Stephen Alpart
About Stephen Alpart
Stephen Alpart (age 61) is Vice President and Chief Investment Officer (CIO) of Granite Point Mortgage Trust Inc. (GPMT), Co‑Head of Originations, and a member of the Investment Committee; he has served in these roles since GPMT’s inception in 2017 . He holds an MBA in Finance and Real Estate from New York University and a BS in Business Administration (Accounting and Economics) from Washington University . Company performance under the pay‑versus‑performance framework shows 2024 Total Shareholder Return (value of $100 invested from 12/31/2019) at 25.13 vs. peer group 79.96, Run‑rate ROAE of −1.2%, and GAAP net loss of $207.1 million, informing incentive outcomes across the NEOs including Alpart .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prudential Real Estate Investment (PGIM Real Estate) | Managing Director, Global Real Estate Finance (managed close‑end debt funds) | 2009–2014 | Led debt funds; originated/underwrote large structured CRE loans; enhanced credit/risk management capabilities |
| GMAC Commercial Mortgage & Capmark Investments | Managing Director, Real Estate Group | Not disclosed | Originated, underwrote, and closed large structured CRE loans for PE firms and owner/operators, strengthening structured finance expertise |
| PaineWebber & Co.; later UBS Group AG | Managing Director (PaineWebber) and later Executive Director (UBS), Real Estate Group | Not disclosed | Origination/underwriting of large structured CRE loans; syndications and workouts; expanded capital markets connectivity |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles are disclosed for Alpart in the executive officer section .
Fixed Compensation
Multi‑year compensation detail from the Summary Compensation Table:
| Component ($) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | 600,000 | 600,000 | 600,000 |
| Stock Awards (grant‑date fair value) | 1,199,984 | 1,199,994 | 1,688,781 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive Plan (AIP) | 225,000 | 354,115 | 225,000 |
| All Other Compensation (401k/HSA etc.) | 12,150 | 12,900 | 13,550 |
| Total | 2,037,134 | 2,167,009 | 2,527,331 |
Additional policies:
- NEOs do not receive perquisites or retirement plans not available to other employees .
- Clawback policy (NYSE/SEC aligned) adopted October 2023, recouping incentive compensation over 3 prior years upon a required accounting restatement .
- No stock options historically and no plans to grant options .
Performance Compensation
A. Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) structure and 2024 outcomes (Alpart target=AIP 75% of base, i.e., $450,000):
| Metric | Weighting | Target Definition | Actual (2024) | Payout vs Target | Vesting/Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic Objectives (balance sheet, risk, investor focus, franchise value) | 50% | Qualitative assessment at year end | Achieved at target (100%) | 100% of component | Cash in Q1 2025 |
| Run‑rate ROAE | 25% | Threshold 2.0%; Target 4.0%; Max ≥8.0% | −1.2% | 0% of component | Cash in Q1 2025 |
| Change in Book Value per Share | 25% | Threshold −15.0%; Target −5.0%; Max ≥+15.0% | −34.4% | 0% of component | Cash in Q1 2025 |
Result: Alpart’s AIP payout equaled 50% of target = $225,000 (paid Q1 2025) .
B. Long‑Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) 2024 awards for Alpart:
| Award | Grant Date | Units (#) | Grant‑Date Fair Value ($) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual RSU | Mar 1, 2024 | 125,523 | 600,000 | Ratable over 3 years (33%, 33%, 34%) |
| Annual PSU (target) | Mar 1, 2024 | 125,523 (target) | 600,000 | Earnout 0–200% based on absolute/relative Run‑rate ROAE and Change in BVPS; 3‑year performance (2024–2026); DERs accrue and pay only on earned shares |
| Supplemental RSU (one‑time retention) | Jun 21, 2024 | 160,256 | 488,781 | Cliff vests on Jun 21, 2027; DERs paid on RSUs |
PSU history: The 2022 PSU cycle (2022–2024) vested at 0% on both absolute and relative Core ROAE; no shares issued .
Stock vested in 2024 (RSUs): 76,594 shares; value realized $388,557 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership (as of Mar 15, 2025): 218,756 shares of common stock; less than 1% of shares outstanding (48,246,760) .
- Hedging/pledging: Company prohibits hedging and pledging by officers, directors, and employees (policy filed with 10‑K; also governance highlights) .
- Executive Stock Ownership Guidelines: CEO 5× salary; other executive officers 3× salary; unvested RSUs count; PSUs excluded; 5‑year attainment with retention requirement (75% of net shares) until in compliance; annual review by Compensation Committee .
Unvested equity as of Dec 31, 2024 (market price $2.79):
| Award | Units (#) | Market Value ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSU (Jun 21, 2024; cliff vest Jun 21, 2027) | 160,256 | 447,114 | DERs on RSUs |
| RSU (Mar 1, 2024; ratable) | 125,523 | 350,209 | 33/33/34% schedule |
| PSU (Mar 1, 2024; target units) | 125,523 | 350,209 | Earnout at 0–200% (2024–2026) |
| PSU (Mar 15, 2023; target units) | 119,047 | 332,141 | 2023–2025 cycle |
| RSU (Mar 15, 2023; ratable) | 79,365 | 221,428 | Ratable vest |
| PSU (Feb 16, 2022; threshold units) | 12,669 | 35,346 | 0% earned; settled early 2025 with no shares |
| RSU (Dec 31, 2020; 5‑yr cliff) | 60,060 | 167,567 | Cliff vest Dec 31, 2025 |
Employment Terms
- Employment agreement (initially at internalization): Target AIP = 75% of base; LTIP split between PSUs (0–200% over 3 years) and RSUs; awards generally subject to continued employment; DERs accrue on PSUs but pay only on earned units .
- Non‑compete/non‑solicit: Nine‑month non‑compete (post‑termination); one‑year non‑solicit of employees/customers; confidentiality/IP covenants .
- Severance (termination without cause or resignation for Good Reason; not related to Change‑of‑Control): 1.5× base salary + target cash bonus, paid over 12 months; prior‑year bonus if earned; prorated current‑year bonus based on actual performance; up to 18 months COBRA reimbursement; unvested RSUs continue to vest; PSUs prorated and vest based on actual performance at end of cycle .
- Change‑of‑Control severance (double trigger): 2.0× base salary + target bonus, paid lump‑sum; prorated target bonus; up to 18 months COBRA reimbursement; immediate vesting of time‑based awards; immediate vesting of performance‑based awards at target (settlement timing may be adjusted for tax) .
- Clawback: Company will recover excess incentive pay upon required restatement per SEC/NYSE rules .
- No tax gross‑ups; no single‑trigger equity vesting; no liberal “change of control” definition in plan .
Compensation Peer Group (benchmarking context)
Internally managed commercial mortgage REIT/real estate finance peer set used for 2024 decisions: ABR, AAIC, BRSP, CIM, DX, LADR, MFA, NYMT, RWT, WD; Semler Brossy serves as independent consultant; no conflicts .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
Say‑on‑Pay approval in 2024 was ~92%; the company engaged large holders on supplemental RSUs and broader governance topics in fall 2024; investors expressed general support and did not request changes; 2025 awards reverted to 50/50 PSU/RSU mix .
Performance Compensation Design (PSUs – detailed)
- Metrics and weights: 25% Absolute Run‑rate ROAE; 25% Relative Run‑rate ROAE (vs. commercial mortgage REIT comparator group); 25% Absolute Change in Book Value per Share; 25% Relative Change in Book Value per Share .
- Earnout schedule: 0–200% of target; absolute metric target levels undisclosed until cycle end due to sensitivity; relative earnouts at 25th/50th/75th percentile thresholds .
Investment Implications
- Retention vs. performance tension: 2024 AIP financial metrics paid at 0% (Run‑rate ROAE −1.2%, BVPS −34.4%), while strategic objectives paid at 100%, resulting in 50% of target AIP; 2022 PSUs earned 0%; this signals stringent linkage to financial performance, but also highlights macro headwinds likely to constrain PSU realizations near‑term .
- Equity overhang and supply: One‑time June 2024 supplemental RSUs (cliff vest in 2027) materially increase unvested time‑based equity; Alpart alone holds 160,256 supplemental RSUs and 125,523 2024 RSUs, in addition to multiple PSU cycles, which can create periodic selling pressure at vest events (with tax withholdings) and increase dilution risk .
- Plan share authorization expansion: The Amended & Restated 2022 Omnibus Incentive Plan requests +10,000,000 shares and extends the plan to 2035; including outstanding awards, potential equity dilution would be ~25.2% based on shares outstanding as of April 7, 2025, subject to shareholder approval—heightening equity supply considerations for traders .
- Alignment safeguards: Prohibitions on hedging/pledging and robust ownership guidelines (3× salary for Alpart) support alignment; clawback enhances governance .
- Pay‑for‑performance sensitivity: The 50/50 AIP weighting and 4‑metric PSU design (absolute and relative) tie payouts to distributable returns and book value stability—investors should monitor ROAE and BVPS trajectory and peer‑relative trends as key drivers of PSU earnouts and future cash/equity payouts .
Appendix – 2024 Target Pay Components (Alpart)
| Component | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Base Salary | 600,000 |
| Target AIP | 450,000 |
| Annual RSU (Mar 2024) | 600,000 |
| Annual PSU (Mar 2024; target) | 600,000 |
| Supplemental RSU (Jun 2024) | 500,000 |
| Target Total Direct Compensation | 2,750,000 |
Appendix – Beneficial Ownership Snapshot
| Holder | Common Shares | % of Common | As‑of Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stephen Alpart | 218,756 | <1% | Mar 15, 2025 |
Appendix – 2024 AIP Award Paid
| Executive | AIP Paid ($) | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Stephen Alpart | 225,000 | 50% of target based on 2024 outcomes |
Appendix – 2024 RSU/PSU Grants Detail (Alpart)
| Grant | Date | Units (#) | Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| RSU (annual) | Mar 1, 2024 | 125,523 | 600,000 |
| PSU (annual; target) | Mar 1, 2024 | 125,523 | 600,000 |
| RSU (supplemental) | Jun 21, 2024 | 160,256 | 488,781 |
Investment Implications (condensed)
- Expect limited PSU realization unless ROAE and BVPS improve; watch portfolio resolutions and funding costs impacting run‑rate returns .
- Elevated near‑term equity supply risk from vesting schedule and proposed plan share increase; monitor annual grant cadence and vesting dates (e.g., June 2027 supplemental RSUs) .
- Alignment guardrails (ownership, hedging/pledging ban, clawback) mitigate misalignment risk, while AIP/PSU metrics provide transparent performance triggers for payouts .