Julie W. Peterson
About Julie W. Peterson
Julie W. Peterson, age 55, is Senior Vice President & Chief Credit Officer of First United Corporation (FUNC). She has 36+ years in banking, rejoining First United in 2014 after a 2012–2014 stint at a super‑regional bank; she served as Director of Credit Administration (2014–May 2022), Managing Director of Credit Risk (May 2022–May 2024), and was named SVP & Chief Credit Officer in May 2024 . Company performance context relevant to her oversight of credit quality: 2024 STIP corporate results included Net Income of $20.57 million, ROA of 1.06%, delinquency ratio of 0.33%, and efficiency ratio of 61.31% ; for long‑term ROAE benchmarking, First United’s 3‑year ROAE was at the 81st percentile of a custom peer group, triggering target nonequity payouts for named executives .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| First United Corporation/Bank | SVP & Chief Credit Officer | May 2024–present | Leads enterprise credit risk oversight and policy setting . |
| First United Corporation/Bank | Managing Director of Credit Risk | May 2022–May 2024 | Managed credit risk function and frameworks . |
| First United Corporation/Bank | Director of Credit Administration | Apr 2014–May 2022 | Led credit administration; underwriting/portfolio governance . |
| Super‑regional bank (unnamed) | Commercial banking roles | 2012–2014 | External experience in larger-bank credit/commercial banking . |
| First United Corporation/Bank | Commercial banking roles | 1989–2012 | Progressive roles in commercial banking . |
External Roles
No external public-company board roles or committee positions for Peterson are disclosed in the 2025 DEF 14A .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Terms | Julie W. Peterson (disclosure) |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | Executive compensation includes base salary, RSUs (LTIP), STIP cash awards, and 2024 ROAE nonequity awards . | Not separately disclosed (Julie is not a named executive in 2024) . |
| Short‑Term Incentive Plan (STIP) | 4 weighted goals (80% corporate: ROA 40%, Delinquency 20%, Efficiency 20%; plus 20% individual), with an all‑or‑nothing net income hurdle and 50/100/150% payout curve; targets set from annual budget . | Participation for non‑NEO executives not itemized; Julie’s individual target/payout not disclosed . |
| LTIP – RSUs (2023 awards) | Other executives: combined LTIP target equal to 20% of base salary; split 50% time‑vesting RSUs and 50% performance‑vesting RSUs . | Julie’s grant counts/values not disclosed; design applies to “other executives” . |
| LTIP – RSUs (2024 awards) | Other executives: combined LTIP target equal to 20% of base salary; split 50% time‑vesting RSUs and 50% performance‑vesting RSUs; vesting schedules below . | Julie’s specific grant counts/values not disclosed . |
Performance Compensation
STIP Corporate Goal Design and 2024 Actuals
| Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Income ($mm) | Hurdle | $10.80 | N/A | N/A | $20.57 | Must meet minimum to pay any STIP . |
| ROA | 40% | 1.01% | 1.12% | 1.23% | 1.06% | Weighted payout based on achievement . |
| Delinquency Ratio | 20% | 0.38% | 0.35% | 0.31% | 0.33% | Lower is better; payout capped at max . |
| Efficiency Ratio | 20% | 65.00% | 61.84% | 58.62% | 61.31% | Lower is better; capped . |
| Individual Goal | 20% | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Individual objectives; Julie’s specifics not disclosed . |
LTIP Performance RSUs – Metric Frameworks and Vesting
| Award Year | Metrics | Weighting | Measurement Period | Payout Curve | Vesting | Peer Group Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 RSUs (performance) | EPS growth; Tangible Book Value Per Share (TBVPS) growth | 50% EPS; 50% TBVPS | 1/1/2023–12/31/2025 | 0% below threshold; 50% threshold; 100% target; 150% max; interpolation in between | On 3rd anniversary of grant (Mar 15, 2026), if employed | Company‑specific metrics; no external percentile measures . |
| 2024 RSUs (performance) | Relative ROAE; Relative TBVPS CAGR | 50% ROAE; 50% TBVPS | 3 years from grant (to 12/31/2026) | Threshold 25th percentile→50%; Target 50th→100%; Max 75th→150% | On 3rd anniversary of grant (May 2027), if employed | Closed peer set of 123 banks ($750M–$4B assets); acquired removed; failed recorded at −99% . |
LTIP Time‑Vesting RSUs – Schedules
- 2023 time‑vesting RSUs vest ratably over 3 years, Mar 15, 2023–Mar 15, 2026 .
- 2024 time‑vesting RSUs vest ratably over 3 years, May 16, 2024–May 16, 2027 .
- Earlier RSU cycles: May 2021 grants included both time‑vesting and performance‑vesting; 7,389 performance RSUs failed to vest for the 3‑year period ended 12/31/2023, while 3,693 time‑vesting RSUs vested ratably in 2022–2024 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | Julie W. Peterson is not listed in the proxy’s beneficial ownership table (which covers directors and named executive officers); thus her share count/% of outstanding is not disclosed . |
| Section 16 compliance | The proxy notes Julie W. Peterson filed a late Form 3 and six late Form 4s, each tied to pre‑scheduled purchases via the Dividend Reinvestment and Stock Purchase Plan . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Executives have guidelines expressed as multiples of base salary: CEO 300%; other named executive officers 100%. Executives must retain 75% of net shares until meeting guideline; directors must hold at least $100,000 . |
| Hedging policy | The corporation has not adopted a policy restricting employees or directors from hedging company stock (e.g., collars, swaps, exchange funds) . |
| Equity plan status | As of 12/31/2024, RSUs were the only awards issued under the 2018 Equity Plan; 14,023 time‑vesting RSUs and 28,213 performance‑vesting RSUs outstanding (performance count shown at max scenario; 9,402 at threshold; 18,807 at target) . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Disclosure |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | Named executive officers are at‑will and not party to written employment agreements; no separate agreement for Julie is disclosed . |
| Severance / Change‑in‑Control | Change‑in‑Control Severance Plan provides double‑trigger protection within a “Protection Period” (90 days before to 1 year after a change in control): CEO at 2.99× Final Pay; certain other NEOs at 2.0× Final Pay; accelerated vesting, 24 months medical/dental cash payment, up to 12 months outplacement; subject to 280G cap . Julie’s participation is not disclosed . |
| Insider trading policy | Insider Trading Policy governing directors/officers/employees exists (filed as an exhibit to the 2024 10‑K) . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and performance rigor: LTIP emphasizes ROAE/TBVPS against a closed peer set with a 50/100/150 payout curve, and STIP uses multi‑metric corporate goals with caps—signals a balanced, risk‑aware pay design. 2022/2021 performance RSUs failing to vest show willingness to enforce outcomes, limiting windfalls .
- Retention considerations: Julie’s role change to CCO in May 2024 plus ongoing time‑vesting RSU schedules (2023–2026; 2024–2027) provide retention hooks; absence of a disclosed individual severance agreement suggests moderate retention risk relative to named executives with explicit CIC coverage .
- Trading/pressure signals: Upcoming LTIP vest dates (Mar 2026 and May 2027) can create calendar‑driven liquidity windows. Late Form 3/4 filings tied to DRIP purchases indicate administrative/process gaps rather than discretionary selling; monitor for future Form 4s to gauge buying/selling cadence .
- Governance watch‑outs: No hedging prohibition is a shareholder‑alignment red flag in banking; maintaining credit discipline is paramount—2024 corporate outcomes (ROA 1.06%, delinquency 0.33%) provide a base case for credit quality under Peterson’s remit going forward .
Net: Compensation frameworks tie to profitability and capital creation, with clear vest schedules; Julie’s individual pay/ownership remains largely undisclosed, so investors should track Form 4 activity, vesting calendars, and credit metrics to assess alignment and potential selling pressure .