Ori Kravel
About Ori Kravel
Ori Kravel is Chief Operating Officer of Global Net Lease (GNL) and has served in this role since January 2025; he is 36 years old and holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Business Administration (Real Estate & Urban Economics) from the Wisconsin School of Business at the University of Wisconsin–Madison . He brings over 15 years of REIT-sector experience in corporate development, capital markets, and operations, with execution spanning over $15 billion in capital markets transactions and $30 billion in M&A . Company performance during his tenure includes an investment-grade credit upgrade to BBB-, raised 2025 AFFO/share guidance to $0.95–$0.97, and improved Net Debt to Adjusted EBITDA from 8.0x to 7.2x alongside $92 million of share repurchases YTD through Oct 31, 2025 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global Net Lease | Chief Operating Officer | Jan 2025–present | Senior executive leadership of operations during deleveraging and disposition strategy; part of an executive team credited with deleveraging, enhancing liquidity, and securing investment-grade rating |
| Global Net Lease | SVP, Corporate Development | Sep 2023–Jan 2025 | Oversaw debt/equity capital markets, M&A, strategic transactions, and operational efficiency |
| Former GNL Advisor & GNL Property Manager | Various roles incl. Senior Vice President | 2011–Sep 2023 | Long-standing platform experience supporting strategy and execution across capital markets/M&A; cumulative experience includes >$15B capital markets and >$30B M&A |
External Roles
No public company board or external directorships for Mr. Kravel are disclosed in the 2025 DEF 14A executive officer biographies .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Amount/Terms | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $415,000 | Set in employment agreement effective Jan 23, 2025 |
| Annual Bonus Eligibility | Eligible | Specific target percentages for Mr. Kravel not disclosed; bonus governed by Company AIP |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Program (AIP) – Company Framework (2025)
Applicable to executive officers; the compensation committee approved the following 2025 AIP metrics and weightings to align pay with strategy. Mr. Kravel is AIP-eligible, but individual target/payout terms for him are not disclosed .
| Metric | Weighting | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| AFFO Per Share | 20% | Profitability focus; mitigates low-quality growth |
| Dispositions | 20% | Core 2025 priority and investor focus |
| Net Debt to Adjusted EBITDA | 20% | Balance sheet optimization and leverage discipline |
| Total Net Debt Reduction | 15% | Liquidity enhancement and lower leverage |
| Individual & Role-Specific Performance | 25% | Execution of responsibilities; peer-consistent weighting |
Equity Awards
| Award Type | Grant Timing | Shares/Units | Vesting | Notable Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Contingent Awards (equity-settled RSUs/PSUs subject to 2025 Plan approval) | Jan & Mar 2025 | 154,495 (for Kravel) | Through Jan 1, 2028 or Mar 7, 2028, if vesting criteria met | Plan approved May 22, 2025; closing price Apr 7, 2025 was $7.15/share |
| RSU Dividends | Ongoing | — | Payable at the same time as ordinary cash dividends, equal to dividends on an equivalent share count | |
| PSU Performance & Settlement | On measurement | — | Committee certifies performance; settlement within 75 days of vesting triggers | |
| Clawback | Ongoing | — | Awards subject to Company’s Dodd-Frank Clawback Policy | |
| Transfer/Pledging Restrictions | Ongoing | — | RSUs/PSUs may not be transferred, assigned, pledged or hypothecated (limited exceptions) |
Program structure enhancements: PSUs’ maximum payout was reduced from 275% to 225% and metrics rebalanced equally among relative TSR, absolute TSR, and long-term debt reduction goals to strengthen pay/performance alignment .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership for Mr. Kravel is not itemized in the 2025 DEF 14A beneficial ownership table (which lists directors and 2024 NEOs), but his Contingent Awards are disclosed (154,495 shares subject to vesting) .
- RSUs/PSUs are non-transferable and cannot be pledged, reducing hedging/pledging risk and supporting alignment .
- Company maintains a clawback policy for erroneously awarded incentive compensation, enhancing governance discipline .
- Director stock ownership guidelines exist (5x annual cash retainer), but executive ownership guidelines are not disclosed in the filing .
Employment Terms
| Term | Details |
|---|---|
| Agreement Effective Date | Jan 23, 2025 (upon COO appointment) |
| Base Salary | $415,000 |
| Bonus/Equity Eligibility | Eligible for annual bonus and equity-based awards |
| Termination (Death/Disability) | Earned but unpaid bonus for prior year and a prorated current-year bonus at target; COBRA premiums reimbursed for 18 months; accelerated vesting of time-based awards and performance awards (performance measured at end of period) |
| Termination (Without Cause / Good Reason) | Earned/unpaid bonus and prorated bonus at target; COBRA premiums reimbursed up to 12 months; accelerated vesting; cash severance (amount not specified in DEF 14A excerpt) |
| Change in Control (CoC) Double-Trigger Window | Four months preceding or 18 months following a CoC; includes earned/prorated bonus, accelerated vesting (PSUs measured at CoC), COBRA premiums reimbursed up to 18 months; cash severance |
| Restrictive Covenants | Non-compete and non-solicitation of employees/customers for one year post-termination; mutual non-disparagement, confidentiality, IP rights |
The Company’s equity plan and award agreements permit accelerated vesting in certain CoC and termination scenarios and are subject to clawback and forfeiture provisions (including for breaches of restrictive covenants) .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: Mr. Kravel’s compensation emphasizes equity and formulaic, strategy-linked incentives (AFFO/share, deleveraging, dispositions), directly tied to the 2025 business plan—appropriate for a COO overseeing operational execution and capital allocation .
- Alignment and governance: Non-transfer/pledging restrictions on RSUs/PSUs and a formal clawback policy reduce misalignment and governance risk; the program excludes tax gross-ups and single-trigger CoC payments for executive officers .
- Retention and acceleration risk: Double-trigger benefits and broad acceleration of equity upon certain terminations or CoC could create sell-side supply or dilution optics around transaction windows; healthcare continuation (12–18 months) and cash severance add to retention economics .
- Execution signal: Management commentary highlights a sizable ongoing disposition pipeline and deleveraging focus; the CEO explicitly looked to Ori for disposition pipeline sizing on the Q2 2025 call (~$300 million), signaling COO involvement and accountability in capital recycling—a key trading signal given buybacks at ~12% AFFO yields and leverage targets .
Overall, the compensation structure’s emphasis on deleveraging, dispositions, and AFFO/share aligns with the operational priorities under Mr. Kravel’s remit. Positive governance features mitigate risk, while acceleration mechanics warrant monitoring around CoC or termination events.