Daniel Deiro
About Daniel Deiro
Senior Vice President, Global Customer Management & General Manager, Japan/Korea at Garrett Motion (GTX) since the 2018 spin‑off; age 52; Automotive Engineering degree from Haute école spécialisée bernoise (BFH‑TI), Biel, Switzerland . Company performance context during his tenure: 2024 net income $282M and Adjusted EBITDA $598M (17.2% margin); adjusted EBIT $485M (14.0% margin); cumulative TSR index value reached 163.88 in 2024 from the April 2021 base of 100 . Management indicated Japan/Korea demand was down significantly in Q1 2024, a region under Deiro’s remit, with FX volatility in KRW/JPY impacting results in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Honeywell Transportation Systems | VP, Customer Management & GM, Japan/Korea | Aug 2014–2018 (pre spin‑off) | Led customer management and regional GM responsibilities for Japan/Korea ahead of Garrett spin‑off . |
| Honeywell Transportation Systems | Senior Customer Management Director | Apr 2012–Aug 2014 | Senior commercial leadership focused on key OEM relationships . |
External Roles
No public company directorships or external board roles disclosed for Deiro in the proxy .
Fixed Compensation
- Detailed base salary, target bonus %, and actual cash bonus for Deiro are not disclosed (he is not a named executive officer in the proxy). Company‑wide executive cash programs are governed by the Short‑Term Incentive Compensation Plan (ICP) with strong pay‑for‑performance design and oversight by the Talent Management & Compensation Committee .
Performance Compensation
Company executive incentive structure (used for NEOs and as the primary framework for executive pay‑for‑performance):
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | 40% | $527 | $620 | $713 | $615 | 97% |
| Adjusted EBITDA Margin (%) | 40% | 14.7% | 16.0% | 17.3% | 17.5% | 200% |
| Adjusted Free Cash Flow Conversion (%) | 20% | 51.0% | 60.0% | 69.0% | 61.0% | 111% |
- Long‑Term Incentive Plan (LTI): 60% PSUs and 40% RSUs; PSUs tied equally to Relative TSR, cumulative Adjusted EBITDA, and cumulative Adjusted EBITDA Margin over a 3‑year period; RSUs vest in three equal annual installments subject to continued service .
- 2025 enhancements: PSU adds a fourth component tied to “New Growth Vectors” (awarded revenue/bookings) to reinforce strategic execution .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging: Directors and executive officers are prohibited from hedging/pledging company stock; policy also bans short sales and derivatives trading by insiders .
- Stock ownership guidelines: For executive officers reporting to the CEO, guideline set to 3x base salary starting 2025; NEOs had 2–5x multiples in 2024; NEOs were in compliance as of 12/31/2024 (Deiro’s specific compliance status not disclosed) .
- Equity events and vesting (Form 4 disclosures for Daniel Deiro):
- 02/22/2024: 46,083 PRSUs certified as earned from the 05/26/2021 grant; 20,738 shares withheld for taxes upon vesting (net issuance reflected); vesting approved 02/15/2024 and effective 02/22/2024 .
- 05/02/2024: Shares withheld by Garrett to satisfy tax liability upon partial vesting of RSUs (share count not specified in summary page) .
- 03/07/2024: RSU grant reported under the 2021 LTI Plan, vesting pursuant to LTI schedules (three equal annual installments) .
- 02/17/2025: Shares withheld to cover taxes upon vesting; transaction reported on Form 4 (XML filing) .
- 05/02/2025: Form 4 indicates a transaction made pursuant to a Rule 10b5‑1 plan (checkbox marked), useful for assessing pre‑planned selling cadence .
| Date | Security | Transaction | Shares (A/D) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 02/22/2024 | Common via PRSU vest | Acquisition; tax withholding | +46,083; −20,738 | PRSUs from 05/26/2021 vest certified and net settled for taxes . |
| 03/07/2024 | RSUs (grant) | Award/Grant | N/A | RSUs under 2021 LTI Plan; LTI RSUs vest in 3 annual tranches . |
| 05/02/2024 | Common via RSU vest | Disposition (F) tax withholding | N/A | Shares withheld to satisfy taxes on RSU vesting . |
| 02/17/2025 | Common via RSU/PSU vest | Disposition (F) tax withholding | N/A | Tax withholding upon vesting; Form 4 XML filing . |
| 05/02/2025 | Common | Transaction under 10b5‑1 plan | N/A | Rule 10b5‑1 checkbox marked on Form 4 . |
Notes: No stock options were granted by Garrett in 2022–2024 (company‑wide); RSU/PSU are the primary equity vehicles .
Employment Terms
- Non‑compete/non‑solicit clauses are standard in Garrett executive agreements (e.g., 2‑year non‑compete and 1‑year non‑solicit provisions disclosed for NEOs; specific terms for Deiro not disclosed) .
- Clawback policy requires recovery of incentive compensation in the event of an accounting restatement that results in overpayment to an executive; policy filed as an exhibit to the 10‑K .
- Change‑in‑control and severance (company policy): Garrett Motion Inc. 2023 Severance Pay Plan for Designated Officers provides 18 months’ base salary (24 months for CEO), prorated annual bonus, and benefits upon involuntary termination without cause; and enhanced cash severance (base + 1.5x target bonus; CEO 2x) on double‑trigger post‑CIC; unvested RSUs and PSUs accelerate on qualifying CIC terminations (subject to award continuation/assumption) .
Performance & Track Record
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Income ($M) | 390 | 261 | 282 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | 570 | 635 | 598 |
| Cumulative TSR Index (Apr 2021=100) | 138.29 | 175.50 | 163.88 |
- 2024 operational highlights: strong win rate (>50%) across light vehicle turbo awards; progress in zero‑emission solutions with Gen3 fuel cell compressors launching in 2025 and electric powertrain launches targeted for 2027; $296M share repurchases in 2024 and planned $50M dividends plus up to $250M buybacks in 2025 .
- Regional demand/FX context relevant to Deiro’s remit: Japan/Korea weakness in Q1 2024; FX pressure in JPY/KRW/CNY during 2024; Europe production softness; China recovery mixed amid price competition .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Increased equity‑based at‑risk pay for executives with PSUs linked to EBITDA, margin, and TSR aligns incentives to profitable growth and shareholder returns; anti‑hedging/pledging strengthens alignment .
- 2025 PSU addition of New Growth Vectors raises performance complexity; focus on booked revenue/awards reduces pure market beta reliance from TSR and ties more directly to commercial execution .
- No option repricing; plans prohibit exchanges of underwater options without shareholder approval; no excise tax gross‑ups; double‑trigger CIC only—shareholder‑friendly governance .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Pledging/Hedging: Prohibited for executive officers (mitigates misalignment risk) .
- Form 4 tax‑withholding dispositions: Recurring around February/March and early May (RSU/PRSU vest cycles), which can cause mechanical insider “sales” for tax only; monitor 10b5‑1 plan checkboxes for pre‑planned activity .
- Say‑on‑pay remained strong (98% approval in 2024), reducing governance overhang on compensation programs .
Equity Ownership & Insider Selling Pressure
- Vested vs unvested: PRSU cycle from 2021 grant vested in Feb 2024; LTI RSUs generally vest in three equal annual tranches, implying ongoing vest dates and periodic tax‑withholding sales; counts disclosed for 02/22/2024 event (46,083 earned; 20,738 withheld) .
- Shares pledged: None—policy prohibits pledging by executive officers .
- Ownership guidelines: 3x base salary multiple for CEO‑direct reports from 2025; retention policy requires retaining at least 50% of net shares until guideline met .
Employment Terms (Severance & CIC Economics)
- Company Severance Plan (Designated Officers): 18 months base salary, prorated bonus, continued benefits; on double‑trigger CIC, cash severance rises to base + 1.5x target bonus (CEO 2x), with RSU/PSU acceleration if awards are not assumed by the acquirer (PSUs deemed at 100% for non‑TSR metrics; TSR hurdles equitably adjusted) .
- Non‑compete/non‑solicit: Two‑year non‑compete and one‑year non‑solicit provisions are standard in executive agreements (examples shown for NEOs) .
- Clawback: Mandatory recovery of incentive compensation upon qualifying restatements .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Deiro’s compensation mix emphasizes RSUs/PSUs under strict anti‑pledging/hedging rules and stock ownership guidelines—positive alignment signals; PSUs tie compensation to EBITDA, margin, and TSR (now supplemented by New Growth Vectors), supporting pay‑for‑performance .
- Trading signals: Expect mechanical Form 4 “F” dispositions around scheduled vesting dates (Feb/March; May), plus potential 10b5‑1 activity—watch for pattern consistency and any open‑market sales; Feb 2024 PRSU vest and multiple tax‑withholding events confirm cadence .
- Retention risk: Company severance and CIC protections for designated officers mitigate attrition risk in strategic roles; RSU/PSU multi‑year vesting promotes retention in customer management roles across Japan/Korea .
- Execution risk: Regional demand softness and FX volatility in Japan/Korea create operational hurdles under Deiro’s remit; however, Garrett’s diversified portfolio, strong variable cost discipline, and >50% win rate in core turbo temper regional weaknesses .