Steven Pelisek
Acushnet HoldingsAbout Steven Pelisek
Steven Pelisek is President – Titleist Golf Clubs and a named executive officer at Acushnet Holdings (GOLF). His 2024 pay design ties short-term incentives to company Adjusted EBITDA and long-term equity to three-year adjusted operating income and ROIC, aligning compensation with profitability and capital efficiency . In 2024, company Adjusted EBITDA was $404.4M (107.4% of target), and the 2022–2024 PSU cycle paid at 129.6% based on AOI and ROIC performance . He is eligible for the company pension and SERP and participates in a legacy nonqualified EDP; the company prohibits hedging and restricts pledging via pre-clearance, with stock ownership guidelines requiring 3× base salary and compliance retained at year-end 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acushnet Holdings Corp. | President – Titleist Golf Clubs | — | Division president; annual incentives add segment operating income targets beginning 2025 |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Amount/Detail |
|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $610,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of base) | 65% |
| Target Bonus ($) | $396,500 |
| Actual 2024 Annual Cash Incentive ($) | $425,841 |
| Perquisites (selected 2024) | $11,340 golf club dues; $1,545 financial planning; $12,075 401(k) match |
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive (2024)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout (% of target) | Vesting/Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | 100% | $340.0 (50%) | $400.0 (100%) | $460.0 (200%) | $404.4 | 107.4% | Paid per plan; no discretionary adjustments |
Annual Cash Incentive (2025 design – applicable to division Presidents)
| Component | Weighting |
|---|---|
| Company Adjusted EBITDA | 75% |
| Segment Operating Income (division) | 15% |
| Board‑approved strategic objectives (individual) | 10% |
Long-Term Incentives (Grants in 2024)
| Award | Grant Date | Target Shares | Grant-Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSU | 2/15/2024 | 7,189 | $480,010 | 1/3 each on 2/1/2025, 2/1/2026, 2/1/2027 |
| PSU (50% AOI; 50% ROIC) | 2/15/2024 | 10,784 | $720,048 | Cliff vest 2/1/2027, subject to performance and service |
PSU Cycle Results (2012-2024 cohort vesting on 2/1/2025)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Max | Achievement | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3‑yr Cumulative Adjusted Operating Income ($M) | 50% | 713.8 | 860.0 | 1,006.2 | 871.1 | 107.6% |
| 3‑yr Average ROIC (%) | 50% | 11.25 | 13.50 | 15.75 | 14.66 | 151.6% |
| Combined Payout | — | — | — | — | — | 129.6% |
| Executive | 2022 PSU Target Shares | DERs Issued (shares) | Performance Factor | Earned PSUs (shares) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Steven Pelisek | 13,649 | — | 129.6% | 17,689.10 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial Ownership
| Holder | Shares Beneficially Owned | Shares Outstanding | Ownership (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Steven Pelisek | 80,864 | 60,013,024 | 0.135% (calculated) |
Outstanding Equity Awards (as of 12/31/2024; market value at $71.08)
| Grant | Unvested RSUs (#) | Market Value ($) | Unearned PSUs at Max (#) | Market/Payout Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/15/2024 | 7,189 | $510,994 | 21,568 | $1,533,053 |
| 2/10/2023 | 6,038 | $429,181 | 27,172 | $1,931,386 |
| 2/16/2022 | 3,033 | $215,586 | 17,265 | $1,227,196 |
• Options: none listed for Pelisek in outstanding awards; company shows zero options outstanding in aggregate .
• Stock ownership policy: 3× base salary for Section 16 officers; must retain 50% of net shares until compliant; Pelisek met ownership or retention compliance by year-end 2024 .
• Hedging/Pledging: hedging prohibited; pledging requires pre‑clearance; no hedging or short‑selling permitted .
Employment Terms
| Scenario | Cash Severance | Annual Incentive Earned for 2024 | Accelerated Equity | Life Insurance | Accrued Vacation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary Termination (without cause) | $915,000 | $425,841 | — | — | $58,654 |
| Change in Control (no termination) | — | — | $2,890,411 (PSUs ≥ target; service vesting continues) | — | — |
| Change in Control + Involuntary Termination/Good Reason | $1,220,000 | $425,841 | $5,847,467 | — | $58,654 |
| Death or Disability | — | $425,841 | $5,847,467 | $1,222,000 | $58,654 |
Additional terms:
- Plan structure: Executive Severance Plan provides 18 months base salary plus one year bonus offset for certain pre‑2019 CMC appointments; 24 months base salary plus one year cash incentive under specified change‑in‑control termination conditions .
- Equity treatment: upon CoC followed by qualifying termination, all unvested RSUs/PSUs vest in full with PSUs at greater of actual or target performance; “Full Career Retirement” prorates PSUs based on service and actual performance .
- Non‑solicit: prohibited for longer of 12 months after separation or severance period; release required for severance .
- Clawback: mandatory recoupment of erroneously paid incentive comp for restatements (NYSE Rule 10D‑1) .
Retirement, Deferred Comp, and Benefits
| Plan/Item | Status/Value |
|---|---|
| Pension Plan present value (12/31/2024) | $1,019,018 |
| SERP present value (12/31/2024) | $4,053,557 |
| Retiree medical eligibility | Yes (hired prior to 1/1/2004 criteria) |
| Excess Deferral Plan II (EDP) balance (12/31/2024) | $89,730; 2024 earnings $14,102 |
| Employee Deferral Plan (equity deferral) | No deferred RSUs/PSUs disclosed for Pelisek |
| Selected perquisites (2024) | $11,340 golf club dues; $1,545 financial planning; $12,075 401(k) match |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and risk: 2024 LTI tilt to PSUs (60% of LTI target) increases performance sensitivity; RSUs at 40% retain talent via multi‑year vesting .
- Annual incentive rigor: EBITDA thresholds/targets and 2019–2023 payout history indicate variability (96%–200%); 2024 paid 107.4% with no upward discretion .
- 2025 design shift: adds segment operating income and strategic objectives for division Presidents, increasing line‑of‑business accountability while maintaining company EBITDA anchoring .
- Governance controls: anti‑hedging/pledging, 3× salary ownership guideline, clawback policy reduce misalignment risk .
Compensation Peer Group and Say‑on‑Pay
- Peer group: Columbia Sportswear, Crocs, Deckers, G‑III Apparel, Helen of Troy, Kontoor Brands, Steve Madden, Topgolf Callaway Brands, Under Armour, Vista Outdoor, Wolverine World Wide, YETI Holdings .
- Say‑on‑Pay: >99% approval at 2024 annual meeting, supporting current pay design .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Strong pay‑for‑performance link via EBITDA (annual) and AOI/ROIC (multi‑year). The 2022–2024 PSU payout at 129.6% and 2024 EBITDA at 107.4% confirm operational outperformance translating to pay outcomes .
- Retention and selling pressure: RSUs vest annually (Feb 1) and PSUs cliff‑vest (Feb 1, 2027); routine tax withholding at vest can create predictable insider selling windows, though hedging is prohibited and pledging restricted .
- Change‑in‑control economics: Double‑trigger equity acceleration and >$1.2M cash in a CIC termination scenario increase retention through potential transaction; retirement eligibility allows prorated PSU delivery on actual performance, moderating immediate departure risk .
- Alignment safeguards: Ownership guideline compliance, clawback, and anti‑hedging/pledging policies reduce misalignment and reputational risk .