Christopher Lindner
Acushnet HoldingsAbout Christopher Lindner
Christopher Lindner (age 56) is President of FootJoy at Acushnet (GOLF). He joined the Company in 2016 and leads the FootJoy brand; prior roles include senior brand, marketing, and commercial leadership across Wolverine Worldwide (Keds, Saucony), Nike/Converse, Bauer Hockey, and Electronic Arts. He holds a B.A. in Business Administration – Management from the University of St. Thomas . Company pay-for-performance metrics during his tenure emphasize Adjusted EBITDA for annual incentives and three‑year adjusted operating income and ROIC for PSUs; recent PSU cycles paid at 200% (2021–2023) and 129.6% (2022–2024), and Company TSR outperformed its peer group over recent years, signaling alignment between incentive outcomes and shareholder returns .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wolverine Worldwide | President, Keds; CMO & SVP North America Sales, Saucony | 2010–2016 | Led brand and commercial functions for lifestyle/performance footwear . |
| Nike, Inc. (Converse; Bauer Hockey) | VP Global Marketing, Converse; VP Global Marketing, Bauer Hockey | Prior to 2010 | Global brand marketing leadership for footwear/hardgoods . |
| Electronic Arts | Leadership positions | Prior to 2010 | Consumer brand and marketing leadership . |
External Roles
- No public-company directorships disclosed for Lindner in Acushnet’s executive officer bios and proxy materials .
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | All Other Compensation ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 575,000 | 39,391 | Perqs include 401(k) match $15,038; financial planning $7,500; golf club dues $11,579; company gear/wear . |
| 2023 | 575,000 | 25,819 | Includes 401(k) match, golf club dues, company gear/wear . |
| 2022 | 545,000 | 18,746 | Includes 401(k) match, company gear/wear . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentives (Short-term)
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Target Bonus (%) | Target ($) | Metric Framework | Achievement | Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 575,000 | 65 | 373,750 | Adjusted EBITDA: Threshold $340.0M / Target $400.0M / Max $460.0M | Company Adj. EBITDA $404.4M → 107.4% of target | 401,408 |
| 2023 | 575,000 | 65 | 373,750 | Adjusted EBITDA: Threshold $304.3M / Target $358.0M / Max $411.7M | Company Adj. EBITDA $376.1M → 133.8% of target | 500,078 |
| 2022 | 545,000 | 65 | 354,250 | Adjusted EBITDA (TPI adjustment as disclosed) | Company Adj. EBITDA $338.1M → 98.1% of target | 347,519 |
- 2025 plan structure shift (for Division Presidents incl. FootJoy): 10% individual strategic objectives, 15% segment operating income, 75% Company Adjusted EBITDA (indicative of tighter line-of-sight and segment accountability) .
Long-Term Incentives (RSUs/PSUs)
| Grant Year | Grant Date | RSUs (shares) | RSU Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | PSUs (target shares) | PSU Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | PSU Metrics (3-year) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 2/15/2024 | 6,590 | 440,014 | 9,885 | 660,021 | 50% cumulative adjusted operating income; 50% average ROIC; vests 2/1/2027 . |
| 2023 | 2/10/2023 | 9,058 | 440,038 | 13,586 | 660,008 | Same metrics; vests 2/1/2026 . |
| 2022 | 2/16/2022 | 9,100 | 400,036 | 13,649 | 600,010 | Same metrics; vested 2/1/2025 at 129.6% of target . |
Performance outcomes on PSUs:
- 2021–2023 cycle: 200% payout (AOI and ROIC both at max) .
- 2022–2024 cycle: 129.6% payout (AOI 107.6%; ROIC 151.6%) .
Vesting Schedules (selected current grants)
| Award | Vesting terms/dates |
|---|---|
| RSUs granted 2/15/2024 | 1/3 on each of Feb 1, 2025; Feb 1, 2026; Feb 1, 2027 . |
| PSUs granted 2/15/2024 | Cliff vest on Feb 1, 2027 subject to 3-year AOI/ROIC performance . |
| RSUs granted 2/10/2023 | 1/3 on each of Feb 1, 2024; Feb 1, 2025; Feb 1, 2026 . |
| PSUs granted 2/10/2023 | Cliff vest on Feb 1, 2026 subject to performance . |
| RSUs granted 2/16/2022 | 1/3 on Feb 1, 2023; 1/3 on Feb 1, 2024; 1/3 on Feb 1, 2025 . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned | % Outstanding | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| Christopher Lindner | 88,065 | <1% | April 7, 2025 |
- Stock ownership guidelines: Section 16 officers must hold 3x base salary; 50% net‑after‑tax retention on vested shares until in compliance. NEOs were either at the requirement or complying with the retention rule at 2024 year-end .
- Hedging/pledging: Prohibited to hedge/short; pledging requires pre‑clearance. No hedging and no pledging without approval under the Securities Trading Policy .
Outstanding Equity Awards (as of Dec 31, 2024)
| Award (Grant Date) | Unvested RSUs (#) | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| RSUs (2/15/2024) | 6,590 | 468,417 |
| RSUs (2/10/2023) | 6,038 | 429,181 |
| RSUs (2/16/2022) | 3,033 | 215,586 |
| Award (Grant Date) | Unearned PSUs (target #) | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| PSUs (2/15/2024) | 19,770 | 1,405,252 |
| PSUs (2/10/2023) | 27,172 | 1,931,386 |
| PSUs (2/16/2022) | 17,265 | 1,227,196 |
Vesting activity in 2024 (liquidity events to monitor):
- RSUs: 3,020 (2/10/23 grant), 3,033 (2/16/22 grant), 2,351 (2/16/21 grant) vested .
- PSUs: 21,166 (2021–2023 PSU cycle) vested with significant value .
Employment Terms
Severance and Change-in-Control Economics (estimated at 12/31/2024 assumptions)
| Scenario | Annual Incentive (earned) | Equity Acceleration | Cash Severance | Life Insurance | Vacation | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary termination without cause / Good Reason | 401,408 | — | 862,500 | — | 33,173 | 1,297,081 |
| For cause | — | — | — | — | 33,173 | 33,173 |
| Death or disability | 401,408 | 5,677,089 | — | 1,728,000 | 33,173 | 7,839,670 |
| Change in control (no termination) | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| CIC + Involuntary termination without cause / Good Reason | 401,408 | 5,677,089 | 1,150,000 | — | 33,173 | 7,261,670 |
Plan architecture and award terms:
- Executive Severance Plan covers NEOs other than CEO; amended in 2019 to reduce multiples for newer execs; applies to Lindner .
- RSUs: Double‑trigger acceleration if terminated without cause/for Good Reason within 18 months post‑CIC .
- PSUs: If terminated without cause/for Good Reason within 12 months post‑CIC, payout timing is accelerated (award agreements govern) .
- Clawback: Mandatory recoupment of erroneously awarded incentive pay upon restatement (NYSE Rule 10D‑1) .
- Pension/SERP: Lindner is not eligible based on hire date; no accrued pension benefits .
Performance & Track Record
- LTI performance: PSU cycles paid at 200% for 2021–2023 and 129.6% for 2022–2024, reflecting above‑target 3‑year adjusted operating income and strong average ROIC, indicating effective execution across the portfolio (including FootJoy) .
- Shareholder alignment: Company TSR exceeded the selected peer group’s TSR over recent multi‑year horizons; pay-versus-performance tables show CAP aligned with TSR and Adjusted EBITDA trends .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and leverage: For Division Presidents, 2025 annual incentive incorporates segment operating income (15%) alongside corporate EBITDA (75%) and strategic objectives (10%), increasing operating accountability while maintaining profitability alignment .
- Equity design: 60% PSU / 40% RSU at target (multi-year), with RSU ratable vesting and PSU cliff vesting over 3 years on AOI/ROIC; supports retention and pay-for-performance balance .
- Risk controls: Hedging prohibited, pledging restricted; stock ownership requirement (3x salary) and 50% net‑share retention until met; clawback policy in force .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: High percentage of at‑risk pay with robust performance metrics (EBITDA for annual, AOI/ROIC for PSUs) and demonstrated above‑target PSU outcomes suggest strong pay-performance alignment. Outstanding unvested PSUs/RSUs create meaningful retention hooks through 2027 .
- Insider selling pressure: Monitor scheduled RSU vestings on Feb 1 of 2026–2027 and potential PSU settlements (Feb 1, 2026; Feb 1, 2027). 2024 vestings (RSUs and PSUs) already contributed to realized equity; expect periodic 10b5‑1 sales around these dates subject to policy windows .
- Downside protections: Executive Severance Plan provides modest cash severance relative to equity value at risk; double‑trigger CIC protection applies, but no tax gross-ups disclosed; pension/SERP not applicable to Lindner, reducing legacy liabilities .
- Governance/controls: Controlled-company structure (Magnus ~50.8% voting) is a background factor for governance; however, compensation policies include clawback, hedging/pledging restrictions, and ownership requirements that mitigate alignment risk .