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Alfred M. Rankin, Jr.

Non-Executive Chairman of the Board at Hamilton Beach Brands Holding
Board

About Alfred M. Rankin, Jr.

Alfred M. Rankin, Jr. (age 83) has served on HBB’s board since 2017 and is the Non-Executive Chairman of Hamilton Beach Brands Holding Company and its principal subsidiary; he previously served as Executive Chairman of the Company . He has over 50 years of board and senior management experience at NACCO and Hyster-Yale, including recent service as Executive Chairman of Hyster-Yale and Non-Executive Chairman of NACCO, and brings long-tenured strategic oversight and public company governance experience; he is not classified as an independent director at HBB .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleTenureCommittees/Impact
HBB (Hamilton Beach Brands Holding Company)Executive Chairman → Non-Executive ChairmanExecutive Chairman prior to 2019; Non-Executive Chairman since 1/1/2019Leads strategic and board oversight; facilitates information flow between board and management
Hyster-YaleChairman, President & CEO → Chairman & CEO → Executive ChairmanPrior to 2020–2/2021; 2/2021–5/2023; 5/2023–presentIndustrial operating and board leadership; capital allocation and long-term strategy
NACCO & NACCO Natural ResourcesChairman, President & CEO → Non-Executive ChairmanPrior to 2020–2018; Non-Executive Chairman since prior to 2020Resource sector governance experience; former parent of HBB provides deep knowledge of HBB

External Roles

OrganizationRoleCurrent/PriorNotes
Hyster-YaleExecutive Chairman; Chairman of Hyster-Yale Materials Handling, Inc.CurrentIndustrial manufacturing leadership and board governance
NACCONon-Executive ChairmanCurrentNatural resources governance; prior CEO/Chair
Federal Reserve Bank of ClevelandDirector (prior service)PriorBrings macro/financial oversight perspective

Board Governance

  • Board leadership: HBB separates CEO and Chairman roles; Rankin serves as Non-Executive Chairman, focusing on strategic oversight, board governance, and consultation to management .
  • Independence: HBB may qualify as a “controlled company” due to Taplin/Rankin family holdings but elects not to use NYSE controlled company exemptions; nonetheless, Rankin is not classified as independent .
  • Committees: Rankin chairs the Planning Advisory Committee and the Executive Committee; he is not a member of the Audit Review, Compensation & Human Capital, or NCG committees .
  • Committee meetings (2024): Audit Review (5), Compensation & Human Capital (6), NCG (4), Planning Advisory (4), Executive (0) .
  • Attendance and engagement: Board held 4 meetings in 2024; all directors met at least 75% attendance at board and committee meetings; non-management directors hold regular executive sessions typically after each board meeting, with the Non-Executive Chairman presiding .

Fixed Compensation

Component2024 AmountDetails
Cash fees$120,027Quarterly cash retainers and committee fees; no meeting fees
Stock awards (transfer-restricted Class A)$152,381Mandatory equity portion of retainer paid in fully vested, transfer-restricted shares; 10-year holding period generally applies
Consulting fee$500,000Separate consulting agreement at $41,666.67 per month; auto-renews annually; renewed for 2025 (Audit Review and Compensation & Human Capital Committees approved)
Insurance and other$1,442Company-paid life, accidental death/dismemberment, and (for some directors) personal excess liability; charitable matching not listed for Rankin in 2024
Total 2024$773,850Sum of cash, stock, consulting, and other

Program structure highlights:

  • Non-Executive Chairman retainer: $250,000 annually, with $150,000 required in transfer-restricted Class A shares; plus committee retainers ($5,000 per committee; $10,000 for Planning Advisory Chair) .
  • Director equity is fully vested at grant but generally subject to 10-year transfer restrictions; prohibition on hedging and pledging applies, with limited exceptions and consent requirements .

Performance Compensation

FeatureDisclosureNotes
Performance-based equity or optionsNone disclosed for directorsHBB does not sponsor a stock option plan; directors receive mandatory equity as part of retainer, not performance-conditioned awards
Director incentive metricsNot applicableNo director performance metrics (e.g., TSR, EBITDA) tied to director pay disclosed; director equity is subject to long holding periods to align interests

Other Directorships & Interlocks

EntityTypeRolePotential Interlock/Conflict Considerations
Hyster-YalePublic companyExecutive ChairmanIndustrial overlap and historical relationships; no specific related-party transactions with HBB disclosed
NACCOPublic companyNon-Executive ChairmanFormer parent of HBB; several HBB directors have NACCO/Hyster-Yale ties, increasing network interlocks
  • Family relationships on HBB board: Rankin is brother of Thomas T. Rankin, father of Clara R. Williams, and father-in-law of J.C. Butler, Jr.; these directors received standard HBB director compensation in 2024 .
  • Controlled voting block: Combined holdings by Rankin/Butler/Williams/Thomas T. Rankin equal 12.19% of Class A, 83.05% of Class B, representing 69.34% of combined voting power of Class A and Class B as of record date .

Expertise & Qualifications

  • Deep operating and governance experience across industrial and natural resources sectors with over 50 years in NACCO/Hyster-Yale leadership; long-term stockholder perspective .
  • Board leadership experience and prior oversight roles at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; strong public company governance credentials .
  • As Non-Executive Chairman, facilitates board focus on strategic goals and risk, supports information flow with management, and advises on significant business matters .

Equity Ownership

SecurityShares Beneficially Owned% of ClassOwnership Notes
Class A Common452,411 (441,335 sole; 11,076 shared) 4.44% Transfer-restricted shares from director plan; 10-year holding; hedging/pledging restrictions apply
Class B Common2,832,122 (78,855 sole; 2,753,267 shared via Rankin Associates HBB, L.P. group) 78.65% Group beneficial ownership via Rankin Management, Inc. and trusts; Rankin disclaims beneficial ownership beyond his pecuniary interest; subject to stockholders’ agreement
Group holdings (Rankin/Butler/Williams/Thomas T. Rankin)Class A: 1,241,099; Class B: 2,990,700 Class A: 12.19%; Class B: 83.05% Together represent 69.34% of combined voting power

Policies affecting alignment:

  • Directors’ equity awards are fully vested but subject to long holding periods; prohibition on hedging and pledging without consent; insider trading controls are in place .

Governance Assessment

  • Strengths: Separation of Chair/CEO roles with a seasoned Non-Executive Chairman; majority-independent board and fully independent Audit, Compensation & Human Capital, and NCG committees despite controlled company status; regular executive sessions and active committee oversight of risk, cybersecurity, compensation, and governance .
  • Risks/RED FLAGS:
    • Not independent: Rankin is classified as non-independent; absence of a Lead Independent Director could dilute independent oversight .
    • Family interlocks: Immediate family members (Thomas T. Rankin, Clara R. Williams, J.C. Butler, Jr.) serve on the board, increasing potential for related-party and governance conflicts; Audit Review Committee oversees and approves related-person transactions .
    • Consulting arrangement: $500,000 annual consulting fee in addition to chairman compensation; auto-renewing contract; approved by Audit Review and Compensation committees—appropriate oversight disclosed, but investors may view dual roles and fees as a conflict risk signal .
    • Concentrated voting power: Taplin/Rankin group control of Class B shares yields 69.34% combined voting power—limits minority influence; stockholders’ agreement governs transfer and conversion rights for Class B .
    • No stock options and long holding lock-ups align interests but reduce flexibility; however, director equity is not performance-conditioned .

Overall, Rankin’s extensive experience and structured committee oversight support board effectiveness, but independence concerns, family interlocks, and a substantial consulting arrangement present governance optics that investors should monitor alongside the controlled voting structure and absence of a lead independent director .