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Brent K. Bilsland

Brent K. Bilsland

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer at HALLADOR ENERGYHALLADOR ENERGY
CEO
Executive
Board

About Brent K. Bilsland

Brent K. Bilsland (age 51) is Chairman of the Board, President, and CEO of Hallador Energy (HNRG); he has served as a director and President since 2009, became CEO in 2014, and was elected Chairman in 2018. He holds a degree from Butler University and previously led the Sunrise Coal subsidiary; he also chaired the Indiana Coal Council in 2015–2016 .
Under the SEC “Pay vs. Performance” table, Hallador’s TSR (from a $100 base at 12/31/2022) was $406.10 (2022), $359.35 (2023), and $465.45 (2024); net income was $18.1M (2022), $44.8M (2023), and $(226.1)M (2024) .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
Sunrise Coal, LLC (HNRG subsidiary)President2006–2017Led core operating subsidiary during key growth and operations phases
Hallador Energy CompanyPresident; Director2009–presentExecutive leadership and board oversight across coal and power businesses
Hallador Energy CompanyChief Executive Officer2014–presentSet corporate strategy; oversight of Sunrise Coal and Hallador Power
Hallador Energy CompanyChairman of the Board2018–presentCombined Chair/CEO role bridges management and board oversight
Knapper Corporation (private)Vice President1998–2004Corporate leadership experience prior to Hallador

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
Indiana Coal CouncilChairman2015–2016Industry advocacy and policy leadership

Fixed Compensation

Multi-year NEO compensation (Brent K. Bilsland) per Summary Compensation Table:

Metric (USD)FY 2023FY 2024
Salary$615,000 $658,846
Stock Awards$0 $1,800,000
All Other Compensation$13,200 $10,725
Total Compensation$997,800 $2,823,771

Additional current plan terms (two-year executive officer plan, 4/1/2024–3/31/2026):

ItemAmount
Annual Base Salary$675,000
Annual Target Bonus$462,000
Biennial RSU Grant Value$1,800,000

2024 annual bonus paid (April 2025): $354,200 .

Performance Compensation

The bonus framework ties to safety (Sunrise and Power), Adjusted EBITDA, and a discretionary component; base points approximate weightings (60% EBITDA, 20% discretionary, and four 5% safety measures) . The Compensation Committee reset 2025 EBITDA targets lower given weak power prices and Sunrise restructuring; 2025 EBITDA targets: Threshold $25.6M, Target $32.0M, Max $38.4M .

Metric (2024 sub-period)Weight (Base Points)ThresholdTargetMaximumActual/AssessmentPayout result
Safety (Sunrise) – Severity vs national avg5100%89%78%84% of national avg (beat target) 200% of target
Safety (Sunrise) – Violations per inspection day50.500.420.34Below 0.34 (beat target) 200% of target
Safety (Power) – Incident rate55.404.503.60Threshold achieved Paid (above threshold)
Safety (Power) – Safety inspection rate51.001.251.50Threshold achieved Paid (above threshold)
Adjusted EBITDA ($mm)60$34.3$49.0$63.7Did not meet goal No payout
Discretionary20N/AN/AN/ACommittee judgmentPaid at maximum

2025 reset for EBITDA (sub-period): Threshold $25.6M; Target $32.0M; Max $38.4M (60 base points) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

ItemDetail
Beneficial ownership1,555,285 shares (3.62% of 42,976,180 outstanding as of 4/9/2025); includes 467,897 owned by spouse and children
Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024)315,236 units (grant 9/6/2024); 89,179 units (grant 11/11/2022)
YE 2024 market value used$11.45 per share (12/31/2024)
RSU vesting schedules9/6/2024 grant vests ratably over three years beginning 3/31/2025; 11/11/2022 grant vests 3/31/2025
Options outstandingNone; company does not currently grant stock options
Anti-hedging/pledgingHedging prohibited; pledging prohibited unless Audit Committee approves; no exemptions granted since adoption
Ownership guidelines (NEOs)No formal stock ownership policy for NEOs; executives nevertheless hold significant shares

Implications for selling pressure: sizeable RSU vesting dates on 3/31/2025–2027 from 2024 grant could create periodic liquidity/events; 2022 grant vested 3/31/2025 .

Employment Terms

ProvisionKey terms
Severance (no-CIC)If terminated without cause or resigns for good reason: 18 months base salary + prior-year annual bonus; if resignation without good reason: 9 months of total (base+bonus)
Estimated severance (as of 12/31/2024)~$1,289,700 if terminated without cause/for good reason; ~$644,850 if resigns without good reason
Change-in-control retentionLump sum $1,181,250 if employed through closing; $1,350,000 if not engaged by acquirer post-transaction; pro-rated prior-year bonus also payable
RSU accelerationUnvested RSUs accelerate upon a change in control or if terminated without cause/resigns for good reason; value at 12/31/2024 would have been $4,630,552 (based on $11.45)
Post-CIC employment askIf employed at CIC, acquirer may require 3 months’ work for added retention equal to 25% of most recent annual bonus (if acquirer pays prevailing salary)
CIC definition and plan changeFor awards on/after 4/15/2025, CIC triggers on consummation (not just approval); unassumed awards vest at CIC; RSU Plan extended to 2035 and adds 2,000,000 shares to reserve (pending shareholder approval)

Board Governance (Director + CEO dual role)

AttributeDetail
Board serviceDirector since 2009; Chairman since 2018
Committee rolesNot listed as serving on Audit, Compensation, or Nominating; those committees composed of independent directors
Dual-role structureCompany combines Chair and CEO; Board cites benefits of direct operational insight; no Lead Independent Director due to Board size
IndependenceAll directors other than Mr. Bilsland are independent under Nasdaq/SEC rules
Meetings/attendance (2024)Board held 8 meetings; each director up for re-election attended ≥75% of board/committee meetings; independent directors meet in regular executive sessions

Director pay note: As an employee, Mr. Bilsland receives no director retainer (table shows “—”) .

Performance & Track Record Indicators

Metric202220232024
TSR – $100 initial (12/31/22 base)$406.10 $359.35 $465.45
Net income (loss)$18,105,000 $44,793,000 $(226,138,000)

Notable compensation actions and operating context:

  • 2024 EBITDA metric paid zero while safety metrics paid at 200% and discretionary paid at maximum; total 2024 annual bonus paid was $354,200 .
  • In March 2025, the Compensation Committee reset 2025 EBITDA performance targets downward in light of weaker power prices and Sunrise restructuring/idle mines .
  • Equity plan amendment proposes +2,000,000 RSUs and plan extension to 2035 (shareholder vote) .

Compensation Committee Analysis and Controls

  • Compensation Committee members (independent): Chair Charles R. Wesley IV; members David C. Hardie and David J. Lubar; oversees executive/director compensation and stock plans .
  • Clawback policy adopted per Rule 10D-1/Nasdaq; filed as Exhibit 97.1 to 2023 10-K .
  • Equity award practices: biennial RSU grants; seeks to avoid timing around material nonpublic information; no stock options currently .
  • Anti-hedging/anti-pledging policy in place; no pledging exemptions granted since adoption .
  • Director comp review in March 2025 used consultant F.W. Cook; increased non-employee director retainers and shifted 50% to fully vested stock .

Director Compensation (as applicable to Mr. Bilsland)

  • As an employee director, Mr. Bilsland receives no separate board retainer or committee fees (shown as “—” in 2024 director compensation table) .

Related-Party Transactions & Other Governance Notes

  • Policy requires Audit Committee advance approval of related-person transactions; independent committee composition affirmed .
  • Section 16(a) compliance: late filings noted for certain directors in 2024 (Gray, D. Hardie, Wesley); none cited for Mr. Bilsland .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment: Significant insider ownership (3.62%) and large unvested RSU balances align incentives but create periodic vest-driven supply around 3/31 in 2025–2027; anti-hedging/anti-pledging reduces alignment risk; no formal NEO ownership guidelines is a governance gap .
  • Pay-for-performance tension: 2024 EBITDA metric paid zero while discretionary paid at maximum; Committee resetting 2025 EBITDA targets lower signals execution challenges in coal/power cycle and increases discretion risk in payouts .
  • Retention and CIC economics: Meaningful cash retention at CIC ($1.18M–$1.35M) plus RSU acceleration can motivate continuity but may create event-driven payout overhang; CIC triggers refined to consummation for awards on/after 4/15/2025 .
  • Equity overhang: Proposed +2,000,000 RSU shares and plan extension to 2035 increase potential dilution; monitor shareholder vote and future grant cadence for supply risk .
  • Board structure: Combined Chair/CEO with no Lead Independent Director concentrates authority; offset by independent committees and regular executive sessions .

Citations: