Mary Louise Bohn
Acushnet HoldingsAbout Mary Louise Bohn
Mary Louise Bohn serves as President – Titleist Golf Balls and is one of Acushnet’s named executive officers; she has 38.0 years of credited service, signaling deep tenure and institutional knowledge . Executive pay is tightly linked to company performance: short-term incentives are driven by Adjusted EBITDA, while PSUs vest on three-year adjusted operating income and ROIC, with 2021–2023 PSUs paying out at 200% and 2022–2024 PSUs at 129.6% based on above-target results . Company-level performance has been solid, with Adjusted EBITDA rising from $376.1M in 2023 to $404.4M in 2024 and TSR improving (value of a $100 initial investment at $207.15 in 2023 to $236.09 in 2024), supporting strong pay-for-performance alignment . She is subject to stock ownership guidelines (3x base salary for Section 16 officers) and at 2024 year-end NEOs had either met or were in compliance with share retention requirements; hedging is prohibited and pledging requires pre-clearance, and the clawback policy was updated in 2023 per NYSE Rule 10D-1 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acushnet (Titleist) | President – Titleist Golf Balls | 38.0 (credited service) | Compensation metrics (adj. operating income, ROIC) tie incentives to profitability and capital efficiency execution |
External Roles
- Not disclosed in the 2024–2025 proxy statements reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $575,000 | $610,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | 65% | 65% |
| Target Incentive ($) | $373,750 | $396,500 |
| Actual Annual Cash Incentive ($) | $500,078 | $425,841 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Metrics
| Metric | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA Threshold ($M) | $304.3 | $340.0 |
| Adjusted EBITDA Target ($M) | $358.0 | $400.0 |
| Adjusted EBITDA Maximum ($M) | $411.7 | $460.0 |
| Adjusted EBITDA Achieved ($M) | $376.1 | $404.4 |
| Payout (% of Target) | 133.8% | 107.4% |
Long-Term Incentives (PSUs – Three-Year Cycles)
| Metric | 2021–2023 | 2022–2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Operating Income Target ($M) | $547.7 | $860.0 |
| Adjusted Operating Income Achieved ($M) | $826.4 | $871.1 |
| AOI Payout (%) | 200% | 107.6% |
| ROIC Target (%) | 9.3 | 13.50 |
| ROIC Achieved (%) | 14.0 | 14.66 |
| ROIC Payout (%) | 200% | 151.6% |
| Combined Payout (%) | 200% | 129.6% |
| Mary L. Bohn PSU Target Shares (#) | 10,583 | 13,649 |
| Mary L. Bohn PSUs Earned (#) | 22,138 | 18,488.10 |
| Vesting/Settlement | Feb 16, 2024 | Feb 1, 2025 |
2024 Grants and Vesting
- RSUs: 7,189 shares; grant date 2/15/2024; vest ratably 1/3 each on Feb 1, 2025/2026/2027 .
- PSUs: 10,784 target shares; grant date 2/15/2024; cliff vest on Feb 1, 2027 subject to three-year AOI/ROIC performance .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Shares Beneficially Owned (#) | 189,001 |
| Shares Outstanding (#) | 60,013,024 |
| Stock Ownership Guideline | 3x base salary for Section 16 officers |
| Compliance Status (2024 YE) | NEOs attained or in compliance with retention requirements |
| Deferred Shares Balance ($) – Employee Deferral Plan | $8,868,912 |
| EDP Balance ($) – Excess Deferral Plan II | $85,443 |
Note: Based on 189,001 owned shares and 60,013,024 shares outstanding, Mary’s ownership is approximately 0.32% .
Vested vs Unvested (as of 12/31/2024)
| Category | Grant Date | Unvested/Unearned (#) | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs Unvested | 2/15/2024 | 7,283 | $517,676 |
| RSUs Unvested | 2/10/2023 | 6,206 | $441,122 |
| RSUs Unvested | 2/16/2022 | 3,170 | $225,324 |
| PSUs Unearned (max performance) | 2/15/2024 | 21,852 | $1,553,240 |
| PSUs Unearned (max performance) | 2/10/2023 | 27,928 | $1,985,122 |
| PSUs Unearned (max performance) | 2/16/2022 | 18,045 | $1,282,639 |
Policy safeguards:
- Hedging prohibited; pledging requires pre-clearance under the Securities Trading Policy .
- Mandatory clawback for erroneously paid incentive compensation per NYSE Rule 10D-1 update (2023) .
Employment Terms
Severance and Change-in-Control Economics (as of 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Annual Incentive Award ($) | Cash Severance ($) | Acceleration of Equity ($) | Life Insurance ($) | Accrued Vacation ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Retirement/Voluntary | 425,841 | — | 657,890 | — | 70,385 | 1,154,116 |
| Involuntary (without cause) | 425,841 | 915,000 | — | — | 70,385 | 1,411,226 |
| Termination for Cause | — | — | — | — | 70,385 | 70,385 |
| Death/Disability | 425,841 | — | 6,005,324 | 611,000 | 70,385 | 7,112,550 |
| Change in Control (no termination) | — | — | 2,984,671 | — | — | 2,984,671 |
| Change in Control + Qualifying Termination | 425,841 | 1,220,000 | 6,005,324 | — | 70,385 | 7,721,550 |
Plan terms:
- Executive Severance Plan: pre-2019 CMC executives generally receive 18 months base + one year bonus (offset for bonus already paid); 2019+ hires/promotions receive 12 months base + pro-rated bonus; CIC terminations receive 24 months base + one year annual cash incentive (greater of target or outlook) .
- Equity Plan: CIC followed by qualifying termination vests all unvested RSUs/PSUs (PSUs at greater of actual or target); Full Career Retirement allows PSUs to vest pro-rata based on actual performance at period end; Mary qualified as retirement-eligible at end of 2024 .
Retirement Benefits (Present Value, 12/31/2024)
| Plan | Years Credited | Present Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Pension Plan | 38.00 | $1,302,805 |
| SERP | 38.00 | $4,815,450 |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix shifts toward performance-based equity: 60% of 2024 LTI at target in PSUs, 40% in RSUs; PSUs link to AOI and ROIC with three-year horizon, reinforcing long-term value creation .
- Annual bonuses align to corporate Adjusted EBITDA, with historical payouts interpolated and capped; 2024 achieved 107.4% of target and 2023 achieved 133.8% .
- Ownership alignment strong: meaningful beneficial ownership and sizable deferred share balances; stock ownership guidelines and retention requirements in force; hedging prohibited and pledging restricted .
Compensation Peer Group and Say-on-Pay
- Peer group updated for 2025 compensation decisions (e.g., Columbia Sportswear, Under Armour, YETI), reflecting branded, global manufacturers; Pearl Meyer advises the Compensation Committee .
- Say-on-Pay achieved over 99% approval in 2024, indicating broad shareholder support for the pay program .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: PSUs tied to AOI and ROIC produced 200% payout for 2021–2023 and 129.6% for 2022–2024, consistent with strong profitability and capital efficiency—supports confidence in execution within Titleist .
- Retention/transition risk: Retirement eligibility plus material pension/SERP values could influence timing of succession; however, deferred share balances and multi-year vesting (RSU tranches each Feb 1, PSUs in 2027) provide retention hooks and create predictable vest-related supply events that may inform trading calendars .
- Change-in-control exposure: Significant equity acceleration and 24 months’ base under CIC termination scenarios imply higher transaction costs; PSUs settle at greater of actual/target, potentially increasing deal compensation liabilities .
- Governance safeguards: Clawback policy, anti-hedging rules, and ownership guidelines reduce misalignment; lack of disclosed pledging and strict trading policies mitigate insider-selling risk beyond scheduled vesting .
Overall: Incentives emphasize profitability (Adjusted EBITDA/AOI) and efficient capital use (ROIC), with robust ownership/deferral behavior and clear severance/CIC terms. Scheduled vesting dates (Feb 1 annually; PSUs in 2027) may be relevant for monitoring insider activity windows and potential share supply; the compensation construct and outcomes support confidence in continued execution while highlighting standard retirement/CIC contingencies .