Peter Morral
About Peter Morral
Peter Morral (age 57) is Vice President and Chief Development Officer at Granite Point Mortgage Trust (GPMT), serving since 2020; he is also Co‑Head of Originations and a member of the Investment Committee since GPMT’s inception in 2017 . He has 20+ years in real estate finance across on‑balance sheet lending, syndications, credit policy/underwriting, and CMBS originations and distribution; education: MBA (Ohio State University) and BLA in History (University of Connecticut) . Company performance context: 2024 “Run‑rate” ROAE was (1.2%) (below threshold), Book Value/Share declined (34.4%), and TSR (from a $100 base in 2019) was 25.13 at year‑end 2024; net loss was $207.1 million, underscoring a challenged operating environment for incentive metrics .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Annaly Capital – Commercial Real Estate Group | Managing Director | Not disclosed | CRE lending leadership; institutional origination platform |
| UBS Securities LLC | Managing Director; Investment Committee member | Not disclosed | Institutional client & large loan originations; subordinate debt pricing/distribution; loan syndications |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Morral .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $600,000 | $600,000 | $600,000 |
| All Other Compensation ($) | $9,150 | $9,900 | $10,350 |
| Notes | Includes Company 401(k) and HSA contributions (for NEOs other than Morral, HSA also applies) |
2024 target pay mix and grants:
| Component | Target/Grant Detail | Amount ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | Fixed | $600,000 |
| Target AIP (Annual Incentive Plan) | 75% of base | $450,000 |
| Annual RSUs (Mar 2024) | Time‑vested, 3‑yr ratable | $500,000 |
| Annual PSUs (Mar 2024) | 3‑yr performance, 0–200% earn‑out | $500,000 |
| Supplemental RSUs (Jun 2024) | 3‑yr cliff vest (retention) | $250,000 |
| Target Total Direct Compensation | Sum | $2,300,000 |
Multi‑year total compensation:
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Awards ($) | $1,199,984 | $1,199,994 | $1,244,386 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive ($) | $225,000 | $354,115 | $225,000 |
| Total ($) | $2,034,134 | $2,164,009 | $2,079,736 |
Performance Compensation
AIP structure and results (2024):
- Weighting: 50% Strategic Objectives; 50% Financial (Run‑rate ROAE, Change in Book Value/Share) .
- Strategic factors (balance sheet, risk management, investor focus, franchise value) assessed at 100% of target .
- Financial outcomes: Run‑rate ROAE actual (1.2%) vs target 4.0%; Change in Book Value/Share actual (34.4%) vs target (5.0%); both earned 0% .
| Metric | Weight | Target | Actual | Earn‑out | Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic Objectives (aggregate) | 50% | Target | Target achieved | 100% of component | $225,000 (50% of $450k target) |
| Run‑rate ROAE | 25% | 4.0% | (1.2%) | 0% | — |
| Change in Book Value/Share | 25% | (5.0%) | (34.4%) | 0% | — |
| Total AIP | 100% | — | — | 50% of target | $225,000 |
PSU design (2024 grant; performance period 2024–2026):
- Metrics and weights: Absolute/Relative Run‑rate ROAE (25%/25%); Absolute/Relative Change in Book Value/Share (25%/25%); 0–200% earn‑out; linear interpolation between threshold/target/maximum; relative measured vs a defined commercial mortgage REIT peer set .
- Absolute thresholds disclosed (examples): Run‑rate ROAE threshold at “target value −2%” earns 25% of target; Change in Book Value threshold at “target value −10%” earns 25% of target; specific target numbers are proprietary until period end .
Historical PSU results (2022 grant; performance period 2022–2024):
| PSU Metric | Weight | Actual | Earn‑out |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absolute “Core” ROAE | 50% | (9.2%) | 0% of target |
| Relative “Core” ROAE | 50% | <25th percentile | 0% of target |
| Total Earn‑out | 100% | — | 0% of target (no shares issued) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
Beneficial ownership (as of Mar 15, 2025):
- Common shares beneficially owned: 143,227; percent of common stock: <1% .
- Hedging/pledging: Company policy prohibits hedging and pledging by officers and directors .
- Stock ownership guidelines: Executives must hold stock with market value ≥3× base salary; unvested RSUs count; unvested PSUs do not; expected to achieve within 5 years; retention of 75% of shares upon vest until compliance .
Outstanding awards (as of Dec 31, 2024):
| Grant Date | Type | Units | Vesting/Performance | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6/21/2024 | RSU (Supplemental) | 80,128 | 3‑yr cliff (vests 6/21/2027) | $223,557 |
| 3/1/2024 | PSU (Target) | 104,602 | 2024–2026 earn‑out; 0–200% | $291,840 |
| 3/1/2024 | RSU (Annual) | 104,602 | 3‑yr ratable (33/33/34) | $291,840 |
| 3/15/2023 | PSU (Target) | 119,047 | 2023–2025 earn‑out; 0–200% | $332,141 |
| 3/15/2023 | RSU | 79,365 | 3‑yr ratable | $221,428 |
| 2/16/2022 | PSU (Threshold listed; actual 0%) | 12,669 | 2022–2024; earned 0% | $35,346 |
| 2/16/2022 | RSU | 16,892 | 3‑yr ratable | $47,129 |
| 12/31/2020 | RSU | 60,060 | 5‑yr cliff (vests 12/31/2025) | $167,567 |
Stock vested in 2024:
| Shares Vested | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|
| 76,594 | $388,557 |
Dividend Equivalent Rights (DERs): accrue on RSUs, and on PSUs only for units earned at vest; no dividends on unearned PSUs; DERs paid on RSUs upon dividend payments to common shareholders .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Detail |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement inception | Direct Company employment since internalization (Dec 31, 2020); current role since 2020 |
| Non‑compete | 6 months post‑termination (without prior written consent) |
| Non‑solicit | 1 year post‑termination |
| Severance (no change‑in‑control) | 1.0× (base salary + target cash bonus), plus prorated bonus based on actual performance; COBRA reimbursement up to 18 months; unvested RSUs continue to vest; PSUs prorated and settle based on actual performance at period end |
| Severance (change‑in‑control, “double trigger”) | 1.5× (base salary + target bonus) paid lump sum; prorated target bonus; COBRA reimbursement up to 18 months; time‑based equity vests immediately; performance‑based equity vests at target (settlement timing may defer to avoid adverse tax) |
| Retirement/death/disability | Prorated target bonus; disability includes COBRA reimbursement; equity treatment mirrors non‑CoC severance (or CoC if retirement during CoC period, with PSUs prorated) |
| Clawback | Dodd‑Frank compliant clawback policy adopted Oct 2023; recovery of excess incentive comp upon required restatement |
| Tax gross‑ups | Not provided |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited by Insider Trading Policy |
| Options | Company has not granted stock options and has no plans to grant them |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Year‑over‑year equity mix shift (2024 supplemental RSUs): Committee added one‑time, time‑based RSUs (~18% of initial target comp; ~35% of annual LTIP) to increase retention amid CRE headwinds; annual mix reverted to 50% PSUs / 50% RSUs in 2025 .
- Pay‑for‑performance tension: 2024 AIP financial metrics earned 0% (Run‑rate ROAE and BVPS decline), but strategic objectives were paid at target (50% composite payout), consistent with balanced incentive design .
- PSU track record: 2022 PSUs earned 0% (absolute and relative “Core” ROAE); highlights execution risk to performance‑based equity in stressed markets .
- Governance safeguards: No tax gross‑ups; double‑trigger CoC vesting; prohibition on hedging/pledging; formal clawback policy; annual compensation risk assessment found no material adverse risk .
Say‑on‑Pay & Peer Group
- Say‑on‑Pay approval: 92% at 2024 annual meeting .
- Compensation benchmarking: Internally managed mortgage REIT/real estate finance peer set (e.g., ABR, BRSP, CIM, DX, LADR, MFA, NYMT, RWT, WD) used for market checks; not tied to a fixed percentile target .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Morral’s at‑risk pay is substantial (PSUs and RSUs); supplemental RSUs (cliff vest June 2027) raise near‑term retention but may create a discrete vesting event and potential supply overhang if insiders monetize upon vesting .
- Performance sensitivity: With 2024 AIP financial metrics at 0% and a 0% PSU earn‑out for the 2022 cycle, incentives are tightly linked to ROAE and book value outcomes; sustained improvement in earnings quality and credit outcomes is necessary to unlock PSU value .
- Change‑of‑control economics: Double‑trigger acceleration (time‑based immediate; PSUs at target) and 1.5× severance provide downside protection; no tax gross‑ups mitigate shareholder‑unfriendly optics .
- Ownership: Direct beneficial ownership is <1% and guidelines require 3× salary stock value (RSUs count); policy bans hedging/pledging, supporting alignment though absolute ownership is modest .
Note: Attempts to retrieve Form 4 insider trading activity for Morral (to assess recent selling pressure) were unsuccessful due to an access error; analysis herein relies on proxy disclosures for ownership and vesting schedules.