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Patrick Guinee

Executive Vice President, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary at FOSTER L B
Executive

About Patrick Guinee

Patrick J. Guinee is Executive Vice President, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary at L.B. Foster, a role he has held since June 2023 after serving as Senior Vice President and previously Vice President since joining the company in 2014; he is 55 years old as of the FY2024 10-K . Prior to L.B. Foster, he held senior corporate governance roles at H. J. Heinz (1997–2013) and Education Management Corporation (2013–2014) . His incentive design emphasizes Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted Free Cash Flow, and Economic Profit Improvement, with annual and multi-year PSU frameworks; 2024 corporate actuals were $34.478 million Adjusted EBITDA vs $36.218 million target and $21.078 million corporate Adjusted FCF vs $19.356 million target, with payouts of 88.0% and 144.5% respectively . Governance practices include no executive employment agreements, double-trigger change-in-control vesting and severance, anti-hedging/anti-pledging policy, and an SEC/Nasdaq-compliant clawback adopted in 2023 (restatements in 2024 did not trigger recovery) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic Impact
L.B. FosterEVP, General Counsel & Secretary2023–presentTop legal officer; corporate secretary; supports compensation/governance and capital discipline frameworks .
L.B. FosterSVP/VP, General Counsel & Secretary2014–2023Established governance, disclosure, and securities compliance; advanced equity plan design and clawback, ownership policy .
Education Management CorporationVP – Securities & Corporate; Assistant Secretary2013–2014Led securities and corporate governance functions .
H. J. Heinz CompanyVP – Corporate Governance & Securities; Assistant Secretary1997–2013Corporate governance and securities oversight at a global issuer .

External Roles

  • No public company directorships disclosed; serves as Corporate Secretary at L.B. Foster .

Fixed Compensation

Metric202220232024
Salary ($)$344,461 $372,228 $392,625
Bonus ($)$11,170 (safety modifier)
Target Bonus % of Base Salary55%
Base Salary Rate (annualized)$376,920 $395,766

Notes:

  • 2024 salary increases effective March 1; adjustments reference market median (50th percentile) .
  • 2024 bonus reflects a 5% favorable modifier for record safety performance .

Performance Compensation

Annual Cash Incentive (2024)

MetricWeightingTargetActualPayout %Weighted Payout %
Corporate Adjusted EBITDA75% $36,218k $34,478k 88.0% 66.0%
Corporate Adjusted Free Cash Flow25% $19,356k $21,078k 144.5% 36.1%
Total Achievement102.1%
Safety Modifier+5%107.2% (final payout)

Definitions and reconciliations for Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted FCF are provided in Appendix B of the proxy .

PSUs – Performance and Earned Shares

PlanYear TrancheMetricsTargetActualPayout %Year WeightResult
2024–2026 LTIP2024Economic Profit Improvement$4,200k $3,425k 81.5% 30% Banked in plan
2024–2026 LTIP2024Adjusted EBITDA$36,200k $34,153k 90.6% 30% Banked in plan
2022–2024 LTIP2024 (Year 3)Corporate ROIC (50%) + Adjusted EBITDA (50%)See table ROIC 10.1%, EBITDA $34,153k 71.3% (composite) 50% Settled Feb 20, 2025

Earned PSUs (executive-specific):

  • 2024–2026 LTIP: Guinee earned and banked 2,194 PSUs for Year 1; settlement at end of 3-year period (Feb 2027) .
  • 2022–2024 LTIP: Guinee earned 4,387 PSUs in Year 3; achievement certified and shares distributed on Feb 20, 2025 .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial Ownership

Record DateShares Beneficially Owned% of ClassUnderlying Earned PSUsTotal
March 20, 202547,851 <1% 28,314 76,165
March 21, 202464,729 <1% 64,729
  • Stock Ownership Policy: EVPs must own stock worth at least 2.5× salary; executives must retain 100% of net shares until compliant .
  • Hedging/Pledging: Prohibited by Insider Trading Policy; no pledging allowed .
  • Section 16(a) filings: Company reports timely compliance by officers .

Outstanding and Unvested Equity (12/31/2024)

Award TypeQuantityVesting/Settlement Terms
Unvested Restricted Stock42,845 shares (market value $1,152,531) 3-year graded vesting; 33⅓% per year
Unearned PSUs (unvested)38,392 units (payout value $1,032,745) Earn annually; vest/settle at plan end (Feb 2026 for 2023–2025; Feb 2027 for 2024–2026)

Restricted stock grant detail:

  • 2022: 2,110 shares (3-year graded vesting) .
  • 2023: 6,751 shares (3-year graded vesting) .
  • 2024: 5,670 shares (3-year graded vesting) .

Employment Terms

Plan Design and Governance

  • No executive employment agreements; no tax gross-ups; double-trigger change-in-control (CiC) protection; clawback policy adopted in 2023 .
  • Severance plan caps between 1× and 2.5× salary+bonus depending on executive; equity awards provide double-trigger CiC vesting .
  • 280G cutback provisions disclosed in prior proxies (safe harbor limit), illustrating shareholder-friendly design (historical reference) .

Separation/Change-in-Control Economics (Patrick J. Guinee)

ScenarioLump Sum SeveranceBenefits ContinuationEquity (Unvested)OutplacementSERPTotal
Non-CiC – Death$222,242 $710,376 (5) $92,406 $1,025,024
Non-CiC – Disability$222,242 $552,986 (5) $92,406 $867,634
Non-CiC – Retirement$222,242 $710,376 (5) $92,406 $1,025,024
CiC + Qualifying Termination$1,226,875 (1)(2) $41,003 $1,654,351 (6) $15,000 $92,406 $3,029,635
CiC – No Termination/Other$0

Footnotes summarize benefit factor mechanics and COBRA valuation; SERP payout conditions are specified .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Mix skews toward performance: 60% PSUs, 40% time-vested restricted stock in LTI; annual plan uses Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted FCF with capped payouts and discretion .
  • 2023 PSUs amended to double-trigger CiC vesting; risk-mitigation through anti-hedging/pledging, clawback, ownership guidelines, and metric diversification .
  • Compensation adjusted to market median (50th percentile) per comparator group; independent consultant (Pay Governance) engaged .

Multi-Year Compensation

YearSalary ($)Bonus ($)Stock Awards ($)Non-Equity Incentive ($)All Other ($)Total ($)
2022$344,461 $522,620 $177,871 $48,242 $1,093,194
2023$372,228 $294,172 $303,186 $71,239 $1,040,825
2024$392,625 $11,170 $399,027 $222,242 $70,806 $1,095,870

Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2023 say-on-pay approval ~87% for 2022 compensation; PSU awards amended to double-trigger vesting following market practices; strong pay-for-performance alignment affirmed .

Risk Indicators & Red Flags

  • No employment agreements/tax gross-ups; anti-hedging/anti-pledging reduces misalignment risk .
  • Clawback policy adopted in 2023; voluntary 2023 10-K/A and 2024 interim restatements did not affect executive compensation or trigger recovery .
  • Section 16(a) compliance reported as timely; suggests disciplined insider reporting .

Equity Grants & Vesting Schedules

GrantDateTypeShares/UnitsTerms
2023–2025 LTIP2/14/2023PSUs (target)15,190 Earned annually; vest Feb 2026; Year 1 earned units disclosed; later tranches per targets .
2023 LTIP2/14/2023Restricted Stock10,126 3-year graded vesting (33⅓%/yr) .
2024–2026 LTIP5/23/2024 (award) / 2/13/2024 (PSU tranche)PSUs (target)8,505 Earned annually; vest Feb 2027; Year 1 banked 2,194 for Guinee .
2024 LTIP5/23/2024Restricted Stock5,670 3-year graded vesting (33⅓%/yr) .
2022–2024 LTIP2/17/2022PSUsEarned; distribution 2/20/2025Year 3 earned 4,387 PSUs for Guinee; settled Feb 20, 2025 .
2022 LTIP2/17/2022Restricted Stock2,110 3-year graded vesting .

Employment & Contracts

  • Separation Plan (Key Employee Separation Plan) governs both CiC and non-CiC terminations; double trigger and capped severance; COBRA benefits continuation; no single-trigger payouts; clawback and ownership policies in force .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Strong pay-for-performance via Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted FCF, and Economic Profit; 2024 corporate FCF outperformance (144.5% payout) offset EBITDA under-target (88.0%), implying balanced focus on profitability and cash generation .
  • Retention: Significant unvested restricted stock (42,845) and unearned PSUs (38,392) plus banked PSUs create material retention hooks through 2026–2027; anti-hedging/anti-pledging diminishes near-term selling pressure .
  • Governance: No employment agreements or tax gross-ups; double-trigger CiC economics ($3.03 million in a qualifying CiC termination scenario) provide protection without excessive entitlements; clawback in place and tested by immaterial restatements without compensation impact .
  • Pay levels: Compensation targeted to market median via comparator group and independent consultant oversight; ownership guideline of 2.5× salary for EVPs further aligns incentives .
  • Signals: 2024 safety-based +5% discretionary bonus modifier indicates Committee willingness to apply qualitative overlays tied to operational excellence; investors should monitor future PSU tranche achievements (targets for 2025–2026 confidential until period end) for execution momentum .