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Wayne “Gil” West

Wayne “Gil” West

Chief Executive Officer at HERTZ GLOBAL HOLDINGSHERTZ GLOBAL HOLDINGS
CEO
Executive
Board

About Wayne “Gil” West

Wayne “Gil” West (age 64) has served as Hertz Global Holdings’ Chief Executive Officer and a director since April 2024. He previously served as COO of Cruise (2021–2023) and as Senior Executive Vice President/COO of Delta Air Lines (2014–2020), with earlier roles at Delta and as President & CEO of Laidlaw Transit Services (2006–2007) . Under West’s leadership, HTZ returned to EPS profitability in Q3 2025 with $2.478B revenue, $184M net income ($0.42 diluted EPS), Adjusted Corporate EBITDA of $190M, and vehicle utilization of 84%—a multi-year high—reflecting execution on the “Back-to-Basics” transformation .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic focus/impact (as disclosed)
Cruise LLCChief Operating Officer2021–2023Executive leadership at self-driving car company
Delta Air LinesSenior EVP & Chief Operating Officer2014–2020Senior operations leadership at a global airline
Delta Air LinesSenior Vice President2008–2014Senior leadership at a global airline
Laidlaw Transit ServicesPresident & CEO2006–2007Led transportation services company

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsNotes
Virgin Galactic Holdings (NYSE: SPCE)DirectorFeb 2021–presentPublic company directorship
Forward Air CorporationDirectorOct 2018–May 2021; Feb 2024–Jun 2024Two separate board stints
Genesis Park Acquisition Corp.DirectorOct 2020–Sep 2021SPAC board service

Fixed Compensation

Metric2024
Base salary rate$1,500,000
Target annual incentive (% of base)150%
Target annual incentive ($)$2,250,000 (rate × 150%)
Actual 2024 bonus paid (total)$1,687,500 (comprised of $1,181,250 Bonus + $506,250 NEIP)

Per employment agreement, 2024 bonus guaranteed at least 112.5% of base (i.e., $1,687,500), prorated for start date .

Performance Compensation

2024 Sign‑On Equity (in lieu of 2024–2025 LTIP participation)

GrantGrant DateFormShares (#)VestingGrant Date Fair Value ($)
Sign-on equity (part 1)4/1/2024Time-based RSUs1,910,369Ratable over 3 years from start date, continued service required 14,690,738
Sign-on equity (part 2)4/1/2024Stock price-based PSUs2,292,8643-year time vesting plus stock price hurdles, with up to 5-year performance window 17,632,124

West did not participate in the 2024 or 2025 long-term incentive program; eligibility under regular LTIP resumes in 2026 (anticipated at least $8,000,000 grant-date value per year) .

PSU Stock-Price Hurdles and Status

Tranche90-Day VWAP HurdleShares (#)Status as of 12/31/2024
1$10.00458,572Not achieved as of 2024 year-end
2$12.50458,573Not achieved as of 2024 year-end
3$15.00458,573Not achieved as of 2024 year-end
4$17.50458,573Not achieved as of 2024 year-end
5$20.00458,573Not achieved as of 2024 year-end

Termination treatment: If terminated without cause or resigns for good reason, RSUs receive 12 months’ service credit; PSUs receive 12 months of service credit and 12 months of additional performance eligibility. Following a change in control and such termination, time-based RSUs fully vest and PSUs vest based on stock value at change in control (i.e., double-trigger acceleration) .

Equity Ownership & Alignment

Beneficial and Outstanding Equity (as of 3/24/2025 or 12/31/2024, as indicated)

CategoryAmountNotes
Beneficial ownership886,789 shares (<1% of outstanding) Officer/director table; asterisk denotes <1%
Unvested time-based RSUs (12/31/2024)1,910,369Market value $6,991,951
Unearned stock price PSUs (12/31/2024)2,292,864Payout value $8,391,882 if earned
Stock optionsNone disclosedNo options listed in outstanding awards
  • Stock ownership guidelines: executives generally have 5 years to reach target; until met, sales limited to 50% of net shares from vesting/exercise; as of proxy date, all continuing NEOs either met the guideline or are within the transition period .
  • Hedging/pledging: prohibited for employees, officers, and directors under Insider Trading Policy .

Employment Terms

TermKey Economics/Provisions
Agreement and startEmployment agreement dated March 15, 2024; CEO effective April 1, 2024 .
Cash compBase salary $1.5M; target annual incentive 150% of base; 2024 actual bonus not less than 112.5% of base (contractual) .
Severance (no CIC)If terminated without cause or resigns for good reason: cash severance equal to 2× base salary + target bonus; pro‑rata bonus (based on actual performance); Company pays incremental COBRA premium; outplacement up to $25,000 .
Severance (with CIC)Same cash multiple (2×) plus equity acceleration: time‑based RSUs vest fully; PSUs vest based on stock value at CIC; benefits/outplacement similar (double trigger) .
Equity on qualifying termination12 months additional service credit to RSUs; 12 months service and performance eligibility for PSUs; enhanced vesting if termination occurs following CIC .
Restrictive covenantsNon-solicit employees 6 months; non-solicit clients 12 months; non-compete 2 years post‑employment .
PerquisitesEligibility for senior executive benefits; up to $30,000 legal fee reimbursement for agreement; reimbursement for business use of private aircraft; life insurance (at least $5,000,000 death benefit; not provided in 2024); lifetime free car rental privileges for him (and spouse) if employed through Dec 31, 2024 .

Board Governance (Director Service, Committees, Independence)

ItemDetail
Board serviceDirector since April 2024 (employee director) .
IndependenceNot independent (employee CEO); Board maintains majority independent directors per Nasdaq rules .
Board leadershipRoles of Chair and CEO separated in April 2024; independent Chair: Colin Farmer .
CommitteesWest is not listed on Audit, Compensation, or Governance Committees; committee rosters exclude him .
AttendanceBoard held 14 meetings in 2024; all directors met ≥75% attendance .
Executive sessionsIndependent executive session at every regular meeting; independent Chair presides .

Dual-role implications: While West is both CEO and a director, the Board mitigates concentration of power via an independent Chair and fully independent standing committees (Audit, Compensation, Governance), despite “controlled company” eligibility. The Board elects not to use controlled-company exemptions .

Director Compensation (for context; applies to non‑employee directors)

Component2024 Amount
Annual retainer (non‑employee directors)$275,000 total: $100,000 cash + $175,000 RSUs .
Committee Chair retainersAudit $50,000; Compensation $25,000; Governance $15,000 .

Director stock ownership guidelines apply to non‑employee directors with five-year compliance windows; until met, sales generally limited to ≤50% of equity holdings .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Pay mix and sign-on structure: 2024 compensation was heavily equity-based via sign‑on awards, with 54.55% in stock price‑contingent PSUs and 45.45% in 3‑year RSUs—explicitly designed to align with sustained share price performance and stockholder value creation .
  • Shift to price‑based PSUs: PSU tranches require 90‑day VWAP hurdles of $10/$12.50/$15/$17.50/$20; none were achieved as of 12/31/24, indicating high performance thresholds and no payout absent durable stock performance .
  • Governance checks: Stock ownership guidelines, hedging/pledging prohibitions, and a Clawback Policy are in place, supporting alignment and risk control .

Performance & Track Record Under West

MetricQ3 2024Q3 2025YoY
Total revenues ($M)2,5762,478(4)%
Net income (loss) ($M)(1,332)184NM
Diluted EPS ($)(4.34)0.42NM
Adjusted Corporate EBITDA ($M)(157)190NM
Vehicle utilization (%)8284+2 pts

Management messaging emphasized completion of a transformative fleet refresh, “Back‑to‑Basics” execution, record utilization since 2018, and ~50% YoY NPS increase in North America during Q3 2025 .

Compensation Peer Group (used for 2024; unchanged for 2025)

Peer Companies
Alaska Air Group; AutoNation; Avis Budget Group; CarMax; Carvana; Element Fleet Management; Group 1 Automotive; Hilton Worldwide; JetBlue; Lithia Motors; Norwegian Cruise Line; Penske Automotive; Royal Caribbean; Ryder Systems; Sonic Automotive; Southwest Airlines; Travel + Leisure; United Rentals .
  • FW Cook serves as the independent compensation consultant; Committee assessed independence and found no conflicts .
  • At the time of 2024 peer selection, HTZ was at the 36th percentile in revenue and 60th percentile in market cap within the group .

Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback

  • 2024 say‑on‑pay approval: approximately 97% in favor; Committee maintained the core design given strong support .
  • Controlled company context: Despite qualifying as a controlled company under Nasdaq rules (CK Amarillo ~58.9% ownership as of 3/24/2025), HTZ elects not to rely on governance exemptions .

Employment Terms – Potential Payouts (Illustrative table from proxy)

ScenarioCash SeverancePro‑Rata BonusEquity AccelerationBenefits/Other
Involuntary without cause$7,500,000$1,687,500$2,330,650COBRA premium differential $19,055; Outplacement $25,000
Good reason resignation$7,500,000$1,687,500$2,330,650COBRA premium differential $19,055
Involuntary without cause in connection with CIC$7,500,000$1,687,500$6,991,951COBRA premium differential $19,055; Outplacement $25,000
Good reason in connection with CIC$7,500,000$1,687,500$6,991,951COBRA premium differential $19,055

Amounts reflect values as presented in the 2025 proxy statement; see “Potential Payments upon Termination or Change in Control” .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and upside sensitivity: A majority of West’s sign‑on equity is tied to multi‑year stock‑price hurdles (90‑day VWAP), which directly aligns realized pay with durable shareholder returns; no tranche vested as of YE 2024, indicating meaningful hurdles remain .
  • Vesting and selling pressure: Three‑year ratable RSU vesting begins from his April 2024 start date; ownership guidelines restrict selling more than 50% of net shares until compliance is achieved, tempering near‑term selling pressure from RSU settlements .
  • Retention and downside protection: Severance economics (2× salary+target bonus, plus equity vesting accommodations and COBRA payments) and double‑trigger CIC terms reduce retention risk but add cost on termination; strong restrictive covenants (2‑year non‑compete) protect the franchise post‑employment .
  • Governance mitigants for dual role: Independent Board Chair, fully independent committees, and anti‑hedging/pledging policies address potential conflicts from West’s CEO/director dual role, even in a controlled-company context .
  • Early execution evidence: Q3 2025 marks a return to EPS profitability, improved utilization, and significant Adjusted Corporate EBITDA improvement, supporting positive execution signals under West’s tenure; sustainability through cycle remains the key determinant for PSU vesting and longer‑term pay outcomes .