Sign in

You're signed outSign in or to get full access.

Carter W. Austin

Vice President at GDL FUND
Executive

About Carter W. Austin

Carter W. Austin is Vice President of The GDL Fund and has served as an officer since 2006; his year of birth is 1966, and he is described as a Vice President and/or Ombudsman of closed‑end funds within the Gabelli Fund Complex, while serving as Senior Vice President of Gabelli Funds, LLC since 2015 . The proxy identifies his address as One Corporate Center, Rye, NY 10580‑1422 . The Fund’s proxy statements do not disclose education, age beyond year of birth, or officer‑specific performance metrics such as TSR, revenue growth, or EBITDA growth .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Gabelli Funds, LLCVice President1996–2015Vice President and/or Ombudsman of closed‑end funds within the Gabelli Fund Complex
Gabelli Funds, LLCSenior Vice President2015–presentSenior Vice President; officer roles across the Gabelli Fund Complex
The GDL FundVice President2006–presentVice President and/or Ombudsman of closed‑end funds within the Gabelli Fund Complex

External Roles

No external directorships or outside public company roles are disclosed for Carter W. Austin in GDL’s proxy officer listings .

Fixed Compensation

  • Officer compensation at GDL is generally borne by the Adviser; the proxies disclose “officers, if any, who were compensated by the Fund rather than the Adviser” and list only Laurissa M. Martire (e.g., $116,778 in 2024), with no compensation disclosure for Carter W. Austin .
  • Accordingly, base salary, target bonus, actual bonus, and any cash compensation for Carter W. Austin are not disclosed at the Fund level .

Performance Compensation

  • The proxy statements do not disclose performance‑linked incentives (RSUs/PSUs, options, performance metrics, weighting/targets/payouts, or vesting) for Carter W. Austin; officer equity awards are not reported at the Fund level .
  • No clawback provisions, bonus metrics, or ESG targets specific to Carter W. Austin are disclosed in GDL’s proxies .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

  • The 2025 proxy lists beneficial ownership for trustees and executive officers. It shows holdings for John C. Ball (32 common shares), Peter Goldstein (0), and Richard J. Walz (0); Carter W. Austin does not appear in the executive officer beneficial ownership table, and no individual ownership is disclosed for him .
  • As context, trustees and executive officers as a group held 43.8% of common shares outstanding (driven largely by Mario Gabelli’s affiliated holdings), while individual officer ownership beyond those listed is not disclosed; pledging by officers is not disclosed in the proxy .
  • Stock ownership guidelines, hedging or pledging policies, and in‑the‑money option status for Carter W. Austin are not disclosed in the proxy .

Employment Terms

  • Employment start date: Vice President since 2006 (officer tenure) .
  • Contract terms, auto‑renewal, severance, change‑of‑control (single/double trigger, multiples, accelerated vesting), tax gross‑ups, deferred compensation, pension/SERP value, and perquisites are not disclosed for Carter W. Austin in the proxy statements .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: With compensation borne by the Adviser and no Fund‑level disclosure for Carter W. Austin, direct pay‑for‑performance linkage to GDL (TSR, revenue/EBITDA metrics) is not evidenced; this structure limits visibility into incentive alignment for Fund officers .
  • Retention risk: Long tenure (officer since 2006) suggests organizational stability across the Gabelli Fund Complex; retention and incentives likely depend on Adviser policies rather than Fund‑specific arrangements .
  • Insider pressure: No disclosed individual ownership or equity awards for Carter W. Austin; absent reported holdings, near‑term insider selling pressure tied to vesting schedules or options is not indicated at the Fund level .
  • Governance: Officer roles span the Gabelli Fund Complex; board oversight and committee structures focus on fund operations and compliance rather than officer incentive mechanics, further reducing direct insight into pay/performance economics for this executive .