
Jon Michael Adinolfi
About Jon Michael Adinolfi
Jon Michael Adinolfi, age 49, is Hillman’s President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and a director, roles he has held since January 1, 2025; he previously served as Chief Operating Officer (June 2023–Dec 2024) and Divisional President, Hillman U.S. (2019–2023) . He brings operating, retail, and finance expertise from prior leadership roles at Stanley Black & Decker (President U.S. Retail; President Hand Tools; CFO North America, CDIY) and Crown Bolt . Company pay-versus-performance disclosures show Adjusted EBITDA of $241.8M in 2024 (vs. $219.4M in 2023), and cumulative TSR of $98.70 (base $100), contextualizing performance into his CEO transition year .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hillman Solutions Corp. | President & CEO | 2025–present | Promoted from COO to lead the company; appointed to the Board . |
| Hillman Solutions Corp. | Chief Operating Officer | 2023–2024 | Enterprise operations leadership preceding CEO transition . |
| Hillman Solutions Corp. | Divisional President, Hillman U.S. | 2019–2023 | Led U.S. business since joining Hillman in 2019 . |
| Stanley Black & Decker | President, U.S. Retail | 2016–2019 | Led U.S. retail channel . |
| Stanley Black & Decker | President, Hand Tools | 2013–2016 | Led Hand Tools business . |
| Stanley Black & Decker | CFO, North America, CDIY | 2011–2013 | Finance leadership in consumer DIY . |
| Crown Bolt | President | 2008–2011 | Led fasteners/hardware supplier (Home Depot channel) . |
External Roles
- No current external public company directorships or committee roles disclosed for Mr. Adinolfi in the proxy biography .
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 400,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | 60% | 60% | 60% |
- 2025 updates: Base salary increased to $700,000 effective with CEO role; target bonus increased to 100% of base salary .
Performance Compensation
- Annual bonus framework (2024): Metrics and weights were Adjusted EBITDA (70%) and Adjusted Leverage Ratio (30%); payout scale 50% at threshold, 100% at target, 200% at maximum .
| 2024 Bonus Metric | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Actual (Reported) | Committee-Adjusted | Payout Factor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA ($000s) | 70% | 219,400 | 235,000 | 260,000 | 241,753 | 248,000 | 152.0% |
| Adjusted Leverage Ratio (x) | 30% | 3.3 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 179.5% |
- Notes: Committee excluded impact of True Value bankruptcy write-off and Intex DIY acquisition for compensation purposes, raising Adjusted EBITDA by $6.2M and improving leverage by 0.2x for payout determination .
| 2024 Bonus Outcome (Adinolfi) | Target ($) | Calculated Payout ($) | % of Target | Discretionary Adj. | Paid ($) | % of Target |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive | 300,000 | 480,900 | 160.3% | — | 480,900 | 160.3% |
- Long-term incentives:
- 2024: Awarded RSUs (38,148 shares; cliff vest at 3 years) and stock options (82,464; 10-year term; 25% per year over 4 years; $9.83 strike) .
- 2025: Shifted to performance stock units (PSUs) using ROIC as the performance metric; mix is 50% PSUs / 50% RSUs for NEOs (including CEO) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership, April 1, 2025:
- Total shares beneficially owned: 960,199; less than 1% of outstanding .
- Options exercisable within 60 days: 679,947 (included in beneficial ownership); RSUs within 60 days: none .
- None of the reported shares are pledged; insider policy prohibits pledging/hedging/short sales by directors and executive officers .
| Ownership Detail (as of 4/1/2025) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership (#) | 960,199 |
| Percent of Class | <1% |
| Options exercisable within 60 days (#) | 679,947 |
| RSUs within 60 days (#) | — |
| Shares pledged | None |
- Outstanding equity at 12/28/2024 (CEO-specific):
- Options: multiple grants outstanding; selected details below.
- RSUs: vesting mostly on the 3rd anniversary; one large 6/7/2023 grant vests 50%/25%/25%.
| Instrument | Grant Date | Status (Exercisable / Unexercisable) | Shares (#) | Strike | Expiration | Unvested RSUs (#) | RSU Market Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Stock Option | 7/15/2019 | Exercisable | 197,790 | 8.50 | 7/15/2029 | — | — |
| Stock Option | 7/30/2020 | Exercisable | 218,393 | 7.89 | 7/20/2030 | — | — |
| Stock Option | 1/22/2021 | Exer./Unexer. | 109,856 / 36,619 | 10.00 | 1/22/2031 | — | — |
| Stock Option | 1/11/2022 | Exer./Unexer. | 34,204 / 34,204 | 9.94 | 1/10/2032 | — | — |
| Stock Option | 3/7/2023 | Exer./Unexer. | 20,073 / 60,222 | 8.77 | 3/7/2033 | — | — |
| Stock Option | 6/7/2023 | Exer./Unexer. | 5,220 / 15,662 | 8.59 | 6/7/2033 | — | — |
| Stock Option | 3/7/2024 | Unexercisable | 82,464 | 9.83 | 3/7/2034 | — | — |
| RSU | 1/11/2022 | Unvested | — | — | — | 22,635 | 221,823 |
| RSU | 3/7/2023 | Unvested | — | — | — | 34,207 | 335,229 |
| RSU | 6/7/2023 | Unvested | — | — | — | 291,036 | 2,852,153 |
| RSU | 6/7/2023 | Unvested | — | — | — | 8,731 | 85,564 |
| RSU | 3/7/2024 | Unvested | — | — | — | 38,148 | 373,850 |
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Upcoming vesting and potential selling pressure (from award terms):
- Options granted in 2024 vest 25% per year starting 3/7/2025; earlier option grants follow 4-year ratable vesting from grant anniversary .
- RSUs generally vest 100% on the 3rd anniversary of grant; the 6/7/2023 291,036 RSU grant vests 50% on 6/7/2026, 25% on 6/7/2027, 25% on 6/7/2028, subject to service . The 1/11/2022 RSUs were scheduled to vest on 1/11/2025 .
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Stock ownership guidelines: CEO must hold shares equal to 5x base salary; achievement required within five years of designation (for CEO Adinolfi, five years from 2025) . For context, the 2025 CEO base is $700,000, implying a guideline value of $3.5 million based on policy multiples .
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Hedging/pledging: Prohibited by insider trading policy; company enforces equity grant timing policy to avoid spring-loading optics .
Employment Terms
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Executive Severance Plan (effective Nov 2, 2023): In connection with the 2025 CEO transition, Mr. Adinolfi receives the same enhanced benefits that previously applied to the CEO (Mr. Cahill) .
- Termination without Cause / Good Reason (no CIC, or >24 months post-CIC): 18 months base salary continuation; 150% of target bonus paid over 18 months (CEO level); company-paid COBRA for 18 months; pro-rated bonus for year of termination based on actual results .
- Termination without Cause / Good Reason within 24 months after a Change in Control: 24 months base salary continuation; 200% of target bonus paid over 24 months (CEO level); company-paid COBRA for 24 months; pro-rated bonus for year of termination based on actual results .
- “Good reason” includes material diminution of duties, relocation >50 miles, or reduction in salary/bonus (with cure period) .
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Equity upon Change in Control: 2021 Equity Incentive Plan awards have no mandatory acceleration; the committee may accelerate at its discretion. Performance-based options under the 2014 plan vest if the transaction triggers achievement of performance conditions; time-based options under 2014 have largely fully vested due to elapsed schedules .
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Clawback: Compensation Recovery Policy adopted and filed as Exhibit 97 to 10-K (recoupment upon restatement) .
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Perquisites: Car allowance $700 per month included in “All Other Compensation” disclosures .
Board Governance
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Board service: Director since 2025; nominee for a term expiring in 2026 under the ongoing declassification plan (Board to be fully declassified by 2027) . As an employee-director, he is not considered independent under Nasdaq/SEC definitions; committees are composed exclusively of independent directors .
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Leadership structure and dual-role implications:
- CEO and Chairman roles are separated: Douglas J. Cahill is Executive Chairman; Daniel O’Leary is Lead Independent Director with defined authorities (agenda-setting, executive sessions, liaison) .
- This separation, independent committees, and LID oversight mitigate typical CEO+director dual-role independence concerns .
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Committee assignments and director pay:
- Mr. Adinolfi is not listed on Audit, Compensation, or Nominating & ESG committees (all independent) .
- Employee-directors do not receive additional director cash/equity compensation beyond their employee pay .
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Board attendance: In 2024, each director attended at least 75% of Board/committee meetings; all directors attended the 2024 Annual Meeting (contextual governance quality metric) .
Multi‑Year Compensation (NEO disclosure)
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Option Awards ($) | Non‑Equity Incentive ($) | All Other ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 500,000 | 374,995 | 374,997 | 480,900 | 18,811 | 1,749,703 |
| 2023 | 446,154 | 2,874,993 | 374,996 | 267,192 | 43,023 | 4,006,358 |
| 2022 | 400,000 | 224,992 | 224,778 | 35,246 | 8,308 | 893,324 |
- 2024 “All Other” detail (401k match, car allowance, insurance): $18,811 total for Mr. Adinolfi (including $10,141 401(k) match; $8,400 car allowance; $270 life insurance) .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Pay mix evolving toward performance equity: 2025 awards move from options-heavy to 50% PSUs (ROIC metric) and 50% RSUs—greater direct linkage to capital efficiency and multi-year performance vs. share-price convexity of options .
- Annual bonus design anchored to deleveraging and profitability: 2024 weighting favored Adjusted EBITDA (70%) and Adjusted Leverage Ratio (30%) with upside to 200% of target .
- Use of discretion: The Compensation Committee excluded one-time True Value bankruptcy write-off and unplanned M&A (Intex DIY) impacts in 2024, increasing bonus payouts (CEO paid 160.3% of target). While arguably reasonable, this introduces discretion risk if repeated .
- Governance safeguards: No tax gross-ups under the 2021 plan; explicit anti-repricing without shareholder approval; clawback policy in place; prohibition on hedging/pledging .
Compensation Peer Group (used for 2024 decisions)
Peer set includes: Allegion, American Woodmark, Armstrong World Industries, Dorman Products, Floor & Decor, Gibraltar Industries, Griffon, JELD‑WEN, Leslie’s, Lumber Liquidators, Masonite, PGT Innovations, Pool, Richelieu Hardware, Simpson Manufacturing, SiteOne, Spectrum Brands, The AZEK Company, Trex, YETI. Hillman’s net sales ranked ~32nd percentile and market cap ~21st percentile within the peer set; no fixed target percentile used for pay positioning .
Related Party Transactions and Risk Indicators
- Related party transactions disclosed involved sales to Ollie’s Bargain Outlet ($0.6M in 2024) due to a director’s executive role there; no related transactions were disclosed involving Mr. Adinolfi personally .
- Section 16 compliance: All applicable insider ownership reports believed timely for 2024 .
- Option/RSU repricing: Prohibited without shareholder approval; equity plan reflects “good governance” practices .
Board Service Details (Director-Specific)
- Service history: Director since 2025; current term runs to 2026 under declassification plan .
- Independence: As CEO, not independent; Board determined all non-employee directors are independent per Nasdaq/SEC .
- Committees: No committee memberships listed for the CEO; all committees chaired by independent directors .
- Director equity ownership guidelines apply to non-employee directors (3x annual cash retainer); not applicable for him as an employee-director .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: 2025 shift to ROIC-based PSUs + RSUs improves pay-performance alignment and reduces option-driven risk-taking; hedging/pledging prohibitions and stock ownership guidelines (5x salary for CEO) bolster alignment .
- Near-term supply from vesting: Large RSU cliffs begin in mid‑2026 (e.g., 145,518 shares vesting 6/7/2026 from the 291,036 grant; other 2023–2024 RSUs vest on 3‑year anniversaries), which can create sell‑pressure unless offset by 10b5‑1 programs or retention holds .
- Retention/termination economics: CEO severance is sizable (18–24 months’ salary plus 150–200% of target bonus, plus pro‑rated bonus and benefits), implying moderate change‑of‑control and turnover cost; equity does not automatically accelerate under the 2021 plan, mitigating windfall risk .
- Risk watch‑items: The 2024 bonus relied on Compensation Committee discretion to exclude bankruptcy and M&A effects, boosting payouts to 160.3% of target; repeated discretionary adjustments would be a red flag for pay discipline .
Sources: 2025 DEF 14A proxy (April 21, 2025) –.