Stephanie Holzhauser
Senior Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer at HAL
Executive
About Stephanie Holzhauser
Stephanie S. Holzhauser is Senior Vice President and Chief Accounting Officer (CAO) of Halliburton, appointed effective July 16, 2025; she serves as Halliburton’s principal accounting officer and is age 45 . She holds a bachelor’s and master’s degree in accounting from Louisiana State University and has over 20 years at Halliburton in finance and accounting roles across external reporting, technical accounting, Completion & Production, and Drilling & Evaluation; most recently Vice President of Operations Finance . Company performance context relevant to executive incentives: 2024 net income was $2,516 million, ROCE was 16.1%, and the value of a $100 investment in Halliburton (TSR) was $120.56; the company returned $1.6 billion to shareholders and generated over $2.6 billion in free cash flow in 2024 . She executed an 8‑K as SVP & CAO on October 21, 2025, evidencing operational responsibility .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Halliburton Company | Vice President, Operations Finance | Apr 2023 – Jul 2025 | Led operations finance encompassing hemispheres, divisions, and FP&A teams |
| Halliburton Company | Vice President of Finance, Western Hemisphere | Sep 2021 – Apr 2023 | Senior finance leadership across Western Hemisphere operations |
| Halliburton Company | Senior Director of Finance, Global Business Lines | 2016 – Sep 2021 | Finance leadership for global business lines |
| Halliburton Company | External Reporting & Technical Accounting roles; Completion & Production, Drilling & Evaluation | 2004 – 2016 | Progressively senior roles in reporting and technical accounting; divisional finance experience |
| Halliburton Company | Associate Accountant; Intern | 2004 start | Early career entry and development in Halliburton finance |
External Roles
No external directorships or outside roles were mentioned in the July 14, 2025 8‑K or press release .
Fixed Compensation
| Element | Value |
|---|---|
| Minimum Annual Base Salary ($) | $450,000 |
- Plan participation: Annual Performance Pay Plan, Performance Unit Program, and Stock & Incentive Plan .
- Indemnification agreement: Form generally provided to executive officers, effective July 16, 2025 .
- Target bonus percentage for Ms. Holzhauser was not disclosed in filings reviewed; NEO targets (for context) range from 100% to 150% of base depending on role, with a 2× maximum, but these were for the 2024 NEO group and not specific to the CAO .
Performance Compensation
Annual Performance Pay Plan Structure (2024 plan year)
| Category | Measure | Weight | 2024 Goal | Actual | Payout Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial | Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) | 60% | $3.192B | $2.979B | Contributed to below‑target payout |
| Financial | Asset Turns | 20% | 1.811 | 1.755 | Contributed to below‑target payout |
| Non‑Financial | Sustainability (GHG and strategic initiatives) | 10% | Achieve defined objectives | Achieved | Positive modifier |
| Non‑Financial | Our People (talent goals) | 10% | Achieve defined objectives | Achieved | Positive modifier |
| Result | Overall Annual Plan Payout | — | — | — | 50% of target for 2024 NEOs (plan results context) |
- Annual plan design: 80% financial metrics (60% NOPAT, 20% Asset Turns) and 20% non‑financial strategic metrics .
- Threshold/Target/Max opportunities for NEOs (context): CEO 48%/150%/300%; CFO and other NEOs 32–35%/100–110%/200–220% of base; these figures were for the 2024 NEO group and not specific to CAO .
Performance Unit Program (PUP) – 2024 cycle design (context)
| Metric | Target | TSR Modifier | Payout Mechanics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relative ROCE vs Performance Peer Group | 55th percentile for target payout | ±25% based on TSR vs OSX (upper quartile 125%, lower quartile 75%) | Payouts interpolated by percentile; capped at target if HAL’s three‑year average ROCE is negative |
- 2024 PUP award mix for NEOs: 70% performance units (half stock/half cash) + 30% restricted stock; options not used since 2020 .
Equity Award Vesting Terms (context)
| Award Type | Vesting | Dividends | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Restricted Stock | Graded 20% per year over five years | Paid quarterly at common dividend rate during vesting | Forfeiture risk if termination/unapproved early retirement |
| Performance Shares | 3‑year performance period | Dividends accrued and paid in cash only upon share delivery | Priced at grant FMV |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership requirements for executive officers: CEO 6× salary; CEO direct reports 3×; all other executive officers 2×; five‑year compliance window; retention of 100% net shares until compliant; exercise‑and‑hold for options if not compliant .
- Hedging and pledging policy: Directors and executive officers prohibited from hedging Halliburton securities and from pledging them as collateral; discourages speculative derivatives (puts/calls); applies to all Halliburton securities, whether or not acquired via plans .
- Options policy: No annual stock option awards since 2020; no repricing or timing of grants around MNPI .
- Beneficial ownership, vested/unvested breakdown, pledged shares for Ms. Holzhauser were not disclosed in the reviewed filings.
Employment Terms
| Term | Key Provision |
|---|---|
| Appointment & Role | Appointed SVP & CAO effective July 16, 2025; principal accounting officer |
| Base Salary | Minimum annual base salary $450,000 |
| Incentive Eligibility | Participation in Annual Performance Pay Plan, Performance Unit Program, Stock & Incentive Plan |
| Severance | “Consistent with other executive officers”; per employment agreements for NEOs: lump sum equal to two years of base salary if terminated without cause or for good reason; restrictions on restricted stock/units lapse on certain terminations |
| Change‑in‑Control | Double‑trigger vesting under Stock & Incentive Plan for Qualifying Termination; options/SARs become immediately vested; restricted stock restrictions lapse; performance awards paid at target; cash awards vest and are paid; similar provisions in Annual Plan and PUP for Qualifying Terminations; no individual CIC agreements; no excise tax gross‑ups |
| Indemnification | Indemnification agreement in form generally provided to executive officers, effective July 16, 2025 |
| Clawbacks | SEC/NYSE restatement‑based clawback for executive officers covering prior three years; supplementary recoupment policy for fiduciary/code violations and supervisory failures; no indemnification against clawback losses |
| Non‑Compete/Non‑Solicit | Employment agreements include substantial non‑compete and non‑solicitation provisions post separation (NEO agreements context) |
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/pledging prohibited for executive officers (alignment positive) .
- No excise tax gross‑ups on change‑in‑control payments (shareholder‑friendly) .
- Related party disclosure: Ms. Holzhauser’s brother, Phillip Spoelker, employed in a non‑executive role; received ~$240,000 compensation from Jan 1, 2024 through Jun 30, 2025; compensation set per standard practices .
- 2024 say‑on‑pay support ~97% (program support signal) .
- Options not used since 2020 (reduces incentive to time MNPI; lowers near‑term selling pressure tied to option exercises) .
Compensation Peer Group (PUP context)
- ROCE peer group for PUP (unchanged from 2023): Apache, Baker Hughes, Chesapeake, Devon, Hess, Marathon Oil, Murphy Oil, Nabors, NOV, SLB, TechnipFMC, Transocean, Weatherford, The Williams Companies; TSR modifier benchmarked to OSX constituents .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 say‑on‑pay approval approximately 97%, following shareholder outreach and program structure emphasizing ROCE, NOPAT, asset turns, and strategic metrics .
Investment Implications
- Compensation alignment: Base salary ($450k) paired with participation in performance‑based annual and long‑term plans anchored on NOPAT, asset turns, relative ROCE, and TSR suggests strong pay‑for‑performance linkage; clawbacks and anti‑hedging/pledging policies further align interests .
- Vesting and selling pressure: Restricted stock vests 20% annually over five years and performance shares over three years; options not used since 2020, implying gradual vest‑driven liquidity rather than large option‑exercise events—lower near‑term forced‑selling risk for a newly appointed CAO .
- Ownership requirements: Executive stock ownership guidelines (2×–3× salary depending on reporting line) with five‑year compliance create incremental share accumulation; retention rules force holding until compliant—positive for alignment but could reduce liquidity flexibility in early tenure .
- Retention and transition: Employment terms with 2× salary severance (NEO agreement context) and double‑trigger CIC vesting balance retention with moderate CIC cost; robust non‑compete/non‑solicit reduce transition risk; indemnification standard for executives .
- Monitoring items: Related party employment disclosure (brother’s compensation) does not indicate governance concern on its face but merits routine monitoring; continued validation of accounting leadership via signed filings (e.g., 8‑K signature) supports execution confidence .