
Antonio Neri
About Antonio Neri
Antonio F. Neri is President and CEO of Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE), serving as CEO since February 2018 and as an HPE director since 2018; he is not independent due to his executive role and holds no board committee assignments . He is 57 years old . Under his leadership, HPE discloses pay-versus-performance metrics showing HPE total shareholder return (TSR) value of a $100 investment rising to $256 by FY2024 (measurement period beginning Oct 31, 2020), with FY2024 GAAP net earnings of $2,579M and non-GAAP net earnings of $2,655M . HPE maintains an independent Chair structure (Patricia F. Russo), separating Chair and CEO roles, which mitigates dual-role governance concerns .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| HPE | President & CEO | 2018–present | Oversaw development of innovations (HPE Apollo, Superdome X, Synergy) and strategic acquisitions (e.g., Aruba, SGI, Nimble, Cray, Silver Peak, Zerto) to advance HPC/AI and hybrid cloud strategy . |
| HPE | President | 2017–2018 | Executive leadership of company operations prior to CEO transition . |
| HPE | EVP & GM, Enterprise Group | 2015–2017 | Drove enterprise portfolio strategy across servers, storage, networking and services . |
| HP Co. (pre-split) | EVP & GM, Enterprise Group | 2014–2015 | Led enterprise businesses through separation planning . |
| HP Co. | SVP & GM, Servers; concurrently SVP & GM, Networking | 2013–2014; Networking concurrently in 2014 | Managed core compute and networking product lines . |
| HP Co. | SVP & GM, Technology Services | 2011–2013 | Led global services organization . |
| HP Co. | VP, Customer Services, Personal Systems Group | 2007–2011 | Customer support leadership; joined HP in 1996 . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Elevance Health, Inc. | Director | Current | Listed as Antonio Neri’s other current public company board; committee roles not disclosed in HPE proxy . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 1,275,000 | 1,300,000 | 1,300,000 |
| Target Annual Incentive (% of salary) | — | — | 200% (Target $2,600,000; threshold $780,000; max $5,200,000) |
| Actual Annual Incentive Paid ($) | 2,352,980 | 3,053,361 | 2,350,318 |
| PfR Actual Payout (% of target) | — | — | 90% and payout formula disclosed (Corporate/BU performance and MBO modifier) |
Notes: FY2024 annual incentive is determined by Base Salary × Target Incentive % × Corporate/BU performance % × MBO modifier; Neri’s FY2024 MBO modifier was 120% and the actual payout equaled 90% of target, amounting to $2,350,318 .
Performance Compensation
Long-term Incentive Grants (FY2024 cycle)
| Award type | Grant date | Shares/Units | Grant-date fair value ($) | Vesting schedule | Performance measures |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSU (annual) | 12/7/2023 | 496,278 | 8,000,001 | 1/3 each year over 3 years, service-based | N/A |
| PARSU (annual) | 12/7/2023 | Target 496,278; Threshold 198,511; Max 992,556 | 8,136,478 (probable) | 50% after 2-year period; 50% after 3-year period, subject to performance and service | Non-GAAP net income growth (internal goals) with ±20% TSR modifier vs S&P 500 |
FY2023 PARSU Segment One Payout (performance period ended Oct 31, 2024)
| Component | Result |
|---|---|
| Non-GAAP net income growth (2-year avg achievement) | 100.0% of target (FY2023 achieved 200%; FY2024 0% after baseline revision due to partial H3C divestiture; two-year average 100%) |
| Relative TSR vs S&P 500 | 66th percentile ⇒ 1.079x modifier |
| Final payout | 107.9% of target |
Pay-for-performance structure (select governance features)
- Clawbacks: Mandatory restatement-based recovery for Section 16 officers; broader discretionary clawback for misconduct beyond NYSE requirements .
- No options/repricing: HPE did not grant options under the 2021 Plan and prohibits option/SAR repricing without stockholder approval .
- FY2025 annual incentive design change: 80% based on HPE revenue, non-GAAP operating profit (earnings from operations), and ARR; 20% individual MBO; LTI program consistent with FY2024 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (12/31/2024) | 2,085,726 HPE shares; less than 1% of outstanding shares |
| Unvested RSUs (as of 10/31/2024) | 148,055 (12/9/2021 grant; $2,885,592), 312,726 (12/8/2022; $6,095,030), 510,163 (12/7/2023; $9,943,077) |
| Unearned PARSUs outstanding | 243,373 (12/8/2022; $4,743,340), 510,163 (12/7/2023; $9,943,077); all values at $19.49 close on 10/31/2024 |
| Options | Neri and NEOs hold no options |
| Ownership guidelines | CEO must hold 7× base salary; all NEOs met or are on track; guidelines include directly held shares, 401(k) shares, unvested time-based RSUs (options and unvested PARSUs excluded) |
| Hedging/pledging | Hedging prohibited; pledging and margin accounts generally prohibited for executives and directors |
Implications: A sizable pipeline of time-based RSU and PARSU settlements through FY2026 suggests periodic sale capacity once awards vest; absence of options reduces exercise-driven selling pressure, and anti-hedging/pledging policies reduce alignment risk .
Employment Terms
| Scenario (as of 10/31/2024) | Cash severance | RSUs | PARSUs | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not for cause | 7,807,444 (2.0× base + 3-yr avg bonus, subject to cap) | 8,476,820 | 7,305,174 | 23,589,438 |
| Change in control + qualifying termination (double trigger) | 7,807,444 | 18,923,699 (full acceleration) | 14,686,417 (target/greater of actual vs pro rata per terms) | 41,417,560 |
Key provisions:
- Severance Plan for Executive Officers (SPEO): CEO multiple 2.0× base plus 3-year average annual incentive; pro-rata annual bonus; pro-rata equity vesting where applicable; lump-sum COBRA stipend (18× premium differential) .
- Change in control: Double-trigger equity vesting; if awards are not assumed in a non-survivor CIC, acceleration occurs at transaction close with PARSUs at greater of actual vs pro-rata target .
- Retirement eligibility: Upon retirement (age/service thresholds), time-based RSUs continue vesting on schedule; PARSUs vest at end of period subject to final performance; Neri eligible for Netherlands-related pension programs referenced by HPE .
Board Governance
- Role and independence: Neri is CEO and an employee director; he is not independent. HPE’s Board is led by independent Chair Patricia F. Russo; all committees are entirely independent, and CEO does not serve on committees, addressing CEO–Chair dual-role concerns .
- Board service: Neri has served on HPE’s board since 2018; overall board/committee attendance rate was ~96% in FY2024 (aggregate statistic) .
- Director pay: As CEO, Neri receives no additional compensation for board service .
Director Compensation (for context; CEO as director)
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| CEO director fees | Not paid; CEO receives no separate compensation for board service |
Compensation Structure Analysis
| Feature | Observation |
|---|---|
| Cash vs equity mix | Majority “at-risk” and equity-based; 90%+ of CEO target total direct compensation is at-risk (per CD&A narrative) . |
| Shift to RSUs vs options | HPE grants RSUs and PARSUs; no stock options granted under 2021 Plan; reduces exercise-price leverage risk . |
| Performance metrics | PARSUs tied to multiyear non-GAAP net income growth with TSR modifier; FY2025 annual bonus to be aligned to revenue, non-GAAP operating profit, and ARR, plus MBO . |
| Metric adjustments | FY2024 included a modification to fiscal 2022 PARSU non-GAAP net income goal measurement and baseline revisions related to Russia/Belarus and H3C divestiture; highlights committee discretion and design flexibility . |
| Clawbacks and policies | Robust clawback, anti-hedging/pledging, double-trigger CIC; no repricing . |
| Peer benchmarking | HRC Committee targets pay around market median; uses FW Cook as independent consultant; annual peer review . |
Say-on-Pay & Shareholder Engagement
- Advisory vote: Board recommends FOR the executive compensation program; HPE emphasizes engagement and governance best practices .
- Board outreach and virtual annual meeting infrastructure detailed; continuous engagement program cited .
Related Party Transactions and Red Flags
- Related party transactions: NGSR Committee oversight with policies; HPE reports FY2024 related transactions were arm’s length; no material executive-related conflicts disclosed .
- Risk indicators: Anti-hedging/pledging, no options/repricing, robust clawback; no tax gross-ups; director/exec stock ownership guidelines .
- Perquisites: FY2024 included limited perqs; Neri’s personal aircraft usage reported at $67,319; executive protection program initiated early FY2025 .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Technical/operator background: More than two decades at HP/HPE; led major product platforms and acquisitions in HPC, networking, and storage; broad strategic and operational expertise across enterprise IT .
- Board skills matrix: Neri’s skills span business development, executive leadership, operations, technological innovation, risk and compliance, among others .
Equity and Compensation Tables (Selected Multi-Year)
| Year | Stock awards ($) | Non-equity incentive ($) | All other comp ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2022 | 13,386,710 | 2,352,980 | 351,675 | 17,366,365 |
| FY2023 | 15,577,803 | 3,053,361 | 135,385 | 20,066,549 |
| FY2024 | 17,646,855 (incl. PARSU modification charge) | 2,350,318 | 78,799 | 21,411,197 |
Employment & Contracts Snapshot
| Element | Term |
|---|---|
| Executive employment agreements | HPE does not enter into individual executive employment agreements; relies on SPEO . |
| Non-compete/non-solicit | Not specifically disclosed in proxy; SPEO governs severance economics . |
| Deferred compensation/pension | Change in pension value for FY2024 reported at $35,225; references to Netherlands pension/IRG for Neri . |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: Significant unvested RSUs and PARSUs create strong multi-year retention hooks; 7× salary ownership guideline and anti-hedging/pledging policy support alignment with shareholders .
- Selling pressure: The three-year RSU vesting cadence and 2/3-year PARSU schedules imply periodic settlement-related liquidity needs; absence of options reduces forced exercise-driven supply .
- Change-in-control costs: Double-trigger vesting and 2.0× cash multiple imply substantial CIC costs ($41.4M total modeled as of 10/31/2024), relevant for M&A scenarios and potential deal premiums .
- Pay-for-performance: Multiyear PARSU design tied to non-GAAP net income and TSR; FY2023 PARSU segment paid at 107.9%, demonstrating payout sensitivity to both internal growth and market-relative returns .
- Governance quality: Independent Chair, fully independent committees, robust clawbacks, and no option repricing limit governance risk signals often scrutinized by investors .