Thomas Curnock
About Thomas Curnock
Thomas “Tom” Curnock, 53, is Group Chief Underwriting Officer (CUO) at Greenlight Capital Re (GLRE). He was appointed Group CUO in October 2024 after serving as Chief Risk Officer, and has worked in risk management and underwriting at GLRE since joining in July 2009; prior roles include Senior Vice President at Aon as a structured reinsurance broker (2001–2007) and investment banker (2007–2009) . He holds a B.Sc. in Mathematics and a Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Salford . Company performance metrics linked to executive pay emphasize fully diluted book value per share growth (7.2% in 2024), underwriting combined ratio (record 86.6% in Q3 2025, 95.4% YTD 2025), and adjusted operating profit/AOP (negative in 2024, resulting in 0% company payout for the Short-Term Incentive) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Greenlight Capital Re | Group Chief Underwriting Officer | Oct 2024–present | Leads enterprise underwriting; aligns incentive metrics (combined ratio, FD BVPS) with performance . |
| Greenlight Capital Re | Chief Risk Officer; Risk management/underwriting | 2009–2024 | Oversight of ERM, capital modeling, exposure management; supports underwriting discipline . |
| Aon | Structured reinsurance broker (SVP) | 2001–2007 | Structured placements; market access and transaction execution . |
| Aon | Investment banker (SVP) | 2007–2009 | Advisory on insurance-linked transactions . |
External Roles
No external directorships or public company board roles disclosed for Curnock .
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year summary compensation (actual reported):
| Metric (USD) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | $420,000 | $450,000 | $500,000 |
| Bonus (discretionary) | — | $13,750 | $32,500 |
| Stock Awards (grant-date fair value) | $294,000 | $294,000 | $315,000 |
| Non-Equity Incentive (Short-Term Incentive payout) | $52,500 | $214,538 | $62,500 |
| All Other Compensation | $10,610 | $12,220 | $41,355 |
| Total | $777,110 | $984,508 | $951,355 |
Additional salary actions:
- March 2025 increase to $520,000 (reflecting elevation to Group CUO) .
- Employment agreement baseline: $450,000 base with target bonus 60% (agreement predates role change; Short-Term Incentive targets can differ by year) .
Performance Compensation
Short-Term Incentive (2024):
| Component | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Basis | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company metric: Adjusted Operating Profit (AOP) | 75% | 6.3% of BV (target) | -1.7% | 0–200% curve; linear interpolation | 0% of company portion |
| Individual performance | 25% | 100% (target) | 152% | Committee assessment vs role impact | 152% of individual portion |
- Resulting cash payouts: $62,500 Non-Equity Incentive + $32,500 discretionary bonus (reflecting extraordinary contributions) .
- Short-Term Incentive targets set annually; Curnock’s 2024 target bonus opportunity was 50% of base salary; weighting Company 75% / Individual 25% .
Long-Term Incentive (RSUs/PSUs):
- 2024 grant (Mar 15, 2024): 26,582 RSUs total; split 33% time-based (8,772 RSUs) vesting ratably over three years on Jan 1, and 67% performance RSUs (17,810 target) cliff vest after 2024–2026 based on FD BVPS growth (65% weight) and combined ratio (35% weight), payout 0–200% .
- 2022 performance cycle payout (2022–2024): three-year FD BVPS growth 26.5% paid at 66.1% on that metric; combined ratio 99.2% paid 0%; Curnock earned 24,819 shares from the 2022 grant .
Performance RSU thresholds (2024 awards):
- Combined ratio: >99% → 0%; 99% → 50%; 97% → 100%; ≤94% → 200% .
- FD BVPS growth: <12.5% → 0%; 12.5% → 50%; 22.5% → 100%; 40.5% → 200% .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Item | Details |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 176,707 shares; less than 1% of shares outstanding (34,557,449) . |
| Restricted shares included | 43,280 restricted shares (counted in beneficial ownership) . |
| RSUs not counted in beneficial ownership | 23,658 RSUs (no voting/disposition rights, not vesting within 60 days) . |
| Outstanding unvested awards at FY2024 (examples) | Time RSUs: 8,772 (2024), 6,567 (2023), 4,742 (2022); Performance RSUs at threshold counts: 8,905 (2024), 9,999 (2023), 14,441 (2022); corresponding market values at $14/share disclosed in proxy . |
| 2024 vesting realized value | 35,258 shares vested; value realized $414,357 (use of closing price on vest date) . |
| Ownership guidelines | NEO ownership: 2x annual base salary; all NEOs in compliance (subject to phase-in) as of Dec 31, 2024 . |
| Hedging/pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging prohibited (legacy pledges grandfathered); no pledging disclosed for Curnock . |
Employment Terms
| Scenario (as of Dec 31, 2024) | Pro-Rated Bonus | Cash Severance | Accelerated Equity Value | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without Cause | $250,000 (50% of base per agreement) | $894,231 (base $500,000 + target $250,000 + Cayman statutory) | — | $1,144,231 |
| Termination for Good Reason | $250,000 | $750,000 (base + target) | — | $1,000,000 |
| Death | $62,500 (actual earned) | — | $1,121,484 (80,106 shares at $14) | $1,183,984 |
| Disability | $62,500 (actual earned) | $144,231 (Cayman statutory) | $1,121,484 | $1,328,215 |
| Change in Control | — | — | $1,214,808 (86,772 shares at $14) | $1,214,808 |
Key terms:
- Employment agreement dated March 23, 2009 (as amended); equity eligibility; benefits .
- Restricted stock generally fully vests upon death/disability or change in control (single-trigger for restricted stock/RSUs per plan), while options follow plan-specific post-termination rules; Compensation Committee retains discretion on option vesting upon change in control .
- Short-Term Incentive pro-rata bonus rules and clawback provisions apply (SEC Section 10D and Nasdaq Rule 5608 compliant) .
Vesting cadence:
- Time-based RSUs: equal tranches over three years on January 1 (subject to service) .
- Performance RSUs: cliff vest after 3-year period (0–200% based on metrics) .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix: 2024 total comp $951k with $315k equity grant value (LTI majority), $95k cash incentives (NEIP+discretionary), indicating emphasis on long-term equity over cash and company AOP gating for cash .
- Trend: Base salary increased 11% in 2024 (to $500k) and further to $520k in March 2025 upon elevation to Group CUO, while discretionary bonus recognized transition contributions despite 0% company AOP payout, highlighting retention/recognition themes .
- Performance alignment: PSUs are tied to combined ratio and FD BVPS growth with rigorous targets/payout curves; 2022 cycle paid only on BVPS, not combined ratio—reinforcing metric discipline .
Say-on-Pay & Peer Benchmarking
- Say-on-Pay approval: >95% at 2024 AGM, signaling strong shareholder support for pay program design .
- Compensation peer group (2024 refresh includes Hamilton Insurance Group, post-IPO): Arch, AXIS, Conduit, Employers Holdings, Enstar, Everest, Hiscox, James River, Kinsale, Lancashire, ProAssurance, RenaissanceRe, SiriusPoint, United Fire Group, Hamilton Insurance Group .
- Design: Target total pay within a reasonable market range; Mercer engaged since 2021; no consultant conflicts identified .
Risk Indicators & Governance
- Clawbacks: Company-wide clawback policy implemented March 2023; equity agreements include recoupment provisions .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited; any legacy pledges grandfathered; none disclosed for Curnock .
- Related-party context: Investment alignment with Solasglas/DME affiliates overseen by Board and Audit Committee; not specific to Curnock .
Investment Implications
- Underwriting leverage to incentives: Curnock’s PSUs directly tie to combined ratio and FD BVPS growth; with record underwriting performance in Q3 2025 (combined ratio 86.6%), his PSU outlook is sensitive to sustaining sub-97% combined ratio and BVPS compounding over 2024–2026 .
- Near-term selling pressure: Annual January 1 RSU vesting and prior 2024 vesting of 35,258 shares ($414k realized) create predictable liquidity windows; absence of pledging reduces forced-sale risk .
- Retention risk mitigants: 1x salary+target severance and single-trigger acceleration on change-in-control for restricted equity provide downside protection; March 2025 salary increase and annual PSU grants support retention .
- Pay-for-performance gating: 2024 AOP payout = 0% for company portion while individual payout recognized at 152%; investors should monitor 2025–2026 AOP and underwriting metrics to gauge cash incentive realizations and PSU vesting trajectories .