% | 15.1% | 182% |
- Combined payout factor for 2024: 186.9% .
- CEO annual incentive earned: $3,550,496 (2024); $3,236,333 (2023); $2,103,362 (2022) .
Long‑Term Equity Incentives (grants made in 2024; values at grant)
| Grant Date | Award Type | Target/Granted Shares | Grant Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting & Performance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11/8/2024 | FNF Performance‑Based Restricted Stock | 91,317 | 5,500,023 | Vests in 3 equal annual installments, subject to achieving Title operating margin ≥9.5% in at least two of five quarters beginning Oct 1, 2024 . |
| 11/8/2024 | F&G Time‑Based Restricted Stock (director retainer) | 6,515 | 300,016 | Vests in 3 equal annual installments; 2022/2023 grants also subject to one‑year Adjusted Net Earnings goal at F&G for first year in the 3‑year period . |
Additional plan design notes:
- 2022 and 2023 FNF restricted stock grants vest over three years with performance condition: Title operating margin ≥7.5% in at least two of five quarters beginning Oct 1 of the grant year .
- No stock options were granted to executives during 2020–2024 .
Realized Equity in 2024
| Metric | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Shares Acquired on Vesting (#) | 92,657 |
| Value Realized on Vesting ($) | 5,529,447 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (Common Shares) | 517,112 shares; includes 14,585 shares held by the Michael J. Nolan Trust; represents less than 1% of outstanding shares . |
| Shares Outstanding (reference) | 274,639,798 shares as of April 14, 2025 . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | CEO minimum 5× base salary; all NEOs and directors exceeded guidelines as of Dec 31, 2024; unvested restricted shares count toward compliance; 50% post‑vest retention until compliant . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging and pledging not permitted without board approval; company lists best practice restrictions . Nolan has no disclosed pledges; a waiver exists only for W. P. Foley II with specified pledged shares . |
| Options | No options granted 2020–2024; none exercised in 2024 . |
Outstanding unvested/unearned awards as of Dec 31, 2024
| Grant | Shares Unvested/Unearned (#) | Market Value ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| FNF 11/10/2022 | 35,105 | 1,970,795 | Vests over 3 years; performance‑based framework per plan . |
| FNF 11/15/2023 | 79,508 | 4,463,579 | Vests over 3 years; performance‑based framework per plan . |
| FNF 11/08/2024 (Equity Incentive Plan) | 91,317 | 5,126,536 | Unearned shares; performance condition as described above . |
| F&G 12/01/2022 (time‑based) | 3,059 | 126,765 | Director retainer award; see F&G performance gate for 2022/2023 grants . |
| F&G 11/15/2023 (time‑based) | 3,448 | 142,885 | Director retainer award . |
| F&G 11/08/2024 (time‑based) | 6,515 | 269,982 | Director retainer award . |
Note: FNF market values at $56.14 (12/31/2024 close); F&G at $41.44 (12/31/2024 close) .
Employment Terms
- Agreement: Amended & Restated Employment Agreement effective Feb 1, 2022; 3‑year term with automatic annual extensions; base salary $900,000; target bonus 150% of salary; benefits consistent with top executives; eligible for equity awards .
- Severance (Without Cause or Good Reason): Lump‑sum 200% of (base salary + target bonus), prorated annual bonus, COBRA coverage with premium cash payments, life insurance conversion premium cash payments, and time‑based equity vesting per plan; no severance for termination for cause or voluntary resignation without good reason .
- Estimated Cash Severance (as of 12/31/2024): $9,377,255 for termination without cause or for good reason .
- Change‑in‑Control: No cash severance without a qualifying termination (i.e., no single‑trigger severance) . Under the omnibus plan, upon a change in control, outstanding options/SARs become exercisable, restrictions on restricted stock/RSUs lapse, and performance awards are deemed earned at target unless stated otherwise (single‑trigger equity vesting under plan unless award specifies) .
- 280G/4999: No excise tax gross‑ups; executive may elect to reduce payments to avoid excise tax; otherwise pays any tax due .
- Clawback: Company maintains a clawback policy for incentive‑based compensation .
- Definitions: “Cause” includes persistent failure to perform, willful neglect, dishonesty‑related criminal acts, material breach, or impeding/failing to cooperate with a board‑authorized investigation . “Good Reason” includes material diminution in title, compensation opportunity, or material breaches; plus specified adverse changes within six months before or two years after a change in control (e.g., status/authority, reporting, budget, location) .
Multi‑Year Pay and Mix
| Component ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | 871,731 | 947,308 | 996,154 |
| Stock Awards | 4,476,678 | 5,510,038 | 5,800,039 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive (Annual Bonus) | 2,103,362 | 3,236,333 | 3,550,496 |
| All Other Compensation | 269,831 | 197,906 | 221,064 |
| Total | 7,721,602 | 9,891,585 | 10,567,753 |
Pay‑versus‑Performance (PEO) and TSR snapshot
| Year | PEO “Compensation Actually Paid” ($) | Company TSR (Value of $100) | Peer Group TSR (Value of $100) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 6,469,384 | 97.57 | 100.69 |
| 2023 | 12,671,960 | 138.67 | 131.27 |
| 2024 | 11,535,648 | 158.17 | 136.36 |
Title Segment performance context (dollars in millions)
| Period | Adjusted Revenue | Adjusted Pre‑tax Margin |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 9,231 | 19.6% |
| 2021 | 11,890 | 21.7% |
| 2022 | 9,549 | 16.7% |
| 2023 | 7,047 | 13.7% |
| 2024 | 7,708 | 15.1% |
Risk Indicators and Red Flags
- No option grants (2020–2024) and no option exercises in 2024, reducing repricing risk; equity is primarily in performance‑based restricted stock with operating margin hurdles .
- Hedging/pledging prohibited without board approval; only the non‑executive Chairman (Foley) has a disclosed waiver with pledged shares; no pledges disclosed for Nolan .
- No excise tax gross‑ups; 280G cutback election is available .
- Clawback policy in place for incentive compensation .
Employment Economics Under Separation Scenarios (as of 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Cash Severance (Estimated) |
|---|---|
| Termination by Company without Cause | $9,377,255 |
| Termination by Executive for Good Reason | $9,377,255 |
Additional benefits may include prorated annual bonus, COBRA coverage support, and equity treatment as outlined in the employment agreement and omnibus plan .
Investment Implications
- Strong pay‑for‑performance linkage: 75% weighting on Title pre‑tax margin and 25% on adjusted revenue produced a 186.9% annual bonus payout for 2024 as operating performance exceeded targets; equity grants have near‑term performance hurdles tied to operating margin and vest over three years, aligning with operating execution but with relatively short performance windows due to market volatility .
- Alignment and retention: Nolan’s meaningful share holdings, three‑year vesting cadence, post‑vest retention until ownership guidelines are met, and absence of option overhang reduce misalignment and short‑termism risk; limited pledging and a clawback policy further mitigate governance risk .
- Separation economics: Cash severance at 2× (salary + target bonus) and single‑trigger equity acceleration at change‑in‑control under the omnibus plan create moderate deal‑related dilution risk; severance is double‑trigger for cash but equity may accelerate on single‑trigger absent award‑level limits, which could influence M&A incentives .
- Execution track record: Title margins recovered to 15.1% in 2024 with improved adjusted revenue, and TSR outperformed peers in 2023–2024; continued sensitivity to interest‑rate‑driven housing activity remains a key variable for incentive realizations and potential insider selling pressure at vesting, though ownership‑guideline retention requirements partially offset .