Blake Johnson
About Blake Johnson
Blake Johnson, age 41, is Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of Granite Point Mortgage Trust (GPMT) since December 1, 2024; he served as Deputy CFO from October 4, 2024 to November 30, 2024 and previously held finance, accounting and tax leadership roles at GPMT during 2017–2020 under the former external manager . He is a CPA and CFA charterholder with an MBT (University of Minnesota), MSc Finance (London Business School), MS Accountancy and BA Business Administration (University of St. Thomas) . Company performance metrics relevant to pay-for-performance in 2024 included “Run‑rate” ROAE of −1.2% and Change in Book Value per Share of −34.4%, with year-end GAAP net loss to common of −$221.5M and book value per common share of $8.47 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Granite Point Mortgage Trust | Deputy CFO; transitioned to CFO/Treasurer | Deputy CFO: Oct 4–Nov 30, 2024; CFO/Treasurer: from Dec 1, 2024 | Orchestrated smooth finance leadership transition; integral to establishing GPMT’s finance, accounting and tax functions during 2017–2020 . |
| Granite Point Mortgage Trust (under former manager) | Head of Tax; Controller | 2017–2020 (Controller from 2018) | Built core finance infrastructure at inception; supported REIT tax and reporting . |
| Two Harbors Investment Corp. | Acting Chief Accounting Officer (portion of 2024); Controller | 2012–2024; Controller since 2020 | Led public-company accounting; strengthened controls and reporting rigor . |
| Wells Fargo; Deloitte; Opus Corporation; Ernst & Young | Finance and audit roles | Not disclosed | Foundation in banking and Big Four audit; broadened technical and controls experience . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Two Harbors Investment Corp. (NYSE: TWO) | Acting Chief Accounting Officer; Controller | Acting CAO: part of 2024; Controller since 2020 | Advanced public REIT financial reporting and controls . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Details | 2025 Framework |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $500,000 initial base per employment agreement . | Continues at agreement rate (not restated in proxy beyond initial) . |
| Target Bonus % | Not in AIP for 2024; agreement provided for a non‑formulaic 2024 cash bonus . | Participates in AIP from 2025; target 75% of base salary for non‑CEO NEOs . |
| Actual Bonus Paid | $250,000 cash bonus for 2024, paid Q1 2025 . | 2025 payout contingent on AIP metrics; 0–200% of target . |
| Sign‑On Bonus | $110,000 cash . | N/A. |
| Sign‑On RSUs | RSUs with grant‑date fair value $200,000; granted Oct 4, 2024 . | Vests ratably over 3 years . |
| Planned 2025 LTIP | Aggregate $250,000 split 50% PSUs / 50% RSUs . | PSUs and RSUs per standard mix . |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | Weighting | Target (program) | Actual (2024) | Payout (2024) | Vesting Mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIP Strategic Objectives (balance sheet, risk, investor focus, franchise) | 50% | Committee assessment with multiplier (0–2x); evaluated collectively . | Achieved at 100% of target . | Contributes to total; Johnson not in AIP 2024 (received cash bonus per agreement) . | Cash paid in Q1 following performance year . |
| AIP “Run‑rate” ROAE | 25% | Threshold 2.0%; Target 4.0%; Max ≥8.0% . | −1.2% (Below threshold) . | 0% for metric; Financial component 0% overall . | Cash (AIP); N/A for Johnson in 2024 . |
| AIP Change in Book Value per Share | 25% | Threshold −15.0%; Target −5.0%; Max ≥+15.0% . | −34.4% (Below threshold) . | 0% for metric; Financial component 0% overall . | Cash (AIP); N/A for Johnson in 2024 . |
| 2024–2026 PSUs: Absolute Run‑rate ROAE | 25% | Threshold at target value −2% (25% earnout); Target 100%; Max target+3% (200%) . | In‑flight; results determined after 12/31/2026 . | 0–200% of target at end of period . | 3‑year performance; vest at end; DERs only on earned units . |
| 2024–2026 PSUs: Relative Run‑rate ROAE | 25% | Threshold 25th percentile; Target 50th; Max 75th percentile . | In‑flight . | 0–200% of target . | As above . |
| 2024–2026 PSUs: Absolute Change in BVPS | 25% | Threshold −10%; Target 0%; Max +10% . | In‑flight . | 0–200% of target . | As above . |
| 2024–2026 PSUs: Relative Change in BVPS | 25% | Threshold 25th; Target 50th; Max 75th percentile . | In‑flight . | 0–200% of target . | As above . |
| 2022–2024 PSUs (legacy cohort) | 50%/50% Core ROAE Abs/Rel | Absolute threshold 5.5%; Target 7.0%; Max ≥8.5%; Relative thresholds 25th/50th/75th . | Absolute −9.2%; Relative <25th percentile | 0% earned; no shares issued; no DERs paid . | Settled at 0% in early 2025 . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (Common) | None disclosed as of March 15, 2025 (table shows “—”) . |
| Beneficial Ownership (Preferred) | None disclosed as of March 15, 2025 (table shows “—”) . |
| Unvested RSUs Outstanding | 66,225 RSUs at 12/31/2024; market value $184,768 (close $2.79) . |
| Vested vs Unvested | RSUs unvested; vest 33%/33%/34% annually over three years from grant . |
| Options / SARs | None granted; company has not used stock options historically . |
| Hedging / Pledging | Prohibited for directors, officers, and employees . |
| Ownership Guidelines | Executives: 3× base salary market value; includes unvested RSUs; 5 years to attain; retention 75% of net shares if below target . |
| Compliance Status | Not disclosed individually; guidelines monitored annually . |
Employment Terms
| Term | Blake Johnson |
|---|---|
| Appointment dates | Deputy CFO: Oct 4, 2024; CFO/Treasurer: Dec 1, 2024 . |
| Contract highlights | Base $500,000; $110,000 sign‑on cash; $200,000 sign‑on RSUs; 2024 cash bonus eligibility $250,000; participates in AIP from 2025; 2025 LTIP $250,000 split PSUs/RSUs . |
| AIP structure (from 2025) | Target 75% of base (non‑CEO NEOs), payout 0–200%; 50% Strategic; 50% Financial (Run‑rate ROAE; Change in BVPS) . |
| Severance (No CoC) | 1.0× (base + target bonus) in installments; prorated current‑year bonus (based on actual); prior‑year bonus if not yet paid; 18 months COBRA reimbursement; time‑based equity continues vesting; performance equity prorated and vests based on actual results . |
| Severance (With CoC) | 1.5× (base + target bonus) lump sum; prorated target bonus; 18 months COBRA; time‑based equity immediate vest; performance equity vests at target; double‑trigger required for acceleration . |
| Non‑compete / Non‑solicit | Non‑compete 6 months post‑termination; non‑solicit 1 year . |
| Clawback | Dodd‑Frank compliant clawback adopted Oct 2023 for incentive comp on restatements . |
| Tax gross‑ups | None provided . |
Potential Payments (Estimates as of 12/31/2024)
| Scenario | Severance | Bonus | Equity | COBRA | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Termination without Cause / Resignation for Good Reason (no CoC) | $750,000 | $250,000 (prorated/actual framework; agreement amount for 2024 shown) | $184,768 | $48,875 | $1,233,643 . |
| Termination without Cause / Resignation for Good Reason (with CoC) | $1,125,000 | $250,000 (prorated target per agreement framing 2024) | $184,768 (immediate vest terms) | $48,875 | $1,608,643 . |
| Death | — | $250,000 (prorated target framework) | $184,768 | — | $434,768 . |
| Disability | — | $250,000 (prorated target framework) | $184,768 | $48,875 | $483,643 . |
| Retirement (if eligible) | — | $250,000 (prorated target framework) | $184,768 | — | $434,768 . |
Notes: Equity values reflect $2.79 closing price on Dec 31, 2024 and outstanding RSUs/PSUs treatment per agreements; severance multiples and COBRA reimbursement per employment agreement .
Performance Context (Company 2024)
| Metric | 2024 Outcome |
|---|---|
| GAAP Net (Loss) attributable to common | −$221.5M . |
| Book Value per Common Share | $8.47 at Dec 31, 2024 . |
| Distributable Earnings (Loss) per basic share | −$2.85 . |
| “Run‑rate” ROAE | −1.2% . |
| Change in Book Value per Share | −34.4% . |
| Common Dividend per share | $0.30 for 2024; Q4 dividend $0.05 . |
| Share repurchases | ~2.4M common at $3.16 avg. in 2024; book value accretion ~$0.28 per share . |
Additional Governance and Compensation Program Signals
- Say‑on‑Pay support: 92% approval at 2024 annual meeting, indicating broad investor alignment with compensation design .
- No hedging or pledging allowed; equity awards use double‑trigger for CoC; no single‑trigger vesting; no tax gross‑ups; independent consultant (Semler Brossy) engaged; PSU framework balances absolute and relative metrics .
- Peer group for benchmarking includes internally managed and comparable mortgage REITs (e.g., ABR, BRSP, DX, LADR, MFA, NYMT, RWT, WD) .
Notable Execution Activity
- Johnson executed as CFO on financing amendments to a JPMorgan Chase Bank repurchase agreement in October 2025, evidencing direct involvement in liability management and funding arrangements .
Investment Implications
- Retention and selling pressure: Sign‑on RSUs vest 33/33/34 over three years, with 2025 LTIP split between PSUs/RSUs; this staging tempers near‑term selling pressure while adding multi‑year retention hooks .
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment: From 2025, Johnson’s cash AIP and PSUs are tied to “Run‑rate” ROAE and Change in BVPS (absolute/relative), directly linking pay to core value drivers in mortgage REITs; recent cohort outcomes (2022–2024 PSUs at 0%) demonstrate payout sensitivity to underperformance .
- Change‑of‑control protection vs. dilution risk: Double‑trigger acceleration mitigates windfall risk; severance at 1.5× under CoC is moderate; however, the plan’s share reserve expansion (2025 proposal) raises headline dilution to ~25.2% including requested shares, warranting monitoring of grant pacing and burn rate (2024 burn rate 5.6%) .
- Execution risk context: 2024 financials reflect elevated credit losses and book value decline; CFO performance will be judged on funding cost management, resolutions cadence, and capital allocation (including buybacks), areas highlighted in the company’s disclosures and subsequent financing actions .