James Brickman
Green Brick PartnersAbout James Brickman
James R. Brickman (age 73) is Co‑Founder, Chief Executive Officer, and a Director of Green Brick Partners (GRBK); he has served on the board since October 2014 and holds a B.B.A. and M.B.A. from Southern Methodist University . Green Brick delivered 492.1% total shareholder return over the five years ended Dec 31, 2024 (37.5% CAGR), with 2024 net income of $417,155k and home closings revenue of $2,069,756k, underscoring strong value creation during his leadership . Brickman’s background includes founding and leading JBGL entities focused on real estate development/finance and prior CEO/Chairman roles in homebuilding and real estate operations, bringing over 40 years of sector experience .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| JBGL Capital LP | Founding Manager and Advisor | From 2008 (end not disclosed) | Platform for residential land/development investing that preceded Green Brick combination, anchoring GRBK’s land-driven model |
| JBGL Builder Finance LLC | Founding Manager and Advisor | From 2010 (end not disclosed) | Originated builder finance activities aligned with GRBK’s integrated approach |
| Princeton Homes Ltd. / Princeton Realty Corporation | Chairman & CEO | Not disclosed | Led land development, single-family construction, and property management prior to GRBK |
| Various JVs/LPs in real estate | Manager | Not disclosed | Spanned office, multifamily/condo, single-family homes, land entitlement, and property management |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not disclosed | — | — | No public company external directorships disclosed for Brickman |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| CEO Base Salary ($) | 1,500,000 | 1,500,000 | 1,516,667 (increased to $1,600,000 effective Nov 1, 2024; pro‑rated) |
Notes:
- New CEO employment agreement approved Oct 25, 2024, with base salary raised to $1,600,000 effective Nov 1, 2024 .
Performance Compensation
- Pay mix: 82% of CEO total direct compensation was performance‑based in 2024, reflecting a high “at‑risk” design .
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024 design and outcomes (CEO)
| Component | Weight | Target/Structure | Actual/Result | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operational & Financial Relative to Peers (Home Closings Revenue Growth, Homebuilding Gross Margin, ROA) | 25% | Payout grid based on meeting/exceeding peers across 24 cells | GRBK met/exceeded in 21/24 cells; GRBK metrics: 17.1% growth, 33.8% margin, 18.2% ROA | 200% |
| EPS (absolute) | 25% | Threshold $5.50; Target $6.68; Max $7.20 | Actual EPS $8.45 | 200% |
| Relative TSR (vs homebuilder peers + S&P 500) | 20% | 1‑, 3‑, 5‑yr equally weighted; 70th percentile = 200% | 1‑yr 78%; 3‑yr 78%; 5‑yr 89% | 200% |
| Strategic Objectives | 30% | CEO goals tied to capital allocation, leverage, talent, and growth | Committee assessed as outperformance on 2024 objectives | 200% |
Vesting/Settlement:
- Committee elected to pay 50% of the earned AIP in fully vested common stock (mitigated by stock ownership retention rules below) .
AIP Payouts (2024 performance; approved Feb 20, 2025)
| Payout Type | Amount ($) |
|---|---|
| Cash | 3,499,500 |
| Stock (fully vested) | 3,499,500 |
| Total | 6,999,000 |
Equity Awards and Option Activity
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Outstanding unvested equity (12/31/24) | None for Brickman |
| 2024 Option Exercise | 500,000 options exercised; value realized $24,615,000; 238,961 shares withheld for exercise price and tax; net shares received 261,039 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (shares) | 1,937,322 |
| Ownership as % of Outstanding | 4.4% (shares outstanding 44,112,612) |
| Vested vs Unvested | Unvested shares: 0 as of 12/31/24 |
| Pledged Shares | Company policy prohibits pledging by officers/directors; no pledging by Brickman disclosed |
| Ownership Guidelines | CEO: 3x base salary; retention of 100% of net shares until in compliance; 5‑year compliance window |
Policies:
- Hedging and pledging prohibited for officers/directors; limited pledge exception only for 10%+ beneficial owners (e.g., certain Greenlight funds in margin accounts), not applicable to the CEO .
- Insider trading windows and prohibition on short sales; grants not timed around MNPI .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Brickman (as of 12/31/24 unless noted) |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | Renewed Oct 25, 2024 |
| Base Salary | $1,600,000 effective Nov 1, 2024 (pro‑rated 2024 pay $1,516,667) |
| Target Annual Incentive (AIP) | $3,499,500 (2024 opportunity) |
| AIP Settlement Mix | Up to 50% in stock at Committee’s discretion (used for 2024 payout) |
| Severance (No CIC) | 2x (base salary + target bonus); estimated cash $10,199,000 at 12/31/24 |
| Severance (CIC + Qualifying Termination within 24 months) | 3x (base salary + target bonus); estimated cash $15,298,500 at 12/31/24 |
| Clawback | Bonuses and equity subject to clawback upon restatement for material non‑compliance |
| Non‑Compete/Non‑Solicit | 12 months post‑termination; perpetual confidentiality and non‑disparagement |
| Excise Tax | “Best net” cutback approach for CEO |
Board Governance and Director Service
- Role and Tenure: CEO and Director since 2014; receives no additional director compensation for board service .
- Leadership Structure: Separate Chair (David Einhorn) and CEO roles; Lead Independent Director in place; independent directors meet in regular executive sessions, supporting oversight and independence .
- Committee Roles: CEO is not listed on any board committees; standing committees are Audit (Chair: Lila Manassa Murphy), Compensation (Chair: Harry Brandler), and Governance & Sustainability (Chair: Richard S. Press), plus an Insurance Committee; 5 of 7 nominees are independent .
- Attendance: Board met 5 times in 2024; each director attended at least 75% of combined board/committee meetings .
Related Party Transactions (Governance Risk)
- The Company held a 90% interest in CLH20, LLC (Centre Living Homes); the remaining 10% was held by Trevor Brickman, President of Centre Living and son of CEO James R. Brickman, with related‑party oversight via policy and committee review .
Say‑on‑Pay, Peer Group, and Compensation Governance
- Say‑on‑Pay: Last advisory vote (2023) approved by 98% of votes cast; say‑on‑pay held every three years .
- Consultants: Pearl Meyer (NEO benchmarking 2024) and FW Cook (CEO agreement renewal, 2025 LTIP design) engaged; committee determined both independent with no conflicts .
- Peer Groups: 2024 Peer Group of seven homebuilders for benchmarking; 2025 Peer Group expanded to nine (adds KB Home and Meritage), with larger builders used “below the line” for structural insight .
- Relative Positioning: Committee noted CEO base and target annual incentive above 75th percentile, but lack of LTIP left total direct compensation materially below 25th percentile; renewed agreement and 2025 LTIP intended to correct market competitiveness, with time‑ and performance‑based awards .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Shareholder Return ($100 initial) | 200.00 | 264.20 | 211.06 | 452.44 | 492.07 |
| Net Income ($000s) | 117,797 | 204,381 | 313,997 | 306,675 | 417,155 |
| Home Closings Revenue ($000s) | 923,901 | 1,305,620 | 1,696,911 | 1,767,788 | 2,069,756 |
Other execution notes:
- 2024 relative performance: GRBK outperformed peers on key operational metrics; AIP grid credited 21/24 cells for max component payout .
- CFO transition: Former CFO Richard Costello resigned effective March 17, 2025; no additional compensation under his agreement upon resignation .
Director Compensation (Context for Dual Roles)
- Independent director pay in 2024 comprised a $100k cash retainer (Chairman $150k), $140k annual RS grant (vesting in one year), and chair retainers; Brickman receives no additional compensation for his director role .
Equity Ownership Detail (Security Ownership Table)
| Holder | Shares | % Outstanding |
|---|---|---|
| James R. Brickman | 1,937,322 | 4.4% |
| All Directors/Officers (10 persons) | 13,081,981 (includes Greenlight affiliates) | 29.7% |
| Shares Outstanding (Record Date) | 44,112,612 | — |
Policy note:
- Anti‑pledging policy applies to officers/directors. Limited pledge exceptions apply only to 10%+ beneficial owners (e.g., certain Greenlight funds may hold shares in margin accounts); the policy states no pledging by the Chairman individually and no pledges in SPVs; CEO pledging is not disclosed and would be prohibited absent an approved exception (which is restricted to 10%+ entities) .
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑Performance: Strong alignment with shareholder outcomes—EPS, peer‑relative operating metrics, and multi‑horizon TSR each paid at 200% in 2024; 50% stock settlement is fully vested but subject to ownership‑retention until guideline compliance, supporting alignment while moderating near‑term selling pressure .
- Retention and Market Competitiveness: New CEO agreement and 2025 LTIP address prior below‑market total direct compensation (due to lack of LTIP), potentially lowering retention risk for the founder‑CEO and better tying multi‑year outcomes to equity .
- Change‑of‑Control Economics: Double‑trigger severance raises to 3x base+target (est. $15.3m as of 12/31/24), which is sizable but within common market constructs; 12‑month non‑compete/non‑solicit and clawback provide investor protections .
- Governance: Separate Chair/CEO, majority‑independent board, regular executive sessions, anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging policies, and high say‑on‑pay support governance quality; related‑party oversight exists for the son’s minority interest in a subsidiary JV .
- Ownership Alignment: Brickman’s 4.4% stake is material, creating “skin in the game”; lack of unvested awards at year‑end and periodic option exercises suggest incentive realization is more AIP‑equity driven vs. large unvested overhangs, potentially reducing forced‑sale dynamics from vesting cliffs .