Brian Grass
About Brian Grass
Brian L. Grass, age 55, is Interim Chief Executive Officer of Helen of Troy (appointed May 2, 2025) after serving as CFO from 2014–2021, rejoining as Interim CFO in April 2023 and CFO in September 2023; prior roles include seven years in public accounting at KPMG LLP and six years in financial leadership at Tenet Healthcare Corporation . Company FY2025 performance: net sales $1,907.7M, operating income $142.7M, net income $123.8M, diluted EPS $5.37; adjusted EBITDA $289.3M, adjusted operating income $252.3M, adjusted diluted EPS $7.17 . Pay-for-performance alignment was tight in FY2025: no annual or long-term incentive payouts were earned, reflecting results; say‑on‑pay support was >91% in 2024 . Long‑term incentive for the FY2023 grant (performance period FY2023–FY2025) paid 0% (cumulative adjusted diluted EPS 25.53 vs 42.52 target; relative TSR below threshold) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Helen of Troy Limited | Interim CEO | 2025–present | Transition leadership; severance updated to full vesting on eligible awards under certain terminations |
| Helen of Troy Limited | CFO (first tenure) | 2014–2021 | Led finance; later retired |
| Helen of Troy Limited | Interim CFO → CFO (second tenure) | 2023–2025 | Assumed investor relations, M&A and operational duties; base salary increased accordingly |
| Helen of Troy Limited | Assistant CFO | pre-2014 | Finance leadership progression |
| Tenet Healthcare Corporation | Various financial leadership roles | ~6 years | Corporate finance leadership |
| KPMG LLP | Public accounting | ~7 years | Audit and accounting foundation |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | FY2025 (CFO) | FY2026 (Interim CEO) |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 635,100 | 1,000,000 (for the longer of interim tenure or six months) |
| Target Annual Bonus (% of salary) | 90% (increased from 85%) | 125% |
| Actual Annual Bonus Paid ($) | 0 (no payout) | |
| Target LTI Grant Value ($) | 1,900,000 (mix: 50% performance RSAs, 50% time‑vested RSAs) | 3,800,000 (mix: 50% performance RSAs, 50% time‑vested RSAs) |
| One‑Time Equity Award | — | $1,000,000 RS award; vests at 12 months from grant |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Framework and Results (FY2025)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted Income ($) | 80% | 197.4M | 232.2M | 255.5M | 162.4M (69.9% of target) | 0% (threshold not achieved) |
| Net Sales ($) | 20% | 1.762B | 2.073B | 2.280B | 1.88B (90.9% of target) | 0% (no payout due to adjusted income threshold) |
Notes:
- No FY2025 annual incentive payouts were made to NEOs .
Long‑Term Incentive—FY2023 Grant Results (Performance period ended Feb 28, 2025)
| Metric | Weighting | Threshold | Target | Max | Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cumulative Adjusted Diluted EPS | 50% | 39.73 | 42.52 | 45.49 | 25.53 (60% of target) | 0% |
| Relative TSR | 50% | ≥35th percentile (threshold) | 50th percentile (target) | 75th percentile (max) | Below threshold | 0% |
Long‑Term Incentive—FY2025 Grant Design (Performance period FY2025–FY2027)
| Metric | Weighting | Design Details |
|---|---|---|
| Cumulative Adjusted Diluted EPS | 40% | Sum of adjusted diluted EPS across FY2025–FY2027; adjusted income definition consistent with AIP; acquisitions included for LTI measurement |
| Adjusted Cash Flow Productivity | 20% | Defined formula aligning cash generation with investment efficiency; capex adjustment limit $35M for new facilities per year (excluding M&A facilities) |
| Relative TSR | 40% | Vesting scale: 25th percentile=50%, 50th=100%, 75th=200%; below 25th=0% |
Brian Grass FY2025 Performance RSAs share schedule (grant date 3/1/2024):
| Shares | Threshold (#) | Target (#) | Max (#) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Performance RSAs (Grass) | 3,819 | 7,638 | 15,276 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 32,562 shares; <1% of shares outstanding (base denominator 22,944,220 as of May 15, 2025) |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | CEO 4x salary, CFO 2x salary, CLO 1x salary; NEOs are in compliance |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited; none of the Directors/NEOs have pledging/hedging arrangements |
| Options | No options granted/held in FY2025; company does not currently grant options |
| FY2025 Vesting Realized | 1,259 shares vested; $91,173 value realized (Grass) |
Unvested Awards at FY2025 Year‑End (Feb 28, 2025):
| Award Type | Shares Unvested | Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Time‑vested RSAs (vest equally Mar 1, 2025/26/27) | 7,638 | 420,319 |
| Time‑vested RSAs (vest Oct 5, 2025/Oct 5, 2026) | 2,159 | 118,810 |
| Performance RSAs (performance period ends Feb 28, 2026; at target for disclosure) | 3,222 | 177,307 |
| Performance RSAs (performance period ends Feb 28, 2027; at target for disclosure) | 7,638 | 420,319 |
Employment Terms
| Triggering Event | Cash Severance | Equity Treatment | Health Benefits | Total Illustrative Payout ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Death | Third‑party life insurance $750,000 | — | — | 750,000 |
| Disability | Third‑party disability benefits up to $2,908,600 | — | — | 2,908,600 |
| Retirement | Continued vesting of performance RSAs based on actual performance; pro‑rata vesting of time‑vested RSAs; COBRA up to 18 months | Performance RSAs $597,626; Time RSAs $325,624 | $51,738 | 974,988 |
| Termination for Good Reason or Without Cause (not in connection with CoC) | 1× salary + 1× target bonus (paid over 24 months) | Pro‑rata performance RSAs based on actual performance $221,610; pro‑rata time RSAs $325,624 | $34,492 (COBRA up to 12 months) | 1,788,416 |
| Termination for Good Reason or Without Cause (in connection with CoC) | 1.5× salary + 1.5× target bonus (lump sum within 75 days) | Accelerated vesting at target for performance RSAs $597,626; full vest of time‑vested RSAs $539,129 | $51,738 (COBRA up to 18 months) | 2,998,528 |
Additional terms:
- Equity awards under 2018 Stock Plan use double‑trigger change‑of‑control acceleration when awards are assumed; single‑trigger acceleration applies only if awards are not assumed/substituted in a CoC .
- On May 2, 2025, Grass’s severance agreement was amended to provide continued and full vesting (instead of pro‑rata) of eligible time‑vested and performance‑vested restricted stock awards upon certain terminations not in connection with change of control .
Compensation & Ownership Trend (Multi‑Year Snapshot)
| Component | FY2024 (CFO) | FY2025 (CFO) |
|---|---|---|
| Salary ($) | 1,603,846 | 635,100 |
| Stock Awards ($) | 1,140,000 | 1,900,000 |
| Non‑Equity Incentive ($) | 164,632 | — (no payout) |
| All Other Compensation ($) | 1,858 | 2,255 |
| Total ($) | 2,910,336 | 2,537,355 |
Governance, Red Flags, and Controls
- Clawback policy compliant with SEC/NASDAQ; recovery of erroneously awarded incentive‑based compensation for three prior fiscal years in event of restatement .
- Insider trading policy prohibits pledging/margin loans, hedging, short‑selling, and requires pre‑clearance/open‑window trading; none currently have pledging/hedging arrangements .
- No reportable related‑party transactions for FY2025 (other than interim CFO’s pre‑appointment consulting) .
- Annual say‑on‑pay vote support exceeded 91% in 2024; no in‑flight changes or discretionary increases to FY2025 incentives .
Investment Implications
- Strong pay-for-performance discipline: zero FY2025 annual and LTI payouts amid below-threshold adjusted income and relative TSR performance, signaling compensation alignment and limited risk of windfall payouts in weak operating environments .
- Upcoming vesting cadence and one‑time $1,000,000 interim‑CEO RS award (12‑month vest) create identifiable dates for potential supply from vest‑related sales; anti‑pledging/hedging policies and ownership guidelines mitigate adverse alignment risks .
- Severance economics (1–1.5× salary+bonus, equity acceleration on CoC) and May 2025 amendment (full vesting upon certain non‑CoC terminations) enhance retention but elevate change‑in‑control incentive alignment; double‑trigger structure limits automatic acceleration when awards are assumed .
- Ownership is modest (<1%); unvested equity provides performance‑linked upside; FY2025 net sales and adjusted EPS underscore operational base while Elevate for Growth/Project Pegasus initiatives aim to drive future margin/cash flow—key to EPS and cash‑productivity LTI metrics .